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Abstract 
Social alienation and the struggle to belong in the South African society are not only matters of 
political discourse but touch the practical sphere of everyday life in the respective places of 
residence. This thesis therefore approaches the entanglements of religion and space within the 
processes of re-ordering African indigeneity in post-apartheid South Africa. It asks how 
conversion to Islam constitutes the longing for a post-colonial and post-racialized African self. 
This study specifically engages with dynamics surrounding Black and Muslim practices and 
identity politics in formerly demarcated Black African areas. Here, even after the official end of 
apartheid, spatial racialization and social inequalities persist. Modes of orderings rooted in 
colonialism and apartheid still define what orderly belonging and African indigeneity mean. 
Thus, the inhabitants of those spaces find themselves in situations every day in which their 
habitat continuously ascribes oppression and racialization. The post-1994 promise for equal 
citizenship seems to be slowly fading, becoming a broken promise, on whose fulfillment the 
majority of people who were previously—by official definition and demarcation—only granted 
the right of being a migratory workforce, sojourners in the White spaces, are still waiting. 
Against this background, this thesis engages with the attempts to reformulate and recreate 
African indigeneity on the basis of a counter-hegemonic ideology of being Black and Muslim. It 
pays attention to the emergence and articulation of a Black Muslim indigeneity that is based on 
bringing together a pre-colonial idealization of the African self with global ideologies of Muslim 
Blackness. With a regional focus on KwaZulu-Natal and a specific look at the developments in 
and around the urban and peri-urban areas of eThekwini (Durban), it features particular case 
studies which highlight religious territorialization on the one hand and attempts to transgress 
the social and spatial modes of orderings by converting to Islam on the other. Here, South 
Africans once classified as Black African seek a common modus operandi in Muslim Blackness in 
order to break with orderly indigeneity as ascribed, defined, and structured by colonialism and 
apartheid, even going as far as to out-migrate from the lived-in places which continue to be 
experienced daily as unsettling and uprooting. With preparations being made to create a new 
settlement and establish a new social order, the unfulfilled promise of post-apartheid will be left 
behind, once and for all.  
This makes the featured case a peculiar, though so far under-researched, example: Throughout 
the history of colonization and especially during the time of apartheid, the practice of Islam was 
strongly interwoven with a changing but persistent struggle for identity and belonging. Being 
Muslim became oppressively obscured as it was directed as an institutional term towards such 
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politically created population categories as Indian or Coloured. This implied a very structural 
and spatial effect, as the communal practice of Islam was limited to those respective residential 
areas. Thus, the former Black African areas of South Africa are important places to engage 
with: Segregated and socio-spatially ordered over decades of colonialism, racism, and apartheid, 
these vast areas of relatively high-density living conditions and desolated livelihoods 
characterize the surroundings of every major city in South Africa. The duality of White urban 
core and Black outskirts represents a spatial and social pattern whose inequalities persist up until 
now. But these places also came to manifest a stratification of religious practices and orderly 
religious belonging, as orderly African indigeneity was unquestionably linked to Christianity, while 
Islamic institutions were almost non-existent within the Black African areas. The case of 
conversions to Islam among the indigenous African population of South Africa also exemplifies 
the paradoxical untouchability of religiously territorialized space within the ideology of 
apartheid, which enabled some to maintain an exclusive sense of belonging to their former 
places of residence and a practical connection to the land from which they had been forcibly 
removed. By moving beyond the specific cases, the ideas and practices of Blackness and 
Muslimness are discussed in light of diasporic identity formations in relation to their colonial 
connotations, thereby opening up a perspective on creating an indigeneity transgressive to the 
conditions of everyday life.  
This thesis is informed by an interdisciplinary perspective of cultural geography and Islamic 
studies and highlights how a racialized Black Islam has been invoked in order to reclaim 
authority over the religious and political scale of the African self. Building on qualitative research 
and the analysis of religious Black Muslim ideology, it connects the struggle to belong within a 
post-colonial society to the utopia of a Black Muslim indigeneity as part of a global Black and Muslim 
community. It will be argued that South African Muslim Blackness is the result of global travels 
of anti-Western and anti-colonial ideologies with an Islamic framework and their subsequent 
translation into the realm of social and spatial orderings. The self of the African convert to 
Islam, culturally inscribed by racialized path dependencies and bodily ascribed by racist social 
realities, is translated into the Islamic counter-hegemonic narrative. Black Islam becomes a state 
of exception, a heterotopia to the daily lived-in narrative of identity politics, and makes 
transgression of persisting modes of social and spatial ordering possible. 
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Black Islam South Africa: Religion 
and the Struggle to Belong in an 
Unsettled Society 
Like so many other parts in the manifold mosaic of society and space in South Africa, Islam as 
a practiced religion, political dimension, and way of life came to the southern tip of the African 
continent through movement and mobility, traveling along the most intricate influences of 
global historical forces in this region: colonialism, imperialism, slavery, and crucially apartheid. 
Islam first arrived in South Africa through the colonial authorities of the Dutch, who had slaves, 
servants, and political agitators-turned-prisoners transported from the Indonesian archipelago 
to the outpost of the Dutch East Indian Trading company at the Cape of Good Hope. With 
them, the Dutch brought not only a considerable number of Muslims  but also—through the 
accompanying Islamic practices and preaching—a realm of alternative orderings, which 
unfolded a force of attraction for other oppressed groups and individuals as well. Although the 
colonial administration largely restricted Islam to the private sphere, it was those unanticipated 
side effects of Europe’s conflicting powerhouses, with their territorial claims and proxy conflicts 
around the globe, that contributed to changing circumstances: With the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the British Empire took over as the dominating power at the Cape of Good 
Hope, igniting a long and violent conflict between the ‘new’ imperial force and the Dutch Boer 
settler colonialists, which eventually paved the way for a cohesive political identity of Afrikaner 
nationalism and the grand narrative of the Great Trek as the religiously mythologized 
foundation of the Afrikaner people (cf. DU TOIT 1983; GILIOMEE 1983). Islam gained a 
flourishing momentum under the changing circumstances of local and regional government and 
the new modes of ordering religious matters. Muslim communities at the Cape thrived in social 
and economic terms, while the newly established passage connecting the British colony of Natal 
on the eastern coast with the Indian subcontinent led to South Africa’s second major site of 
Muslim migration to South Africa. Without a doubt, these transcontinental mobilities 
contributed to the stratified development of Islam and Muslims communities, as did the slave 
trade along both coastal regions of the African continent and last but not least migration by 
land, especially in the twentieth century, which was strongly linked to the migratory workforce 
3 
of the gold mines on the Witwatersrand. Nevertheless, the overall presence and representation 
of what Islam in South Africa is today, in cultural, political, social, and economic terms, is 
characterized by those two regional hotspots: the Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 
As is the case for so many social elements, counter to the logics of White1 European oppression 
and domination, Islam remained. Muslims found a position within the racialized and segregated 
conditions of daily life—or rather were assigned to one—in social, political, and spatial terms. 
All three dimensions are particularly important when looking at cultural developments within 
the South African sphere of historically evolved, spatially inscribed, and subjectively embodied 
politics of domination, oppression, exploitation, and segregation. In particular, the rule of 
apartheid from 1948 to 1994 proved to be a ruthless—though orderly governed—racism based 
on the cultural-political differentiation which, as a result of the conflict with the British 
territories, had been inscribed in Afrikaner state policy: “privileging whites as whites and 
exploiting nonwhites as nonwhites” (MACDONALD 2006: 38). The socio-spatial path 
dependencies South Africa inherited—a most questionable ‘cultural legacy’ of the Europeans, 
those “unsettled settlers” (BADEROON 2005: 91)—represent a spatial and societal set-up that is 
still characterized by a constant flux of longing for belonging and contestation of place-making 
and finding home. For one part of the society, the White minority of colonial descendants, these 
issues have been and are still being negotiated within the framework of a discursive and 
performative fluidity of ethnicity. For the other part, the Non-White majority, which was 
progressively divided into separate groups along the color-line and projected as socially 
homogenous, the longing for belonging continues to be a monolithic struggle that is defined by 
race (cf. NASH 2003: 186). And even though the history of colonialism and the racialized regime 
of apartheid have finally come to an end, the daily lived conditions have only gradually changed. 
Ultimately, a post-colony, as MALULEKE (2008: 124) puts it, “is still a colony. We find ourselves 
in a situation in which the colony continues even after the colonial period.” 
Thus, in the post-colony of post-apartheid, the promise of the Rainbow Nation is fading away, 
while Neville Alexander’s vision of the Groot Gariep (cf. HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017; 
TAYOB 1999b), the one unifying river for all those different streams, remains a distant prospect. 
A shared idea of belonging and a foundation for a common narrative have failed to materialize, 
 
1Making use of racialized population categories in scholarly work always entails the contingency of their reproduction. 
Nevertheless, ascriptions such as Black, White, Coloured, Indian, Bantu, or African are of crucial importance for the 
presented discussion, as they have outlived colonialism in South Africa and remained a social and cultural reality 
beyond the formal end of apartheid. 
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as have the subsequent aims of a cohesive model of society which broadly integrates the people 
living in South Africa2. Instead, the door seems to be wide open for fractured developments 
along reinterpreted, reaffirmed and newly founded ethnical lines. As DODSON (2000: 156) 
writes: 
“[…] South Africans who once rejected state-imposed ethnic classification are now 
actively reclaiming and reasserting their ethnicity. […] Geographical strategies, such as 
choosing the community in which one lives, are an important element in such cultural 
reorientation. Certainly the forces of fragmentation, such as Zulu nationalism, Muslim 
fundamentalism, and the call for an Afrikaner volkstaat, are at least as strong as the forces 
of unification, and the future cultural geography of the country will be determined by 
the ways in which these opposing forces play themselves out.”  
Islam in the new South Africa needs to be assessed along these lines as well. Having been affected 
by the oppressive politics of apartheid, with its racial classification and spatial segregation, 
Muslims in South Africa have maintained and even established exclusive positions within the 
larger structure of society—in spiritual, social, practical and territorial terms. Being Muslim has 
become a sanction and an opportunity at the same time. And as the positions of the different 
Muslim groups and Islamic institutions towards the struggle against apartheid differed, so too 
do their positions towards getting involved in the country’s ongoing process of social and 
cultural transformation. While such debates are mainly situated in those parts of the society in 
which Muslims are commonly expected to be found—the former categories of “Coloured” and 
“Indian”—Islam has gained presence in places that were previously solely associated with 
Christianity, i.e. the areas in the Black African townships and homelands of South Africa once 
classified and territorialized for the indigenous African population. Here, conversion has taken 
place, and Islam has been embraced by people who seem to articulate a change in faith, moving 
beyond the religion of the oppressor into a realm of challenging the modes of order, while 
striving for an authentic and a liberated African self. The struggle to belong in South Africa’s 
unsettled society continues to take place within the realm of Black Islam. 
Now, Black Islam is not a socially unifying category, nor are African Muslims in South Africa a 
homogenous or in any way coherent community. The same applies to Muslims in South African 
in general (see section “Islam in South Africa: An-Other Order?” below). Black is understood as 
a sphere of specific experiences on the level of the individual, as well as of the group, which 
 
2JOHNSTON (2014) dedicated a whole (and quite entertaining) chapter to asking: “Do South Africans Have a Shared 
Life?” In the face of his rather descriptive approach, the facts he presents provide the reader with a broad impression 
of the diversity that any attempted cohesive politics must address. 
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combines the particular historical and socio-spatial path dependencies in South Africa with the 
realities of repeated discrimination, oppression, and a shared history of suffering (cf. OAKES 
2007; GILROY 1993). Islam is the mode of expression, the self-proclaimed state of exception, 
which makes resistance to the persistent inequalities and injustices possible—or at least projects 
the hope of doing so. Black Islam is therefore understood as a heuristic opening to shed light onto 
spiritually and religiously moved and motivated developments happening against the backdrop 
of the systematic exploitation, oppression, and dispossession of the majority population of South 
Africa—all those once deemed Non-White by racial classification.  
This is not a study about Muslims converts in South Africa but rather about the realm of 
conversion to Islam as a mode of challenging the social and spatial orderings. The research is 
therefore located across (a) the fields of colonialism, apartheid, and religion, (b) the distinct 
sphere of Muslim political identity and historical path dependencies of Islam in South Africa, 
and (c) the contemporary positionality of Muslim converts among the indigenous African 
population, with the specific regional focus on KwaZulu-Natal. The central research objectives 
deal with self-proclaimed empowerment and post-colonial liberation as Black and Muslim. 
Therefore, the historical aspects highlighted throughout this study are important for the overall 
contextualization, though they are secondary to the specific focus of the research at hand, which 
concentrates on meaningful cultural practices and political representations of Blackness within 
the lived-in places (cf. TUAN 1991: 105; RELPH 1976) of converts to Islam. Research on conversion 
entails an epistemological dilemma, which is evident within the word conversion itself. 
Conversion is a state of in-between-ness, of transgressing orders. Researching conversion reveals 
the act’s means, representations, and purposeful re-orderings, in relation to neither the social 
field that is left behind nor the one that is embraced. Instead, the focus rests on the cultural 
significations and social significance of conversion as a prolonged ritual, as meaningful practice 
in the lived-in places. 
In this regard, research on conversion to Islam among the indigenous population of South 
Africa is not to be understood as a venture into religious aspects but as a confrontation with a 
unique expression of breaking with the oppressive and brutal history that has long been endured 
and persists in daily lived experiences. Black Islam South Africa is therefore constitutive of modes 
of differentiation to the racially classified self and, at the same time, of empowerment towards 
an understanding of indigeneity, of being or becoming African, beyond colonial categories.  
Breaking with White colonialist discrimination, dispossession, and oppression by engaging with 
the social, spatial, and political ideas of Black and Muslim may spur comparative thoughts on 
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similar developments in the United States since the Civil Rights Movement. Yet, as 
FREDRICKSON (1995: 298) clarifies in his study of Black ideologies in the U.S. and South Africa:  
“[T]he African-American influences were less important than the local conditions and 
indigenous currents of thought. The reading of Stokely, Carmichael, Eldridge, Cleaver, 
Malcolm X, James Cone, and other American Black Power advocates was clearly a 
stimulus, but the adoption of African-American concepts and slogans was selective rather 
than wholesale, and the ideas that were appropriated were often reinterpreted to fit 
South African conditions.”  
The same applies to Black and Muslim ideas of counter-hegemonic ideology. Here, Black Islam 
could easily be linked to developments on the other side of the Black Atlantic (see GEBAUER & 
HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016), and such travels of ideas most definitely took place, as will be 
presented within the cases of this study. However, it was mainly the da’wah activities of locally 
established institutions, the influence of African Muslim migrants and, as one of the case studies 
featured here presents in detail, the ideological influence of global Sufi currents that made Islam 
in the Black African townships an integral part of the manifold religious landscape of South 
Africa.  
The appropriation and reinterpretation of ideas of Black African resistance, liberation, and 
empowerment in light of the local, regional, and national struggles for self-proclaimed 
indigeneity can be seen as a form of cultural-political bricolage  (LÉVI-STRAUSS 1966; cf. JACKSON 
1989b: 175), a do-it-yourself attitude that—as will be analyzed in the featured case studies—
exemplifies the history of the resistance to South Africa’s White supremacy. Such appropriation 
and reinterpretation can also be found in religious terms within the influence of Black liberation 
theology on the South African struggle. This is especially interesting as counter-hegemonic 
Blackness has to be seen in the light of Black Consciousness, South Africa’s distinct ideological 
foundation for Non-White resistance. Moving into such a direction, this study engages with 
Black African modes of challenging the social and spatial order within a South African society 
that has been influenced by the religion of Islam. Here as well, research is still rare: 
“[I]t is still striking that so little attention is given to conversion in the vast African 
townships—and that is almost exclusively delegated to Muslims from various parts of 
Africa. While the world of Islam in South Africa and elsewhere is indeed a universe of 
debate and contention, the question of how Muslims will fit into a future South Africa 
has barely been addressed.” (HANSEN 2012: 259) 
In this regard, this study tries to shed light on a field which is presently dominated by overviews 
and anecdotes, as well as valuable though less critical accounts by actors from the field, i.e. from 
an intra-Islamic perspective. TAYOB (1999a: 96f.) points the way when he writes: 
“Africans embraced Islam and founded communities and mosques, but insufficient 
research exists on the nature of African Muslim communities themselves. Fewer in 
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number and less economically successful, their institutions are not as easily visible. […] 
The new communities, founded on the basis of the past forty years of conversion 
campaigns, are even less well known. These await greater appreciation from scholars.” 
The research presented here will be less about specific communities and more about the 
meaning of conversion as a practice and representation, as well as its implications for the modes 
of order and ordering in post-apartheid South Africa. 
From a cultural geography perspective, religion encompasses both practices and material 
presence; therefore, it provides a rich and, in the case of South Africa, under-researched field 
of inquiry (DODSON 2000: 145). Conversion not only points to a shift in terms of religious 
affiliation and spiritual belonging but also very much to a change in cultural practice, 
experience, and signification. Yet these identity politics are far more subtle, far more indirect in 
terms of the ordering of the self, as well as the expression of positionality in society and space, 
than other culturally stratifying dimensions. 
Black Islam South Africa gives voice to Africans for whom conversion to Islam not only offered a 
measure of hope that something would change but also a means of reconfiguring the self and 
constituting an orderly social setting within an otherwise disorderly and unjust environment. 
People made use of their redefined perspectives to move not only beyond colonial and apartheid 
South Africa but partly also beyond the post-apartheid promise, often perceiving that promise 
as unfulfilled and attempting to move into an unknown but self-defined future. Those who defy 
the oppressive structures and institutions still surrounding them are often trying to lay out a new 
set of rules and behaviors for their children, so that they do not have to continue their parents’ 
struggle for a social and spatial order they can call home. 
Objectives and Research Questions 
By engaging with conversion to Islam among people classified as Black African, this study 
approaches the role of religion within the framework of challenging social and spatial modes of 
order and ordering in the post-apartheid society of South Africa. It asks how the struggle to 
belong is motivated, modified, and enabled by, as well as channeled through the cultural 
elements offered by an appropriation, adoption, and hybridization of Islam in the realm of Black 
African cultural self-awareness, conceptually understood as a re-ordered indigeneity. The study 
therefore pays specific attention to the practical, emotional, symbolic, and territorial spheres, 
thus relating the material realities of everyday life to socio-historical identity constructions 
understood as cognitive performances. Central aspects are the acts of differentiation within South 
African society and the acts of resistance to South African society through conversion to Islam. 
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Against the backdrop of South Africa’s history of colonial and apartheid oppression, 
segregation, socio-spatial order, and the un-making and dis-ordering of lived-in places, the study 
asks: In what ways is the social and spatial order of South Africa’s daily lived inequality and 
uprootedness, which has experienced, produced and re-produced for generations, challenged 
by the conversion to Islam of people classified as Black African? In what ways is conversion to 
Islam constitutive for a re-ordered African indigeneity and belonging in South Africa in social, 
cultural, and spatial terms? Is the societal order challenged in earnest and in such a way that a 
subjectified break with the persisting structures can be realized? Does conversion in the given 
case lead to the formation of self-defined belonging and indigeneity or rather an adaptation of 
an already existing and established set of power relations, based in existing Muslim communities 
and institutions? 
In order to approach these questions and objectives, this study consists of two major parts. One 
reflects on the dimension of religion in the ordering of indigeneity in South Africa. An empirical 
case study of a community of indigenous Africans removed during the late days of apartheid 
serves as the central focus. It illustrates how African indigeneity first became re-ordered under 
the influence of Christian missionary work, how the respective community could circumvent 
the spatial effects of apartheid for a certain time under the protective sphere of religious 
territoriality, and how the dis-orderly effects of being ultimately evicted impacted religious 
rootedness as well. Having gained a better understanding of the interlinkages of social and 
spatial modes of ordering, the defining powers of indigeneity, and the role of the religious 
sphere, the study then moves into the empirical cases of Black Africans in KwaZulu-Natal 
resisting the embodied and spatially ascribed cultural orders by converting to Islam and the re-
ordering of Blackness through religious re-grounding. 
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Research Design and Applied Methods 
“The power of a country road is different when one is walking along it from when one 
is flying over it by airplane. […] The airplane passenger sees only how the road pushes 
through the landscape, how it unfolds according to the same laws as the terrain 
surrounding it. Only he who walks the road on foot learns of the power it commands 
[…].” (BENJAMIN 1979: 50) 
This project did not start in a very well-structured manner but rather based on curiosity and 
unexpected circumstances. I came upon the topic of conversion to Islam in Black African 
townships in 2011, while carrying out research for my thesis as a Master of Arts student in 
geography, Islamic studies and law. My research took me to the Cape Flats of Cape Town and 
dealt at that time with anything but Islam. Nevertheless, the topic captured my curiosity, and 
my circumstances enable me to further engage with the topic and finally to pursue it in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, the former City of Durban3, in 
2012 and 2013. My research engagement there initially had nothing to do with Islam in South 
Africa either. However, my curiosity led to interest, interest to questions and questions to 
consultations—with colleagues from different fields, such as geography, religious studies, 
anthropology, and political science. In order to spare the details for the coming chapters, it is 
sufficient at this point to note that the result was motivating yet inconclusive: a perfect basis for 
further research. As noted above, the literature available on conversion to Islam and Muslim 
activities among those classified as Black African in South Africa is both dominated by anecdotal 
viewpoints and clearly under-researched. Therefore, my overall aim in terms of methodology is 
to diversify the perspectives on the researched topic by applying an intensive set of qualitative 
methods in an explorative way (SAYER 1992: 241ff.; SAYER 2000: 20f.). The focus therefore 
rests on holding a conversational attitude towards the empirical cases while bearing their socio-
historical and socio-spatial setting in mind. 
The empirical field work of this study encompassed three periods in 2013 and 2015, which 
comprised qualitative interviews, group interviews and discussions, participant observations, 
walking interviews, formal and informal meetings, as well as archival research to retrieve written 
documents and maps. Conceptualizing the study in a qualitative manner and focusing on the 
micro-scale of the different cases did justice to the explorative and open, though in terms of time 
 
3One major aspect—in administrative as well as symbolic terms—of the post-apartheid transition phase was the re-
organization and renaming of municipal structures (cf. HARRISON, TODES & WATSON 2008: 83). Through this process, 
the former City of Durban merged with surrounding municipalities to form the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. 
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restrictions not open-ended, approach of the overall project. The majority of the gathered 
knowledge was gleaned through what could better be termed conversations and shared 
experiences. The experiences were shared insofar as the researched subjects kindly made my 
participation in selected group gatherings, celebrations, commemorations, and weekly study 
circle meetings possible. Therefore, the differentiation between formally and informally 
gathered data is blurry, and attempting to neatly divide the two sets seems unlikely to be worth 
the effort. To avoid a pre-classification that falls into the trap of racialized categories such as 
Black Muslim or African Muslim, I followed a network approach restricted to the people who were 
pointed out during the interviews, meetings, and conversations. New participants were either 
introduced directly, their contact details were forwarded on by other participants, or we met on 
an occasion such as a group meeting, a dhikr session, or a simple home visit. While this approach 
most definitely had its pitfalls, it was essentially necessary to avoid a pro-active structuring of 
the social field that would otherwise have fallen back on pre-existing, colonial categories. 
The qualitative interviews were carried out within a narrative and in most cases biographical 
setting with the highest amount of openness possible, providing impulses to stimulate the 
narration. An important aspect therein was leaving control over and authorship of the narration to 
the interviewed person. CLOKE, COOK, CRANG et al. (2004: 157f.) provide the proper analogy 
for this in their differentiation between roles that are played during interviews: The researcher 
should neither try to be an actor within the dialogue, nor a director. Instead, the role of the 
choreographer seems to be appropriate, always “listening with the third ear” and engaging in 
the narration in a sensitive, self-aware, and reflective manner. Most importantly, especially if 
interview sessions led to frequent meetings and discussions, the interviewed persons were offered 
what GIRTLER (2002: 59ff.) terms an ero-epic dialogue when he or she essentially desired a 
good, plain conversation.  
I met and interviewed all participants more than once, keeping continuous contact with 
everyone throughout the research periods. Instead of concentrating on a sheer quantity of 
qualitative data, i.e. number of interviews, discussions were intensified by means of multiple 
meetings and group discussions. The effects of self-reflection upon the information discussed 
grew with the number of re-visitations. Issues which were initially presented as highly political 
in a first round, for example, were later set in a more differentiated light. 
Even though it was intended and communicated that the first meetings would be of informal 
and introductory character, the cornerstones or main emphases of the individual narrations 
were clearly sketched out during the first encounter. Follow-up sessions deepened several topics 
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and made links to other participants possible. Again, the most important rule of qualitative 
research is that one must always be prepared. The meetings and conversations took place either 
in the homes of the interviewed or in research-related religious places. Others were specifically 
arranged as walking interviews (see below). I initially intended to assist the interviewing process 
with a recording device that was properly and openly introduced to the participants. However, 
the research developed in such a way as to prompt me to question using a recording device. 
During a specific situation in the second of three major fieldwork stages, the interviewees clearly 
signaled that the presence of the recorder would interfere with the continuation of the narration. 
The further the research on conversion to Islam, Islamic practices, and prospective projects 
aiming at transgressing social and spatial order in post-apartheid South Africa progressed, the 
more topics arose that were clearly of political sensitivity to the interviewed. I therefore decided 
to continue on without using a recording device, making minutes from memory instead. The 
fact that about half of the acquired qualitative material was gleaned without (or even because 
of the choice to abandon) the recording device reveals how important it is to negotiate between 
methodical-technical expectations (research ‘by the book’), field-ethical sensitivity (research as 
social responsibility), and fieldwork reality (research as unanticipated endeavor). Research 
practice has to adhere to its objectives, not ‘the book’ (WESTERN 1992: xv ff.; cf. also ESCHER 
& BECKER 2013). Some of the follow-up interviews led to a shared car ride home. It is worth 
noting that sitting together in a car on a thirty-minute drive sometimes offers more empirical 
material than hours of coordinated interview sessions. Again, my minutes from memory have 
been of crucial value; these were either written down directly upon returning to the apartment 
or spoken onto the recorder while driving home alone in the car. While outside of South Africa, 
messaging through WhatsApp and e-mail allowed me to maintain established relations. 
Moreover, conversations that included historic detail, for example, or other material which 
could not be further elaborated upon during the regular interviewing sessions (either due to time 
constraints or material that could not be found right away) could continue via messaging, and 
material such as old photographs or letters could be exchanged. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
point out that this interferes with an important aspect of qualitative research, i.e. keeping 
distance to the field and the participants. Thus, more than once, the relationship between 
researched and researcher had to be discussed and re-evaluated in order to re-establish a proper 
positionality (PRZYBORSKI & WOHLRAB-SAHR 2014: 48f.). 
For one case study on religious territoriality (see section “The Eviction of Emmaus”), I used a 
mobile interviewing technique that can be loosely defined as a walking or go-along interview 
(EVANS & JONES 2011; KUSENBACH 2003). It followed the general idea of what JONES & EVANS 
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(2012) propose as rescue geography (see also EVANS & JONES 2011). Within qualitative research, 
especially in human geography, there seems to be a recent movement towards interviewing on 
the move (cf. KÜHL 2016). This may indicate an increasing awareness on a methodological level 
of the influence of place on the process of interviewing. On the other hand, the popularity may 
also offer nothing substantially new to existing research practices, except that it now has a catchy 
title. The major distinction of rescue geographies as carried out in this regard is two-fold: First, the 
approach invokes geocoding, and second, it aims at redrawing or reconstructing (i.e. rescuing) 
places at the intersection of place-relatedness, attachment, and affect. Embedded into a 
framework that is clearly inspired by the debate on place and placelessness deriving from 
humanistic geography (RELPH 1976), the technique aims at redrawing, revisiting, and reliving 
places that do not exist anymore in material terms. Their absence could be the result of urban 
redevelopment, to use the example brought forward by the authors mentioned above, or, as in 
the case of this book, of forced removals and the demolition of neighborhoods during apartheid. 
In contrast to go-along interviews, the focus of the methodical modification is not on stimulating 
the narration but on bringing together participative mapping and qualitative interviewing. In a 
narrative-archeological sense, the personal and affective connections of the interviewee to the 
lost place are captured by walking along the narratives in place, even though the material setting 
now differs. The actual technical realization and methodical implications are discussed in the 
respective case studies. 
Critical Subjectivity: Research in Religious Fields 
Before leaving the conceptual and methodological sections behind and finally moving into the 
research itself, a word needs to be given to the issue of carrying out research in religious fields. 
As with many other topics in geographical research, the overall access to the settings is generated 
by a thematic, and in some cases even personal, closeness to the matters at hand. When it comes 
to religious fields, especially in the South African context (cf. COCHRANE 2004), the questions 
to be critically posed relate to the religious affiliation and affinity of the researcher as well as his 
or her rarely defined position as insider or expert within that field. The matter is thus by no 
means one of credibility nor of any illusory claim of objective distance. It is rather a question of 
positionality, which enables the reader to reflect on the represented knowledge. It is about 
applying the methods of scientific inquiry to those who themselves apply such methods (for a 
debate see FLEISCHER & HAFERBURG 2012). With regard to the specific field of conversion to 
Islam, LUKENS-BULL (2007: 173f.) rightly argues that 
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“the researcher who studies Islam has to deal with the question of subject position in 
particular, if not unique, ways. The first is what religion the researcher holds or claims 
to hold while in the field. Are they Muslim and if so, of what orientation? This of course 
affects how they see things. Or are they not Muslim? This leads to its own problems. If 
they are not Muslims prior to fieldwork, do they convert? Are such conversions real (in 
terms of the researcher’s own subjective religiosity)?” 
With the latter aspect, Lukens-Bull points to such cases where researchers have converted in 
order to gain better access to the field—which must be called ethically questionable. Apart from 
these extremes, a researcher can also be accepted by the community that he or she is engaging 
with through the methodical interaction. 
This is the case for the featured study. Throughout my research, I disclosed myself to the 
participants as a researcher with a background in geography, Islamic studies, and law, who is 
neither a Muslim nor belongs to any particular religion. It is worth noting that I only actively 
had to deal with this aspect in situations where I was in contact with representatives of 
established Islamic organizations, and seldom in contexts where I engaged with converts. 
Throughout the years of research, a form of respect towards each other developed, which 
included a strong interest in sharing in religious debates. The approach generated a position 
somewhere in between welcomed visitor, friend, and conversationalist. Nevertheless, I 
constantly negotiated my position as a researcher. When asked about my own position towards 
Islam or if I was a Muslim myself, I always tried to make it clear that my research work does 
not allow me to engage in discussing such matters as I have a position to maintain, not an 
objective one but, as far as possible, a non-subjective one at least. On some occasions, I was 
drawn into debates about the role of Islam in Europe and Germany, or in some situations the 
allegedly dominant position of Jews, which made the constant negotiation difficult. Another 
question must be posed in relation to religious practices: When it comes to observations, how 
does one distance oneself from the role of participating subject within practices in religious 
contexts? I participated in religious events, such as Dhikr sessions or commemorations, on a 
regular basis but tried to never wholeheartedly engage in them. I was present, and though I 
sometimes even caught myself chanting, I concentrated on not getting drawn into the recitation 
that went on for hours. When it came to prayer, I expressed my respect for it but kept my 
distance, sitting on the side, watching. 
Qualitative research always carries a quality of human interaction with it. Some research 
subjects seem to necessitate a higher degree of reflection and negotiation than others, but in any 
case, disclosing the proximity and distance of the researcher, as a person, to the researched field is 
obligatory when striving for a critical and self-reflective approach. 
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Exploration Is Method—in Theory 
When it comes to qualitative research, there is a thin and fuzzy line running in between research 
objectives, theoretical conceptualization, and methodological embeddedness—if there is even a 
line at all. Might we not be better off talking about a circular relationship, within which positions 
are sometimes rearranged throughout the process? The textbooks on qualitative methods 
primarily tell us that theoretical framing is guided by the research objectives and that the 
selection of methods has to adhere to the overall framework, thus sitting last in line. But what 
comes first, the question or the theoretical understanding for the knowledge yet to be sought? 
The pragmatic philosophical perspective (cf. DEWEY 1938; cf. PRZYBORSKI & WOHLRAB-SAHR 
2014: 197) reminds us that even an educated guess is an educated one. Therefore, every 
question asked presupposes an act of abstraction of real-world settings, i.e. conceptualization. 
And when method starts, theory doesn’t end at all. The books may be closed, but the extended 
knowledge emerging from the empirical data automatically feeds back to the study’s concept 
with sometimes ground-shaking effects. 
Theoretical concepts are in place from the very beginning of the first formulation of research 
objectives, and, as MADISON (2005: 12) argues, critical research relies on theoretical frameworks 
to shed light onto social phenomena and to enable their interpretation. Moreover, our thoughts 
and ideas as geographers, gathered through observation of specific phenomena, are seldom if 
ever carried back home to stay in a ‘discussion-free’ environment. Embedded within the—too 
often self-referential—field of academia, findings are put to debate, thoughts are exchanged, 
and new objectives are formulated. Their degree of specificity is particularly put to a test when 
the necessity of fundraising arises. Thus, whether we want to or not, we cannot avoid engaging 
in abstraction before engaging with those elements of everyday life that we, in our idealistic 
perspective, sought to approach open-mindedly. Moreover, when theory becomes a mode of 
interpretation, it is a method in itself (ibid.).  
This perspective allows us to bridge the too often rigid differentiation between those research 
objectives guided by theory and those guided by phenomena or case. The question of locating 
theory must be answered more gradually: Does the research imply a conceptual contingency at 
the point of formulating the research objectives and therefore a narrowing of the theoretical 
focus and the resulting discussion ex ante, or is the overall process initialized by a wide and 
rather open set of questions, or better of working hypotheses? Both variations should not be 
understood as an either/or decision within the qualitative-interpretive paradigm (cf. CLOKE, 
COOK, CRANG et al. 2004: 327) but as a reminder to locate one's own research on the gradual 
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continuum that spans between those poles. While overly generalized on both ends, this 
dichotomization should also remind us that meeting the needs of both ends entails its difficulties. 
In the first case, the more rigid ex-ante conceptualizations, the research runs the risk of trying 
to prove theories with the material, while ignoring contradictory implications that emerge from 
within the data or those that move beyond it. In the latter case, i.e. the more wide and open 
working process, the researcher runs the risk of getting lost within the empirical process and 
losing focus on central questions being asked. This is most often the case when open approach is 
misunderstood as a romantic perspective of qualitative research as steered by the field or floating with 
the field. After all, there are no fields without the limitations, basic rules, and prospective 
outcomes, which are defined by the actors delimitating and producing them, i.e. the actors of 
the academic world. Even the most explorative approach follows central objectives. In other 
words, we are reminded once more: even an educated guess is an educated one. 
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Conceptualizing the Challenging of 
Order 
To understand what “challenging” social and spatial order implies, it is first necessary to 
illustrate the specific local path dependencies of South African socio-spatial settings that define 
the analyzed cases and thus frame the agency of the people in the focus of the qualitative 
research. Furthermore, we must critically consider the concepts of social and spatial order and 
ordering itself. Therefore, the following section first presents the conceptual framework guiding 
the study. The idea of order and ordering will be located within the field of cultural geography 
and the inherent discussion of space and place. After considering the conceptualization of social 
and spatial order and ordering, I discuss a theoretical understanding of challenging, 
transgressing, and resisting order. While power relations have always been in the focus of 
geographical research, only relatively little attention has been given to framing spatial and social 
modes of resistance and transgression. Therefore, cultural geography approaches that derive 
from the traditions of Marxist as well as humanist geographic perspectives will be presented. 
But how shall we gain an analytical understanding of resistance and transgression beyond mere 
descriptive work? By extending the conceptual idea and answering the analytical invitation to 
make maps of cultural orderings (ESCHER & WEICK 2004), the theoretical setting can be transformed 
into an applicable analytical framework, which will help us to critically engage with the featured 
case studies. Next, South Africa’s history of oppression, dispossession, and colonial rule will be 
embedded within the conceptual debate by relating it to specific aspects of colonialism and the 
racist spatial politics of apartheid. The oppression and dispossession of the indigenous 
population that became classified as Black or African will be considered in the light of ordering 
indigeneity through spatial, social, and cultural politics and practices, in order to understand how 
a dominating White minority constructed a dystopian cultural landscape around the African 
other. 
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Approaching the Conceptual Dimension of Social and 
Spatial Order and Ordering 
“Order is not something that always exists in a pristine state, fully formed. Nor is it 
something always intentionally created, it is instead a contingency effect that arises from 
ongoing social, and some would say technical, processes.” (HETHERINGTON 1997: 10) 
Order is an enigmatic concept. Its implications for social research can be normative, descriptive, 
or analytical and can even entail (often unintended though unavoidable) ventures into the 
terrain of hermeneutics or epistemological contingency. Therefore, more often than not, 
research agendas touching on issues of order and ordering avoid or circumvent a theoretical 
debate on the topic by either leaving their concept of order in a rather blurry state or by over-
determining its conceptual values (see for example MURRAY 2008; HETHERINGTON 1997). Yet, 
the questions of modes, regimes, agency, intersubjectivity, locality, practice, scale, and scope of 
order and ordering are part and parcel of the conceptual apparatus of geographical inquiry (cf. 
amongst others JACKSON 1989b; DAVIS 2006[1990]; CRESSWELL 1994, 1996; TUAN 1979: 10, 
145; BLUNT & DOWLING 2006: 14; for a post-colonial critique, see ROBINSON 2008)—which is 
presumably far more fundamental than the fetishized quest for and questioning of space (cf. 
WERLEN 2010: 264)4. Moreover, with the paradigmatic interventions brought about by the 
spatial turn in the social sciences, ongoing debates within the disciplines of sociology, 
psychology, and philosophy are finally meeting at the spatial table and posing questions about 
space and place (see for a debate HETHERINGTON 1997). The following section does not claim 
to deliver a concise theoretical sketch but aims rather at building a solid foundation for exploring 
how to conceptualize challenging and resisting modes of order and ordering in light of a 
relational approach to society in space. 
Constantly produced by individual actors, groups, societies, organizations, and institutions on 
a multitude of scales and at various times and places (cf. CRESSWELL 2014b; BOURDIEU 1989), 
order is of crucial importance for structuring the world that people live in. Without orientation, 
position, location, affirmation, i.e. without order and modes of ordering, we could not exist as 
individuals, nor would we be capable of living in communities (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 253). 
As DOVEY (1978: 28) writes: “The environment consists of a vast range of potential meanings 
 
4Approaching order and ordering from a cultural geographical perspective means touching on the issue of social, 
cultural, and spatial ordering through the academic discipline of geography. This issue would require a book of its own 
and is, incidentally, relative to its post-colonial magnitude, somewhat under-represented within monographic 
discussions. For further reading, refer to BONNETT (2005), among others. 
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from which each culture selects those that constitute its everyday reality […] Our ordering 
process narrows down an enormous potential world to a real world.” These different modes are 
not limited to spatial dimensions in material terms but can be simultaneously conceptualized 
within the realm of orderly social space and ordering spatial practices (HETHERINGTON 1997). 
Reaching from everyday interactions to macro-institutional networks, a world of social and 
spatial arrangements unfolds through and within the human experience, which may be 
perceived and projected as orderly or disorderly, unfolding a dialectic relationality of consensus 
and contest as the foundation for social history (COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 18). It is as if 
social life itself finds its basic meaning in unavoidable acts of differentiation and homogenization 
and the constant necessity to decide between the former and the latter. At the same time, social 
scientists—themselves orderly subjects within an orderly subfield of society—become agents of 
ordering by trying to understand, analyze, and deconstruct these sometimes apparently fixed but 
inherently fluid realities. We are reminded that the decisions we make as individuals are part of 
and subject to a constant flux of ordering of society and space. 
What is orderly for one person or group of people will be experienced as the total opposite by 
others: “[T]he questions of ‘what is order?’ and ‘whose order?’ are therefore central, since the 
outcomes of attempts to impose ‘order’ depend not just on how it is conceptualized but also on 
who is trying to impose it” (RAKODI 2005: 3). This opens up the realm of hierarchy and order 
contextualized by subject, structure, and agency, where the intersection of psychic forms, the 
human body, geographical space, and social order can be seen as the fundamental basis for 
mechanisms of order and sense-making (STALLYBRASS & WHITE 1986: 3). 
Within social and spatial settings, certain people and practices emerge as dominant to others 
and remain so, with the effect that the enacted authority is expressed as the apparent order of 
things (COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 18), inherently favoring a specific group of people. This 
does not imply however that an explicit intention underlies the formulation of order.  
“In any society, the pattern of people’s lives and their living conditions take the forms 
which they do, not so much because somebody somewhere makes a series of decisions 
to that effect; but in large parts because certain social mechanisms, principles, 
assumptions—call them what you will—are taken for granted.” (WESTERGARD & 
RESLER 1976: 141) 
Dominant practices not only provide structure through their enactment but also unfold a 
structuring momentum through their acceptance, which may render the power that is at work 
subject to intentional explanation without it necessarily having been intentionally enacted (cf. 
LUKES 2005: 136; DOWDING 2006: 140). According to BOURDIEU (1997 [1977], 1989), this 
conceptualization can be further differentiated into analytical categories of consciousness-
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producing activities: the structuring structures or modus operandi (i.e. ordering) on the one hand 
and the structured structures or opus operatum (i.e. order) on the other. What follows is an 
understanding of modes of order and ordering as an intertwined duality of structure and agency: 
Neither is an individual capable of imposing ordering regimes by his or her own means, nor is 
an effectively imposed order an ‘objective reality.’ Societal—and therefore spatial—order is 
practiced reality, enabled and translated by silent, permanent dispositions that are embodied 
and incorporated and become reflected within shared social fields (cf. LUKES 2005: 140; 
BOURDIEU 1990b: 146ff.). The questions posed by RAKODI (2005) of ‘what is order’ and ‘whose 
order’ cited above therefore conflate as each attempt to impose order can only use the means 
of the existing order.  
This logic of power relations combines a relational perspective on power, culture, and society 
together with an understanding that  hegemony in capitalist societies has always been contested 
and never fully achieved (GRAMSCI 1971; JACKSON 1989b: 53; see also MOUFFE 1979: 178ff.): 
Power, order, and positionality are constantly produced, reproduced, and ‘taken-for-granted’ 
by all actors of the social fields in their relationality (cf. BOURDIEU 1999 [1993]), while social 
power relations themselves are produced and reproduced not only by their acceptance but 
through their contestations and resulting reaffirmations. In other words, acting against the order 
is part of the order.  
A Sense of Order? 
If the establishment of modes of order and the practices of ordering are understood as 
reciprocal, how should the capacity to challenge social and spatial order be framed? In order to 
conceptually approach this aspect, the most durable causes that bring about societal power 
relations and positions need to be brought into focus by asking how order and ordering can 
become commonsensical or taken-for-granted. 
Discussing the conceptual understanding of hegemony offered by GRAMSCI (1971), COMAROFF 
& COMAROFF (1991: 21f.) provide an understanding of culture as a “shared repertoire of 
practices, symbols, and meanings from which hegemonic forms are cast—and by extension 
resisted,” which is a necessary precondition for approaching the naturalization of order and 
ordering. They argue that any conceptual discussion of social and spatial ordering would be lost 
in the sea of sociological abstraction without introducing the dimension of culture as a basic 
system, the “semantic ground” of shared beliefs, which makes the intersubjective realization 
and recognition of power relations translatable and their unquestioned transmission from one 
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subject to the other possible. Against this background, the authors differentiate between two 
modes of power: On the one hand is the agentive mode, which refers to the actual human agency 
at play in the production, circulation, and consumption of signs and objects, i.e. the human 
capacity to shape subjectivities and realities by limiting and enabling the actions and perceptions 
of others. On the other hand, COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1991: 22) argue for the dialectic 
counterpart, which they call the nonagentive mode of power. This can be seen as an attempt to 
grasp the level of the commonsensical social and spatial order, as it incorporates ordering 
beyond the realm of institutionalized power relations. It focuses instead on those forms which 
are hidden within everyday life and therefore perceived as “natural” and “ineffable,” and as 
such beyond human agency. Based on an understanding of culture as a basic system or semantic 
foundation, order and ordering can appear self-evident when the enactment and acceptance of 
power—its realization (with its implicit duality of the meaning) and recognition—are seen in their 
capacity to secure compliance by shaping the very beliefs and desires of subjects, imposing 
internal constraints under historically changing circumstances (LUKES 2005: 43f., 143f.). Order 
is a historical product of wants, haves, and states of being in society and space. It does not necessarily 
need an overtly acting subject but rather a field of intersubjective relations, whose members 
share an understanding of recognized desires and practices. Indeed, the most subtle modes of 
order are actually those that never have to be directly acted out; they work on their own as 
stable dispositions within the social field. Central to this thinking is the theoretical concept of 
the habitus, the conceptual idea of socially incorporated order, which acts as the transmitter or 
“mediating link” (MATON 2008: 55) between structure and agency, between the objective-
material conditions of the social space and their equivalence within the symbolic space (see 
Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Habitus, the mediating link between social space and symbolic space (after BOURDIEU 1989). M. Gebauer. 
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 “The habitus is necessity internalized and converted into a disposition that generates 
meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions” (BOURDIEU 2014 [1984]: 139). Social 
space is perceived by the individual through practices within the settings of everyday life, which 
leads to a symbolic as well as practical recognition of the order of things, of one’s own position 
within social space. Dominant or dominating relations and social positionings therefore do not 
have to be explicit: They unfold as social reality, as the common sense of order, through values, 
norms, beliefs, and institutions that are reflected and represented in social practices (cf. 
COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 21). 
The ideas above open up the realm of modes of order and ordering with respect to social space, 
an elusive term, which falls somewhere between being a mere metaphorical figure and a 
heuristic dimension for understanding societal relations, interactions, and those powerful 
outcomes that are themselves produced by the diverse distances the term points out. But how 
does this relate to a more ontological spatial perspective? One possibility can be seen in 
extending the analytical category of the habitus by translating its implications from the realm of 
the actual to the real, i.e. from the interlinkages of positionality and differentiation to the social 
and spatial contingency of objects’ structures and powers. That is to say: transferring this trail 
of thought derived from a critical realist perspective (AGNEW 1987; SAYER 2000) into a cultural 
geographical field focused on the production of meaning through practices and subject 
interaction, i.e. the places and place-making processes. 
Within his discussion on ideology and the power of place, CRESSWELL (1996: 155ff.) points to 
the interrelation between powerful ideas, powerful practices, and place-making. Understanding 
ideologies as “ideas related to practices—ideas connected to what we do” (CRESSWELL 1996: 
157), places are not solely reflections of order but are, at the same time, the products and 
producers of order. Place thus amplifies ideology through it creative capability and the 
continuation of meaningful practices within a cultural framework (cf. ibid. : 161). Practices—
social and spatial, performed and imagined, and intrinsically taking place in or out of place—
must lie at the center of our conceptual and analytic attention in this regard, as the 
“interpretation of place is, in everyday life, a practical interpretation” (CRESSWELL 1996: 157). 
Whether acted out explicitly or tacitly, practices are linked to the meaningful world of everyday 
life and lead us to the superimposed facets of power and ideology, the hidden transcripts of 
intersubjective interactions. Thus, places and place-making processes are the key entry points 
for understanding maps of meanings and engaging with maps of cultural orderings from a 
geographical perspective (ESCHER & WEICK 2004; JACKSON 1989b). Calling on the three-fold 
definition of place and place-making offered by AGNEW (2005, 1987), place is (1) the location of 
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order, providing its specific and relative point in space. It is this dimension that defines the 
boundaries of order and the scale of ordering practices. Knowing the location of order is 
essential to enacting it or being enacted by it. Being inscribed in space as a location may be the most 
persistent quality of order, as its territoriality constantly unfolds through its spatial and material 
translatability. Translation implies intersubjective, locally specific contextualization in order to 
realize, decipher, and acknowledge order. Therefore, place is also (2) the locale of ordering (cf. 
GIDDENS 1984), the structuring moment of social relations, where the modes of order are 
produced and reproduced through practice and interaction (CRESSWELL 1996: 156). It is in this 
realm that ideologies, the meaningful ideas of what we do, are demanded and tacitly enacted. 
The locale of order defines codifications of appropriate and inappropriate practices in relation 
to their location. It is the essential quality of place, as it is constructed and experienced in 
material artifacts, represented in discourse, used as representations (HUBBARD 2005: 45; 
HARVEY 1989)— spatial and social at the same time (CRESSWELL 1996: 3). Finally, order and 
ordering is (3) a sense of place, which encompasses two variations: It implies a position within 
larger fields of power or structural logics of society (BOURDIEU 1977, 1989; GIDDENS 1984) and 
thus points to direct and indirect mechanisms that bring about a sense for one’s place embodied 
and performed within a hierarchical structure of social and spatial power relations. At the same 
time, according to a humanistic perspective (RELPH 1976; TUAN 1976, 1977), sense of place 
highlights the bodily and sensual realization and intersubjective affirmation and acceptance of 
social and spatial relationships, and thus hierarchical positioning within a second mode of order. 
Both variations are built around the same logic, the relational reciprocity of place-making 
practices and practices made by places, and each approach points towards a different agenda 
for the analysis: revealing the hidden transcripts on the one hand or engaging with the zones of 
interactions of lived-in place on the other. Nevertheless, as authors such as (HUBBARD 2005) 
argue, cultural geographical undertakings which look at practices have to entail both Marxist-
oriented approaches and humanistic perspectives (see also KOBAYASHI & MACKENZIE 1989). 
This epistemological path unites the abstract concepts of space and place represented by the 
trialectic spatiality of cultural practices, representations, and imaginations with a human-
centered, emphatically analytical understanding of social space as lived-in place (HUBBARD 
2005: 42ff.). Ordering practices are in turn place-making practices, meaningful societal projects 
constantly being repeated, produced and reproduced through the actions of human beings 
within a web of intersubjective interactions and significations. 
If the modes of order and ordering are brought about by a relational cohesion between structure 
and structuring, then the dimension of subject interaction must reflect the same reciprocity. 
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Thus, embodied dispositions not only presuppose a sense of one’s place, but also a sense of other’s 
place, a tacit knowledge of one’s own position in relation to the perceived positionality of the 
other. Again, habitus becomes important as sense of place: 
“The habitus is at once a system of models for the production of practices and a system 
of models for the perception and appreciation of practices. And in both cases, its 
operations express the social position in which it was constructed. As a result, the habitus 
produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are 
objectively differentiated; but they are immediately perceived as such only in the case of 
agents who possess the code, the classificatory models necessary to understand their 
social meaning. Thus, the habitus implies a ‘sense of one’s place’ but also a ‘sense of 
other’s place’. For example, we say of an item of clothing, a piece of furniture or a book: 
‘that’s petty-bourgeois’ or ‘that’s intellectual’.” (BOURDIEU 1990a: 131) 
The last sentence of the citation exemplifies that—even within the rather abstract 
conceptualizations of Bourdieu’s analytical offerings—the material subjectivity of human beings 
is central to understanding embodied social and spatial positionalities. Sense of place can 
therefore be understood as acting and being enacted through modes of intersubjective practice and 
experiences in lived-in places. “If the habitat shapes the habitus, the habitus also shapes the 
habitat, through the more or less adequate social usages that it tends to make of it” (BOURDIEU 
1999 [1993]: 128). Dispositions of an established order which, in their embodied relationality, 
are taken for granted by the agents in a social space are thus simultaneously naturalized in space 
in ontological terms, as they durably inscribe hierarchies and distances and therefore social 
realities into the material world (ibid.: 124). The location, locale, and sense of place of order 
and ordering are hence to be understood as subjectified and intersubjectively reified senses of 
limits, which make the social and spatial world appear self-evident: 
“Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very 
different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms 
tending to produce this effect, the most important and the best concealed is undoubtedly 
the dialectic of the objective chances and agents’ aspirations, out of which arises the sense 
of limits, commonly called the sense of reality, i.e. the correspondence between the objective 
classes and the internalized classes, social structures and mental structures, which is the 
basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established order. […] when there is a 
quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles 
of organization (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-
evident. This experience we shall call doxa.” (BOURDIEU 1977: 164) 
Within the conceptual framework of social and spatial order and ordering, the idea of doxa is 
crucially linked—via Agnew’s definition of the locale— to the realm of ideologies, the meaningful 
ideas of what we do (CRESSWELL 1996: 157), and the meaningful places of ideological 
production and reproduction (HUBBARD 2005). Regarding geographical work, CRESSWELL 
(2003: 277f.) offers the useful metaphor of the doxic landscape, uniting the idea of doxa with the 
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figure of the landscape, which is understood as a way of ordering the world, i.e. a lived-in 
representation of order, and therefore a means of ordering the landscape’s inhabitants. As the 
realm of ideology, these doxic landscapes encompass the whole symbolic cultural order (PEET 
1998: 123), thus referring to the lived relation between people and their world (JACKSON 1989b: 
47). The term landscape may have its drawbacks given the political contingency it encapsulates; 
however, as a metaphor with heuristic intention, doxic landscape proves a valuable modification 
and extension of the idea of maps of cultural orderings proposed by ESCHER & WEICK (2004). 
It shifts the descriptive representation of social and spatial relations implied by a map slightly 
towards the constructedness of these representations and relations brought about by the actors 
and institutions, who are themselves being structured by the social and spatial environment 
which they create. The doxic landscape is thus more of a lived-in order than a representation 
thereof. 
Challenging the Sense of Order: Dis-Orderly Places 
Order and ordering become taken for granted when the objective-material conditions and their 
subjectified equivalence as symbolic systems (cf. Figure 1 above) correspond with the everyday 
realities of lived-in places. They are translated into the sense of the world as well as one’s sense 
of place within the world. Coming back to RAKODI (2005) and the what and whose of order, we 
can therefore add the question of where order is in terms of location, locale, and sense of place, 
adding the conceptual dimension of place to the aspects of subject, structure, and agency 
approached so far. Within an analytical framework, the scale of ordering can be differentiated 
along the lines of the location of ordering, the orderly locale, as well as the sense of order. The 
where of order is therefore not a third question to be asked but rather the concretization of the 
aspects of what and whose. 
For their tendency to project modes of social and spatial order as relatively closed systems of 
relational reference, such conceptualizations are open to critique. Especially when it comes to 
the idea of challenging order, their implied structural rigidity and monolithic stability does not 
seem to leave scholars with enough room to maneuver, apart from merely accepting that change 
is already embedded within the overall understanding of how power relations are shared within 
social field. On the other hand, the perspective is clearly geared towards the subliminal 
mechanics of how societies work. Challenging order then becomes a question of challenging the 
sense of order and the orderly sense of place. Therefore, HETHERINGTON (1997) argues for moving 
from imagining a static condition of order to viewing ordering as a series of processes, a shift 
which would reflect the inherent mobility of modes of ordering and the fact that order and 
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ordering are always “full of uncertainty, heterogeneity and contradiction” (ibid.: 7) and rarely 
observed in such perfect and orthodox conditions. By referring to FOUCAULT (1983), he 
presents two principles of ordering: resemblance and similitude (ibid.: 9, 43). The signified order 
points to a known referent in the case of resemblance, whereas similitude stands for something 
signified but not so easily attached to a referent. Taken together with the circular relationship 
of realization and recognition presented above, these principles of ordering call into question 
unilateral conceptualization of the translatability of social space into symbolic space and vice 
versa. This offers us alternative versions of the figure of the habitus and thus a set of dispositions 
which offers more shades to its embodied distinctions. 
Consequently, to understand the challenging of modes of social and spatial order and ordering, it 
is necessary to look to those places within the web of actors and institutions where alternatives 
to the commonsensical order are offered, performed, and maintained. In other words, we must 
look to the (supposedly) dis-orderly places. Following FOUCAULT (1986), these can be 
understood as sites of alternative social ordering which emerge from within the orderly fields of 
society as heterotopia, or spaces where an-other order can be performed (see also HETHERINGTON 
1997). Foucault provides us with examples of these other-orderly places on different scales, such 
as the brothel, the cemetery, or the colony. For the framework of this study on religious 
conversion, the idea of heterotopia is of specific importance, as sacred spaces can be seen 
particularly well in this light. For example, in his analysis of Muslim spaces, SCHIFFAUER (2010: 
43) differentiates heterotopic spaces, distinguishing illusionary heterotopia from compensational 
heterotopia. While the former represent an illusionary space that renders real space and all real 
places of human interactions as an even greater illusion, the latter materialize an alternate space 
that offers perfect order in contract to the fuzzy disorder of the lived-in places (FOUCAULT 
1986). In this regard, heterotopia have two directions: inward looking and outward oriented. 
However, they have but one functionality: to keep everything in order and everyone in his or 
her orderly place. ESCHER (2003) points to exactly this in his account of a specific sacred 
geography of Muslim practice-put-into-place. He argues that sacred space must be understood 
in the light of the “other place” of heterotopian conception and that heterotopia presuppose  
“a system of openings and closures, which make them both isolated and at the same time 
possible to penetrate. […] Foucault’s concept of ‘other places’ is the function, or the 
purpose which the heterotopian place, the sacred place for the rest of the area, has for 
society. It helps preserve the social status quo!” (ESCHER 2003: 66f.)  
He thereby reveals a difficult aspect of challenging the sense of social and spatial order and 
ordering: Disorderly places (or better other-orderly places) enable an alternative mode of 
ordering to be acted out as meaningful practice—in the case of sacred space in illo tempore as 
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well as in illo loco (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 263)—while keeping people profoundly in place. 
This makes a temporally and spatially limited modification of the self and the embodied 
dispositions possible without necessitating that the status quo positionality within the social field 
be questioned. Thus, the formation of alternative order has a stabilizing effect on the order 
taken for granted in society. Heterotopic spaces are not sites of resistance, transgression, or the 
marginal but rather spaces of alternate ordering, where new ways of ordering emerge that stand 
in contrast to the existing dispositions of social order in society (HETHERINGTON 1997: 9, 40).  
Before approaching orderly indigeneity, religious territoriality, or an understanding of 
conversion any further, let us shift the focus from structure to the dimension of agency, moving 
the conceptual debate towards the realm of deviance and resistance. Here, an introduction to 
cultural geographies of resistance will center the geographical analysis and the production of 
geographic knowledge around the task of engaging with the meaningful practices of places and 
place-making processes in their ideologic, structural, and programmatic settings. 
Sense of Change: Understanding Resistance 
“[T]he world is socially and historically constructed and […] in its construction, 
hierarchies are created and reproduced which result in violence that is symbolically 
expressed. It is in the very constructedness of such hierarchies that political action becomes 
possible. If worlds are constructed, then they can be re-constructed in other ways and in 
other words.” (SCHUBERT 2008: 196) 
As argued above, the conceptual approaches discussed so far reveal a tendency towards the 
question of how modes of order and ordering are maintained and stabilized within society. They 
shed light—in hermeneutic terms—onto those modes of order and ordering that are in place. 
However, they fail to engage with the creative forces questioning, destabilizing, undoing, and 
reconfiguring order, i.e. with the heterodox modes of ordering. Despite their theoretical density, 
they lack a perspective that is progressive and inventive in social and spatial terms, which brings 
the creation of something new into the picture. Solely following this school of thought could 
therefore lead into a limbo of perceiving the social and spatial world as a reproduction or 
reconfiguration of existing social arrangements, or even an intervention into them, which limits 
the understanding of the human subject’s agency to the self-affirming realm of structure and 
positionality. This would then preclude the possibility of discovering new thoughts beyond those 
thoughts that are just in other words (cf. SCHUBERT 2008). The political contingency within the 
work of Bourdieu as well as his concepts of nomos and doxa may enable us to move beyond the 
sole analysis of social and spatial ordering. As FOWLER (2011: 50) emphasizes: “[Bourdieu] is 
indeed one of the streams of great social thinkers concerned fundamentally with justice, with 
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the mechanisms of how social injustice becomes customary, and with the transformative 
consequences of this knowledge.” However, the concept’s limits lie exactly here: in a focus on 
the transformative consequences of knowledge which fails to fully understand the invention and 
creative continuation of knowledge and the practices aimed at transformation and change. 
This critique reflects a common charge brought against structuralist-Marxist epistemologies and 
applies in the same way to the concept of heterotopia. Foucault’s other orderings and other spaces 
may provide a concept for thinking about deviant modes of ordering, but at the same time, they 
are situated within the setting of regularities and regulators. Transformation is therefore framed 
as affirmation of persistent structures and structuring effects of the social field, while alternative 
modes of ordering seem to be nothing more than an interruption of the ordering routine in 
lived-in places. Heterodoxy and heretic behavior remain mediated by the ruling doxa (DEER 
2008: 124). 
Working along these conceptualizations and the corresponding critique while also the dealing 
with socio-spatial differences and the production of power relations has provided the foundation 
for new pathways in cultural geography. Beginning in the late 1980s, under the direct or indirect 
influence of key thinkers in cultural studies such as Stuart Hall (cf. MITCHELL 2011), cultural 
geographical research—at least within an Anglo-American context—became more theory-
sensitive. It began moving away from the rather descriptive and partly universalist position of 
classical cultural geography and opening towards sociological epistemologies on society and 
space, while still keeping the empirical inquiries on the ground of everyday inequalities and 
injustices (see JACKSON 1989b: 9ff.). Contributors such as JACKSON (1989b), CRESSWELL 
(1996), PILE & KEITH (1997), ROUTLEDGE (1997), and HUBBARD (2005), to name a few, 
strongly advocated an understanding for the formation of society and space as a series of 
relational processes that are linked to the production and reproduction of structure as well as to 
intrinsic power relations and their respective representations through symbols, semiotics, and 
practices within everyday life and lived-in places. Working with their contributions is of essential 
value for a critical understanding of cultural geography as a discipline that aims to understand 
human life-worlds as culturally contingent, in between the objective world of materiality and 
the intersubjective realm of consciousness and experiences (JACKSON 1989b: 48). They demand 
questioning not only the ways that the social relations are structured, shaped, experienced, and 
interpreted but also specifically the transformative powers of so-called subordinate, counter-
hegemonic cultures. Understanding cultural geography as a discipline that is obliged to produce 
maps of cultural orderings (ESCHER & WEICK 2004) has been of crucial importance in the face 
of a postmodern and post-structuralist tendency which increasingly renders ontological 
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questions intangible, or even undesirable, while constantly pushing the production of 
geographical knowledge into the field of literature studies and empirical undertakings into the 
realm of textual debates. 
Socio-spatial orderings must be understood as cultural orders and orderings, because any 
understanding of difference and differentiation is contingent upon the capacity and capability 
for cultural knowledge embedded and embodied in the respective subjects (ESCHER & WEICK 
2004: 260). Thus, culture is “the medium through which people transform the mundane 
phenomena of the material world into a world of significant symbols to which they give meaning 
and attach value” (CLARKE, HALL, JEFFERSON et al. 1976: 10). Through culture, “people’s raw 
experience” is converted into a world of significant symbols against the backdrop of 
geographical and historical contingency, namely the dynamic processes that produce culture(s) 
through the agency of “real men and women” (JACKSON 1989b: 48). In this regard, lived-in 
places are produced by the ideologic underpinnings of culture, while at the same time being the 
field of meaningful practices of order and ordering, producing positionality, agenda, and power 
relations. To understand challenging modes of order and ordering, we must first understand 
place-making processes, the where of cultures’ negotiations, productions, reproductions, and 
subversions. 
CRESSWELL (1996: 176) makes a strong point in this regard when stating that “any social 
transformation, to be successful, has to be understood as a spatial transformation.” But what is 
the entry point for inducing change, the starting point for durable social transformation? It is 
not the modes of domination but rather the underlying patterns of perceived hegemony (ibid.: 
16). Such a starting point directly challenges the genesis of social and spatial modes of order and 
ordering, constituting the setting one’s own agenda instead of setting something upon the other's 
agenda, to refer to Steven Luke’s differentiations of power dimensions (LUKES 2005). The 
patterns underlying hegemony are ideological beliefs, i.e. the production and reproduction, the 
continuation, and interruption of meaningful ideas and related practices, which must be 
understood as both social and spatial at the same time. Ideologies are neither just a system of 
ideas and representations which dominate the minds of the people (PEET 1998: 122f.) nor a 
simple set of ideas (CRESSWELL 1996: 16); they are the very basis guiding human practice. 
In order to conceptualize the challenging of order and ordering in terms of transformation and 
change in society and space, CRESSWELL (1996) as well as PILE & KEITH (1997) introduce the 
theoretical idea of resistance to make approaching heretical geographies or geographies of resistance 
possible. According to ROUTLEDGE (1997: 69), resistance can be conceptualized as  
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“any action, imbued with intent, that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular 
circumstances relating to societal relations, processes, and/or institutions. These 
circumstances may involve domination, exploitation, subjection at the material, 
symbolic, or psychological level.”  
Thus, geographies of resistance not only contain counter-reactions to existing modes of order 
and ordering; they move the formation of new configurations to the foreground of the analysis. 
Yet, as the relational perspective assert, these configurations do not arise in a socio-spatial setting 
that is completely uncoupled from the realm of hegemonic order. Instead, they point in two 
directions. Similar to the dual direction of heterotopia, resistance is either inward-looking, pointing 
the transformation towards the maps of power, or it is outward-oriented, towards something 
new, which is often based on intangible, invisible, and unconscious desires and beliefs (PILE 
1997: 60). It can thus be seen as the practice heretic to the heterodoxic topoi within the doxic landscape. 
In his introductory remarks to the edited volume geographies of resistance, PILE (1997: 27ff.) defines 
the spatiality of resistance along four analytical dimensions: location, boundaries, movement, and 
territorialization. The first, (1) location, is inspired by the account of MOHANTY (1987) on the 
politics of location and looks at difference, unity, and positionality within the spatiality of 
counter-hegemonic struggles. The location of resistance is not permanent or fixed but rather 
defines the place-making politics of resistance through constant socio-historical experiences of 
inequality or injustice. “The unity of communities or resistance is formed through the 
production of location as much as through the uncovering of location within the phantasms of 
multiple power relations” (PILE 1997: 28ff.). Location thus has a spatial-political and socio-
political quality to it. It represents the ground on which resistance is carried out as well as the 
positionality that is taken up in contestations of power relations. Characterized by the same 
fluidity, (2) boundaries define and delineate spaces of resistance. They convey the temporality and 
spatiality of the struggle and are constitutive of both inner, psychic resistance and outer, political 
resistance. Boundaries mark out locatable formations of difference through resistance. The 
dimension of (3) movement must be understood as a consequence of location and boundaries. This 
dimension deals with the actual mobility of a counter-hegemonic, transformative power and 
explains the practice of confinement as a common social and spatial practice in authoritative 
and oppressive regimes (e.g. through prisons, ghettos, or segregated lived-in places, as in the 
example of South African apartheid). This dimension also explains why the aspects of origin, 
path, and destination are of such importance to so-called social movements: they build up their 
position by spatializing the location of injustice and the boundaries of resistance on site. Movement 
also points towards the issue of scale of resistance by making the exchange, translation, and 
transformation of meaningful ideas possible. This touches again on the where of social order, as 
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discussed above. If movement implies changing location, then mobilization is always strategic and 
never happens in a spontaneous manner, though it may be presented that way. Finally, the 
spatiality of resistance must be understood through the aspect of (4) territorialization, which links 
all other dimensions to the actual processes of place-making as contested practices. Resistance 
implies space is territory and transgresses by conquering, administrating, and regulating space. 
Here, power is most essentially the power to control demarcated space, “to occupy it and 
guarantee that hegemonic ideas about that space coincide with those which maintain power’s 
authority” (ibid.: 27ff.). In a certain way, the more fixed and undisputed the spatiality of 
resistance as territory becomes, the less it actually is resistance; at some point, it becomes 
bounded ordering. Territorialization and re-territorialization is the mobilization of power through 
symbols in and of space. Resistance as territory can therefore be understood as the most 
spatialized dimension: Although it does not necessarily imply a space of exclusion, the process 
of territorialization drastically aims at transforming meaning and enabling territory to become a 
space of belonging, thereby undermining those modes of order and ordering which rest on the 
idea of territory as a natural source of power. 
Approaching the question of agency and intentionality of change, COMAROFF & COMAROFF 
(1991: 31) debate the issue of conceptualizing and defining resistance—understood as the nature 
of protest and symbolic struggle—in the light of consciousness and motivation: “Does an act 
require explicit consciousness and articulation to be properly called ‘resistance’? Should the term 
apply only to the intentions behind social and political acts, or may it refer equally to their 
consequences?” In their view, the question cannot be addressed with an either/or answer as 
most historical examples are “extremely murky” in this respect. “Just as technologies of control 
run the gamut from overt coercion to implicit persuasion, so modes of resistance may extend 
across a similarly wide spectrum” (ibid.). Still, their study on resistance to specific missionary 
encounters in Southern Africa points convincingly to an understanding of agency of change as 
a collective effort to gain “conceptual mastery over a changing world” (ibid.). Viewed through 
the framework of this study, the agency of change means to bring forward one’s own agenda 
and sense of order instead of placing desires and interests onto an-other agenda. Nevertheless, 
their study also shows that the concept of resistance has its inherent limits and that a further 
differentiation may be necessary. 
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Agency of Change: From Resistance to Transgression 
Resistance is a meaningful word which covers manifold practices. For BARBALET (1985), it is 
an irreducible concept in any theory of power and is realized within each specific social 
characteristic of power relations. Resistance is thus a variation in the modes of order and 
ordering, an intentionally counter-hegemonic act when expressed and acted out, which remains 
at the same time intrinsically linked to the orderly and ordering environment. CRESSWELL 
(1996: 22ff.) vocalizes strong discontent with the concept’s scope and scale in his own study on 
place-making practices of resistance and what he terms heretical geographies. He argues that 
theoretical accounts of resistance have reached such an extreme that almost everything, “from 
eating to walking to writing books and making films” is cast in the light of the word, while its 
conceptual value has become lost in an intangible romanticism of the everyday (ibid.: 22). When 
it comes to power and domination, resistance is one counter-gemenonic aspect. But does it lead 
to actual changes in lived-in conditions? After all, resistances are meaningful practices which 
take an oppositional stance to the dominating field. Therefore, the politics of resistance may 
have intent but lack autonomy, whereas radically transformative ideologies ideally entail the 
capacity to remove themselves from the sphere of influence of domination.  
A more distinctive conceptualization is available in the idea of transgression, which literally 
means “crossing a boundary” (CRESSWELL 1996: 21). These boundary-crossings, real and 
symbolic, challenge the bounded territories of social and spatial order and therefore constitute 
geographies of transformation: “The geographical ordering of society is founded on a multitude 
of acts of boundary making – of territorialization – whose ambiguity is to simultaneously open 
up the possibilities for transgression.” (CRESSWELL 1996: 149). The commonsensical of the 
lived-in places is thus questioned in earnest as transgressions break with “normality” and 
thereby destabilize what is “assumed,” “taken for granted,” and considered “natural” (ibid.: 26).  
“Just as it is the case that space and place are used to structure a normative world, they 
are also used (intentionally or otherwise) to question that normative world. There has 
been a great deal of discussion about marginality, resistance, and the construction of 
difference recently. Here I wish to delineate the construction of otherness through a 
spatially sensitive analysis of transgression. Transgression, I shall argue, serves to 
foreground the mapping of ideology onto space and place, and thus the margins can tell 
us something about ‘normality’.” (CRESSWELL 1996: 9) 
For CRESSWELL, the major difference between the concept of resistance and that of 
transgression is the level of intentionality. Acts of transgression do not necessarily rest on intent; 
instead, they are oriented towards results, towards a particular action being noticed. Here again, 
a proximity to the theoretical roots of structuralist and relational perspectives on society and 
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space becomes evident. However, when acted intentionally, transgression becomes a “form of 
resistance that creates a response from the establishment—an act that draws the lines on a 
battlefield and defines the terrain on which contestation occurs” (CRESSWELL 1996: 23). In 
terms of spatiality, transgressions do not form their own orders but do allow for alternative 
territorializations with the inherent contingency of new modes of order and ordering. While 
acts of resistance are inherently part of the order (HETHERINGTON 1997: 139), transgression 
moves beyond or causes dis-order within the system. A law, a code of order, an agreed-upon set 
of rules can be transgressed. It implies a breach, a violation, and defiance. Transgressive acts 
themselves are acts of nonobservance and disobedience. Transgression implies the quality of 
irreversible consequences, a boundary-crossing aimed at pushing forward, not to step back 
again. This contradicts with the perspective offered by CRESSWELL (1996: 166) that 
transgressions do not form their own order because they critique instead of replacing 
boundaries. That is true of resistance, which is inherently limited by the fact that every practice 
of resistance must acknowledge those power structures it means to question. However, 
transgressions, as they are understood here, can also hold a possibility, a window of opportunity, 
for re-configuring existing modes of order and creating new ones. This argument augments the 
binary focus on creation vs. critique within the conceptual debate on social and spatial re-
ordering (i.e. creating new modes of order vs. critiquing existing modes of order), extended it 
through a third dimension of facilitation (i.e. facilitating new modes of order and ordering, even 
if just as ideas). Transgression thus offers two possibilities: either to take a stand against the 
existing ordering sphere (transgression as a heterotopic act) or to move beyond it, not returning 
back across the boundary which has been transgressed (transgression as a utopic act). In this 
regard, CRESSWELL (1996: 166) may be right in arguing that constant transgression entails 
continuous chaos. According to the perspective on structure, agency, and the reproduction of 
social and spatial ordering discussed above, this would mean that only constant chaos can 
facilitate an earnest momentum for re-ordering. The chaos of transgression can generate the 
momentum for attempting a utopic idea. 
In light of the objectives of this study, the question arises: Is religious conversion chaos? This 
could be true to a certain degree, insofar as conversion is understood as an intentional act 
transgressive to the everyday life led so far. In order to understand resistance to or transgression 
of persisting inequalities within a cultural landscape that is shaped by a history of oppression, 
dispossession, devaluation of cultural heritage, and violence, maps of cultural orderings have to 
be crafted which reveal the interrelations of actors, communities, material structures, and 
institutions (ESCHER & WEICK 2004). A cultural geography that acknowledges the structuring 
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effects of positionality as well as the agency of intersubjectivity in the lived-in places has the 
potential to produce maps that engaging with practices, experiences, and representations of 
everyday life and thus to disclose the doxic landscapes to the analytic eye. As multilayered 
constructs, such maps include and reflect spatial differences and differentiations. Understanding 
and engaging with spatial differences in cultural orders means acknowledging the aggregations 
of cultural knowledge which prevail and their varying and uneven distribution. It also means 
ascribing the cultural quality to these maps of order. (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 260). Yet, such 
maps need not be specific maps of resistance (nor do they need to solely focus on religious aspects). 
Analyzing the practices and politics of everyday life, the symbols of differentiation, and the 
practices of empowerment and social cohesion through maps of cultural orderings can help us 
understand the acts and aspirations of de- and re-territorialization in the featured case of 
conversion to Islam by people once classified as Black African under the colonial and apartheid 
rule of South Africa. As a first layer of such a map, the following section will introduce the 
particularities, path dependencies, and spatial differences ordering the South African context, 
exploring its history of ordering indigeneity by means of racialized ideologies on society and 
space.  
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South Africa’s Orderly Indigeneity: 
Colonial Roots, Apartheid’s 
Perfection, Post-Apartheid Leeway 
Looking at global developments over the twentieth century, South African society is far from 
the only one that was (and is to some extent still) characterized by racialized injustice and 
colonial oppression enacted by regimes that defined themselves as White or European 
supremacist. Nor was it the only society to officially break with its divisive political past to 
embark on a path of liberation and transformation. In terms of segregative, racist policies and 
lived realities, the social dynamics in South Africa may justify comparisons with those of the 
United States (see FREDRICKSON 1981, 1995). Within the field of African independence, South 
Africa is often be described as the latecomer, the last on the continent to break with its colonial 
past. It is, however, a problematic misconception that national entities, or better nationally 
territorialized societies, could free themselves by political declaration and discourse from the 
structures and effects of intentionally governed and constantly inscribed inequalities, which 
evolved across multiple colonial genealogies around ideologies of us vs. them, of superiority and 
inferiority. On the contrary, central to change are the people, living as they do in their respective 
regions—the locations of order—their daily lives imbued with the orderly concepts and ideologies 
which justify those inequalities long taken for granted. It is they who must question and 
challenge the embodied dispositions and practiced routines for themselves and for society at 
large. For this reason, changes in the modes of social and spatial order and ordering and their 
related processes are, to say the least, difficult to compare. Moreover, such changes unfold on 
various levels—the locales of order—from lived-in places to regional peculiarities and global 
relations. Different capacities for change exist at each scale, which are complicated by the inertia 
of the materiality of place (CRESSWELL 1996: 159f.), those unavoidable site effects that the 
physical, built up habitat has upon the inhabitants (BOURDIEU 1999 [1993]). Thus, what is 
declared on a representational level must be translated to, and decidedly accepted and enacted 
by, diverse actors and institutions within their social and spatial settings, each of whom has their 
specific, power-related contingencies and positionalities, their modes and rates of converting the 
symbolic capital of a political act into economic, social, and cultural realities. Change in social 
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and spatial relations is seldom brought about by those who declare the process; it is more often 
implemented by specific repercussions within the social and spatial settings. In other words, 
change has to be attached to meaning, collectively and individually (cf. CRESSWELL 2014a: 5). 
The logical consequence is the questioning of those meaningful practices that reproduce the 
existing modes of order, i.e. the sense of place as a sense of ordering, a knowing of the ordering 
logics as well as one's own position within them. This does not always correspond with an 
officially declared discourse of change, as is the case in the featured study on conversion to 
Islam. 
The South African situation exemplifies the persistence of modes of social and spatial ordering 
and othering as a consequence of colonial domination. More than twenty-five years after the end 
of apartheid, declared by the first free and equal elections in 1994, polarizations along the lines 
of the former population groups still exist, though they have been slowly translated into 
corresponding economic lines (HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017). The endurance of these 
effects, which has up until now rendered South African society one of the most socially unequal 
on the globe (DE LA FONTAINE, MÜLLER, HOFMANN et al. 2017b: 4), is brought about by the 
prevailing cultural, economic, social, and political structures, as well as by meaningful practices, 
the injustices lived out in the lived-in places. 
South Africa carries a dubious uniqueness: Not only did the period of apartheid lead to an 
anachronistic continuation of colonialism and White supremacy, it did so through a carefully 
orchestrated, insidious concept of cultural ordering, a radical modernity in social and spatial 
terms (DODSON 2000: 155). The doxic landscapes (CRESSWELL 2003: 277) that evolved led to an 
orderly continuation of the oppressive dialectics, or bi-polarizations (cf. CHRISTOPHER 2002), 
by inscribing racial difference and racist differentiation into society and space. On the one hand 
was the noble conqueror, the progressive colonialist, the devout missionary, the civilized settler. 
On the other was the primitive native, the underdeveloped tribesperson, the sinful heathen, the 
disorderly African. In order to facilitate this dialectic and the resulting reign of a White minority, 
practices for differentiating intermediary population groups according to color variations arose 
within the grand dialectic of White/Non-White, which kept those classified as White on top of 
the social hierarchy and the indigenous subjects at the very bottom. 
The following section will cast light on the question of how racial categories and the resulting 
cultural hierarchies have been made commonsensical through everyday modes and politics of 
oppression and segregation on all scales of the society, from benches to trains and from beaches 
to whole regions of the country. Inequality among the people living in South Africa became 
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naturalized (COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 28) with the help of imagined origins, projected 
belongings, far-fetched biologisms, and cultural stereotypes. Moreover, the whole ideology of 
dividing people according to racialized population groups while keeping them segregated in 
social as well as spatial terms was deeply influenced and legitimized by religious motivation, 
namely a politically mythologized belief (and pretext) that it was God’s instruction to separate 
the groups from each other in order to facilitate their development.  
The matters of colonial and apartheid rule, the domination of a White minority, their effects on 
social and spatial configurations as well as ethnicity and political identity, and last but not least, 
the shift from apartheid to post-apartheid governance are already the focus of a wide array of 
literature from various fields, including geography, political science, planning, and 
developmental studies, just to name a few (see amongst others HORRELL 1971; BALDWIN 1974; 
MABIN 1992; CHRISTOPHER 2001; TUROK 2001; OSMANOVIC 2002; SIHLONGONYANE 2002; 
HAFERBURG 2013; JOHNSTON 2014; DE LA FONTAINE, MÜLLER, HOFMANN et al. 2017a). To 
avoid a repetitive recapitulation of these diverse studies, I present here a selection of specific 
aspects, chosen to provide the reader with an introduction to the cornerstones of these topics 
and their effects on society, space, and place. Two perspectives therefore make up the focus: 
ordering as cultural politics and practices of racial classification and ordering as spatial politics 
and practices of territorial segregation. Both reflect the historical developments of oppression, 
dispossession, and exploitation that affected—on a very real, subjectively experienced level—
the everyday lives of the majority of people living in South Africa. Both perspectives are 
important to understanding the shared history of suffering that frames the meaning of Blackness 
in the colonial and post-colonial realities of South Africa. In the subsequent chapter, I will 
explore the question of what roles religion played in this socio-historical narrative as an 
affiliation, a faith, an ideology, a lived-in place, and a way of life. This I do by locating the 
dimension of religion within the modes of order and ordering, thereby preparing the ground 
for a critical and comprehensive debate on conversion to Islam. But first, the ideological 
foundation of Whiteness (cf. WALTER 2001: 22) and the construction of an orderly indigeneity 
for the disorderly African must be discussed. 
Putting Whiteness on Top: Ideological Foundations for 
Ordering Indigeneity 
“Southern Africans noticed the ‘white man’ and the ‘black man’ from the time whites 
arrived. But they noticed other things too. Whites thought they were ‘white.’ They also 
thought they were ‘civilized,’ ‘Calvinist’ ‘burgher’ ‘settlers’ from ‘Christian’ ‘Europe’ and 
were more affluent than ‘black,’ ‘savage’ ‘natives’ from ‘heathen’ ‘Africa,’ who were poor 
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besides. It is anachronistic to assume, therefore, that race necessarily took precedence 
over lesser identities or that the lesser identities derived from color. The status and the 
meaning of ‘whiteness’—and of color in general—were not given; they were ambiguous, 
contested, and in flux.” (MACDONALD 2006: 40) 
Colonial and apartheid modes of order and ordering were established on different scales, in 
different spheres, and at different points in time in order to keep the European settler and 
colonialist minority constantly in power while keeping everybody else profoundly in place. 
These modes devaluing being African by placing indigenous people not only at the bottom of the 
economic spectrum, but also on the spatial fringes and outskirts in both urban and regional 
terms. Intermediary color groups were placed in between—in terms of governance, as well as 
spatial zoning—in order to establish a hierarchy through direct as well as indirect rule. 
Population influx brought about by the dynamics of the colony facilitated the constructing 
population groups such as Coloureds, Indians, or Asians, who were—in the eyes of the ruling 
minority—distinct from both the ruling class and the indigenous population. The descendants 
of early Dutch settlers and Non-European women—enslaved, indigenous, or both—also found 
themselves classified in this in-between-ness. The Black/White, or African/Non-African 
polarity became “a variant of the indigenous-immigrant dichotomy, assuming that the 
Coloured and Indian population would identify with the Whites if offered full political and 
economic rights” (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 98). The diverse pathways open during the colonial 
period were succeeded by the apartheid regime, which in its radical modernist approach to state 
and society holds the dubious honor of uniqueness within the global history of the twentieth 
century. Apartheid was the institutionalization of an emerging but contested settler-colonial 
identity that was based on Whiteness as an idea of racial inclusion, superiority, and supposedly 
civilized hegemony (cf. BONDS & INWOOD 2016; MORRELL, WRIGHT & MEINTJES 1996: 53; 
CASHMORE 1996: 377ff.). The extensive success of this system of segregative policies relied on 
the enforcement of cultural separation through spatial order across all aspects of daily life, as 
well as through local, regional, national, and international politics and relations (cf. DODSON 
2000: 155). The ordering of space and the production of orderly places produced and re-
produced an ideological structure of orderly indigeneity by inscribing the logics ordering the 
indigenous population as the African other into the physical habitat, which in turn became the 
means of structuring the people living there. Invoking the conceptual term indigeneity in a 
colonial setting like the South African one does not imply that settler and migrant communities 
have no right to postulate a sense of indigeneity and belonging to the place themselves, as this 
would obscure the conceptual undertaking in a deterministic way. After all, the essential 
territorial aim of settler colonialism was to bring about a place-bound sense of belonging, i.e. a 
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new sense of indigeneity. Nevertheless, as CAMERON, DE LEEUW & GREENWOOD (2009: 356) 
point out, the specific difference between the settlers' perspective and that of the indigenous 
population lies the fact that the latter has no “other homeland” to return to. Meanwhile, in the 
South African context, the settler colonialists’ production of belonging to place entailed the dis-
ordering and re-ordering of the indigenous other through the politics and practices of enforced 
uprootings, relocations, and re-groundings at a new place chosen by the intruders. In other 
words, the creation of the White minority’s domination and belonging amounted to the 
displacement and the ordering of indigeneity. In certain ways, the heuristic category of African 
diaspora therefore applies to the socially and spatially re-ordered indigenous African population 
of South Africa in the same way it does to the descendants of the slave trade on the American 
continents. The conceptual difference is first and foremost a geographic one. What unites both 
sides of the Black Atlantic, to draw on the conceptual understanding of shared Blackness proposed 
by GILROY (1991, 1993, 2000), are the continuous acts of differentiation and politics of 
difference brought about by the European settlers, which became the central justification for all 
subsequent aspects of oppression and segregation, be they social or spatial (cf. POSEL 2001b: 
62). In South Africa in the nineteenth century, the very European ideas of race and racial 
differentiation based on phenotypical ascription entered the picture as the primary marker of 
colonial domination, becoming the ideological foundation for the cultural political dialectic of 
Whiteness and Blackness. However, what seems to be a clear-cut dichotomy—at least in semantic 
terms—reveals a complexity best understood by tracing the historical developments that led to 
the establishment of the prevailing cultural orderings and the political and ideological 
construction of the African other, exploring its role in patterns of White domination.  
From the establishment of the very first outpost of the Dutch East India Company in 1652, the 
relations between the European colonialists and the indigenous population were violently 
confrontational and characterized by the Europeans’ perception of their superiority to the 
peoples already living there. As the settlement which became Cape Town was meant to be a 
refreshment outpost for ships on their voyage around the Cape, territorial expansionism and 
the exploitation of resources seemed to be the sole strategies of the colonialists. This quickly led 
to clashes, first with the Khoikhoi pastoralists and San hunter-gatherers and later, in the course 
of the colony’s expansion, with Bantu-speaking farmers. In a historical-anecdotical way, the 
planting of a thick hedge east of the intruder’s settlement can be seen as be South Africa’s first 
materialization of a demarcated boundary, at least according to the European understanding 
of a boundary (cf. THOMPSON 2001: 38; CHRISTOPHER 2001: 13). This territorial expansionism 
should not be understood as a random development but rather as the result of the establishment 
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of settler community whose autonomy was gradually increasing. In need of more resources, the 
Dutch semi-migrant farmers called the trekboers moved farther inland, originally under the 
authority of the colony’s administration, who mandated and surveyed their movement through 
a system of land tenure until part of the trekboer population sought independence to form their 
own sphere of social and territorial governance (THOMPSON 2001: 50f.; DAVENPORT & HUNT 
1974: 1). In a socio-political constellation that consisted of dominating Europeans, exploited 
indigenous people, and a growing number of slaves brought to the Cape as a workforce, land 
and labor were the means of defining and maintaining an exploitative hegemony (cf. FREUND 
1976: 55). The capitalistic idea of European civilization was deemed superior to that of the Non-
European others. Yet this self-appointed superiority slowly took hold on different grounds. 
GUELKE (1989) argues that the progressive formation of a settler community of free burghers on 
the territory of the Dutch East Indian Company's outpost was accompanied by a growing sense 
of exclusivity, of being a community at home, though away from their places of origin. “This 
sense of superiority took a variety of forms which had less to do with how Europeans saw non-
Europeans than it did with how they saw themselves” (ibid.: 44). It was not solely directed in 
antagonism to the indigenous population but rather to all Non-European subjects, including 
slaves from other parts of the African continent as well as from other regions of the world. Racial 
ascriptions played an increasing role but were secondary to a social hierarchical self-awareness 
built on belonging—both to the place of origin and the place of arrival at the same time. 
This nascent ideology of othering changed with the arrival of British colonial forces at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. With war waging in Europe, the British Empire took hold 
of the strategically important settlement at the Cape. Under their rule, the previously 
unquestioned supremacy of Dutch settlers came into limbo: The policy of equalization 
(gelykstelling in Afrikaans) proclaimed by the British made it necessary to justify the hegemonic 
narrative anew:  
“Talk of equalization unveiled the substructure of the social order. Whites, without 
having thought much about it, had achieved systematic supremacy, but had bothered 
justifying only slavery. […] Subordinating nonwhites was the linchpin of white society, 
but whites took the supremacy they had achieved for granted until Britain’s talk of 
reform forced them to clarify what had been implicit all along. […] That is, whites 
adopted racialization as a strategy to justify the supremacy that had evolved more or less 
independently of racial feelings.” (MACDONALD 2006: 38) 
From then on, two interrelated regimes of identity construction and othering, both based on 
the premise of Whiteness, gained momentum. On the one hand was the British imperial colony, 
with its logics of conquering, classifying, and ruling indirectly, which was granting political 
franchise in gradual degrees to different parts of the dominated population. On the other hand 
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was an expansionistic Boer society, which depended heavily on the exploitation of Non-
European slave labor. Here, an Afrikaner political identity emerged, based on the Great Trek, a 
religiously biased and heavily mythologized narrative of the exodus of the Boer from British 
domination, which succeeded the trekboer migrations farther inland5. It is, however, difficult to 
speak of the Boer or Afrikaner society in terms of a coherent and institutionalized shared realm 
of ordering and belonging. What became Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid were rooted in 
a long process of cultural differentiation and defining White citizenship. What became Afrikaner 
identity started with settlers employed by the Dutch East Indies Company who began to 
perceive themselves as burghers. As MACDONALD (2006: 38) argues, differentiating belonging 
along the lines of Black and White slowly became an essential aspect of their citizenship. 
Boer expansionism, British imperialism, and their conflicting, militarized struggles over the 
territorial domination of South Africa characterized the establishment of the White/Non-White 
differentiation (cf. VAN DEN BERGHE 1978: 100). The conflict between the Boer and the British 
ended with the territorial merging of the two British colonies, Natal and Cape, with the 
Afrikaner republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State to form the Union of South Africa in 
1910. Thus was the turning point for all further developments in the conception of a South 
African state and society at large (HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017: 57f.).  
Along the way, existing African nations such as the Zulu, Ndebele, or Sotho—themselves 
entrenched in conflict—were effectively stripped of their independent territories in military 
encounters with Afrikaner and British forces (VAN DEN BERGHE 1978: 100). What came into 
being was a racialized regime of territorial governance and cultural politics that was comprised 
of both oppressors’ worlds, making use of the imperial logic of division and rule and the 
ideological influences of social Darwinism on the one hand, while inheriting and incorporating 
the Afrikaner self-awareness and racist othering on the other. The numerical minority was no 
longer just defined as European but as White, while the majority of others were divided into 
subgroups, enabling the minority to wield power over land and labor by converting constructed 
color differences into policies (MACDONALD 2006: 35). In contrast to the standard British 
colonial strategies, no attempts were made at state level to Europeanize the African other, i.e. to 
carve out hybrid subjects. On the contrary, what was not classified as White was to be kept 
aside, in a parallel sphere and parallel space of separate development. White/Non-White 
 
5Afrikaner started to appear as a self-description in the second half of the eighteenth century and was related to the 
settlers’ growing independence and differentiation from their motherland of Holland (cf. TIRYAKIAN 1957: 388). 
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became the basic definitions for the racialized segregation and classification of the people living 
in South Africa and remains up until now enshrined in the census categories. 
 
 
Map 1: Political map of South Africa, 1899. Source: (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 16). 
Numerical proportions also played another role: The oppressive regimes that ruled over the 
different phases of colonial and apartheid history were well aware of being in the minority. This 
aspect was of less importance during the expansionist phases, in part because of the rather 
weakened state of the African political entities and societies with whom the settlers and 
colonialist came into contact. This weakened state was the result of decades of brutal 
militarization and totalitarian conflict brought about by the expansion of the Zulu kingdom 
throughout the northern and eastern regions of Southern Africa during the nineteenth century 
(see THOMPSON 2001: 70ff.). In contrast, with an increasing rate of urbanization, the territorial 
supremacy of the White minority was increasingly being seen as contested at the turn of the 
twentieth century. The establishment of a rigid segregative regime that kept the other—whether 
classified as Bantu or Black, Native, Coloured, or Indian—in a constant state of cultural, 
political, economic, and spatial difference to the White colonialist. This regime’s main focus 
rested on the indigenous population. The rise to power of the Afrikaner National Party after 
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the 1948 election and the subsequent rule of apartheid with its ordering logics must be seen in 
this light:  
“Apartheid was underpinned by a hankering for order – an orderly society and an orderly 
state to tame the perceived dissolution and turbulence engendered during the 1940s. For 
many anxious whites, the fate of white supremacy had grown precarious, endangered by 
the spectre of die swart gevaar (the black danger) threatening to overwhelm the cities.” 
(POSEL 2001b: 57) 
Apartheid, therefore, was the culmination of a lengthy process of constructing, defining, 
delineating, territorializing, and ordering the native African at the far end of the social spectrum 
through classification, legislation, and spatial distribution. With the establishment of the Union 
of South Africa, Whiteness essentially meant privilege—political, economic, and social. In order 
to prolong this status in the face of changing circumstances, an orderly indigeneity was created, 
which took “the form of laws, customs and traditions. A racist ethos, a deeply embedded racist 
habitus constantly helped to justify whites’ loss of feeling for human fellowship with blacks” 
(MBEMBE 2010: no pagination). POSEL (2001a) provides a vivid summary of the paradoxes and 
absurdities involved in trying to construct the social and cultural conditions as well as the origins 
and places of belonging of the indigenous, native African through the force of law (cf. also 
JACKSON 1989a: 180). This difficulty of this task is also reflected in the discussion offered by 
CHRISTOPHER (2002) on shifting census categories throughout the twentieth century, a topic 
which will find room for debate further below in the context of counting Muslims in South 
Africa (see section “Islam and classification: The questionable representation of census data in 
South Africa”). Similarly, MACDONALD (2006: 41) points to the rather interesting etymological 
aspect of the dominating groups’ self-categorization as “White,” or “Blank” as it was called in 
Afrikaans: “It was as if whites were saying both that they were lightly colored and that they were 
without color […]. It was as if their identity was incomplete until contrast with their opposites 
completed them.” This antagonistic othering reflects the intrinsic unsettledness of the different 
oppressive groups that came from Europe. Despite their diverse and conflicting interests in 
power over and power through territory, their shared identity converged around a common 
core of social, political, and partly cultural self-perceptions, which were intrinsically defined in 
negative comparison to the native other. At the same time, this “other” became constructed as 
homogenous groups of people in the eyes of the Europeans, leading to the ordering of African 
indigeneity in social, cultural, economic, and spatial terms. This emphasizes the dialectic, not 
binary, relationship between Whiteness and Blackness within the South African context and could 
therefore also point to an aspect less prominent in the attempts to deal with persistant 
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polarizations after the end of apartheid. Leaving this point aside, the next section will deal with 
the institutionalization of racial classification and segregation with regard to spatial orderings. 
The Spatial Ordering of Indigeneity 
Conceptualizing social and spatial modes of order and ordering as described above, place as 
location reflects the bounded orientation of order, and place as locale implies the structured and 
structuring articulation of ordering, while sense of place offers an analytical view of ordering as 
belonging, i.e. the incorporated and intersubjectively represented and reproduced dispositions 
of order. Regarding the socio-historical path dependency of South African society and its 
particular history of colonization and apartheid, all three dimensions are of crucial importance 
for understanding the political, ideological, spatial, and practical strategies and logics of 
ordering indigeneity in the interest of upholding the hegemony of an oppressive minority. The 
majority, divided and segregated into different color groups, were dominated from without as 
well as from within. The radical modernity of this orderly racialized and racially ordered society 
is a result of the deeply ascribed and inscribed positions of actors and institutions within their 
social fields and physical relations. The systematic dispossession and deprivation of territorial 
powers through segregation and division and rule, as had already been practiced in so many 
other colonial contexts, was brought to a dubious perfection in the South African context by 
manifesting the classification of the majority of the society in spatial terms, producing orderly 
inhabitants in ordered habitats. For WESTERN (1981: 63), the magnitude of remodeling and 
reordering society through space on all scales of life finds no real comparison and was only made 
possible by rendering lived-in places “under virtual tabula rasa conditions.” The unwanted 
subjects and undesired bodies of constructed racial otherness were forcibly uprooted and 
removed, in order to be re-grounded in a manner that was orderly in the eyes of the dominating 
group. The spatial ordering of indigeneity led to the creation of orderly places for the African other 
in three steps: through racial classification, spatial manifestation, and the subsequent ordering 
and control of movement through the definition and demarcation of the places of everyday life. 
The specific feature in terms social and spatial modes of ordering is that uniting all three 
dimensions turned the questions of territorial location, social affiliation, and cultural 
representation into matters of citizenship, sense of belonging, and bodily experience 
(MACDONALD 2006). According to (APPIAH 2000), such powers of racism rest on the non-
collectivist power of ascription: 
“the body is central to race, gender, and sexuality but not so central to class and ethnicity. 
[...] [R]acial identification is simply harder to resist than ethnic identification. The 
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reason is twofold. First, racial ascription is more socially salient. Second [...] race is taken 
by so many people to be the basis for treating people differentially.”  
The following section will highlight the most important developments in this regard by working 
with examples from what is now the province of KwaZulu-Natal, the regional focus of this 
study. The discussion will start with a very brief review of the colonial roots of apartheid policies 
before moving on to the matters of classification and spatial manifestation on the different socio-
spatial scales. Then, the spatial-cultural politics of ordering and controlling the African other will 
be highlighted, before closing with some insights into the historical events that created Non-
White resistance ideologies. The two latter points are important to look at, as they form the a 
backdrop for a contextualized understanding of Black and Muslim resistance in the featured case 
studies. 
Pre-Apartheid 
In assigning the indigenous population to specific areas, the British colonial administrations had 
put reserves and locations into policy, practice, and place long before apartheid created African 
homelands and townships out of them. The Shepstone System was a plan, outlined by Secretary 
of Native Affairs Theophilus Shepstone in 1874, intended to reorder the indigenous population 
as workers and day laborers within the framework of a European-capitalistic ideology (MAYLAM 
& EDWARDS 1996: 148). Especially in the Natal colony, it demarcated areas for Africans which 
were governed by an officially recognized tribal system with customary laws. The British colony 
of Natal differed from the Cape and the Boer Republics in this regard, as it already had a system 
of land tenure and taxation in place, which had enabled White settlers and speculators to 
demand rents and labor from the Africans residing there since the second half of the nineteenth 
century (ETHERINGTON 1977: 35). The increasing urbanization of South Africa at the turn of 
the twentieth century—in many regards a result of the system of reserves and land tenure—
brought Africans to the expanding metropoles (for a historical account on Durban and Natal, 
see MAYLAM 1982). This led to an increase in the segregation of urban space as well as racial 
tensions in the sprawling urban centers (cf. MAYLAM 1995). Thus, in terms of spatial 
development and planning, the ideology and policies of apartheid perpetuated the political and 
administrative legacy of the colonial era and the formation of the Union of South Africa. For 
the rural areas, the legislative element was the Natives Land Act of 1913, which allowed the 
strict territorialization of the African population while at the same time prohibiting Africans 
from buying and owning land outside of the reserves. This led to the deprivation of residential 
rights for African families and households. For the White farmers and settlers, this policy was 
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understood as the removal of so-called black spots in an otherwise White landscape (SMITH 1990: 
14f.). In the case of the growing cities, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 was the 
corresponding legislation. Meanwhile, the funding of areas designated for Africans within the 
colonial cityscape was meant to be generated through a very peculiar system: 
“The search for a self-financing African housing process which would not burden white 
ratepayers, was partly resolved through the provisions of the Native Beer Act of 1908. 
The municipality was granted a monopoly over brewing and sale of traditional beer. 
[…]These developments were instrumental also in the establishment of a separate 
Native Administration Department in the municipality in 1910 to regulate African 
urbanization. The first in South Africa, the administrative structure and its housing 
system, largely financed by beer sale profits, became known as the ‘Durban System’. It 
subsequently spread to other centers and was used as a model in the formulation of the 
Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which, in post-colonial society, was to be the principle 
instrument in administering, controlling and managing urban Africans.” (DAVIES 1991: 
76) 
Under this so-called Durban system, the construction of houses, as well as the maintenance of 
infrastructure were to be financed through the sale of indigenous beer. Only very limited 
resources accumulated from the system, and as a result, the African areas quickly deteriorated 
(CHRISTOPHER 2001: 36). 
Both legislative developments, the Land Act and the Natives Act, are the very roots and 
preparatory groundwork for the wholesale segregation of Non-White South African society 
during apartheid. Although both Acts were repealed in 1991, the legacy of the removals brought 
about by the Land Act of 1913—the most severe and long-lasting uprootings of the indigenous 
population of South Africa—still impacts the country today. To frame it in numbers, the initial 
Act and its extensions allocated 12.9% of the South African territory to the African indigenous 
population, which at that time, as today, constituted the majority of the population (BALDWIN 
1974: 8). The underlying policies were based on a strong capitalistic ideology of commodifying 
and owning territory. At the same time, the locations within the urban areas were meant to 
supply the growing urban economy with a cheap workforce. However, these areas became a 
social mirror of the African homestead economy and were therefore the subject of continuous 
criticism (MESTHRIE 1984: 42), which resulted in the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937. 
This piece of legislation regulated the influx of male Africans into the colonial cities and gave 
each person fourteen days to find work, later reduced to three days during apartheid (WESTERN 
1981: 290). 
The late colonial period of the Union of South Africa has to be understood as the segregative 
legacy upon which the institutionalization of apartheid policies grew. It served as blueprint for 
the subsequent racist and segregationist regime by carving out the cornerstones of territorial 
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demarcation and forced relocation of the indigenous population, as well as the destruction of 
livelihoods through urbanization and the ensuing migrant workers system. 
Racial Classification 
Before removing major parts of the resident population, people first had to be classified and 
represented as other. Interestingly, “African” was not used as a category during colonialism or 
early apartheid; instead the terms used were “Kafir,” “Bantu,” “Native,” or since the 1980s, 
“Black” (see CHRISTOPHER 2002; VERWEY & QUAYLE 2012: 555). Aside from these semantic 
peculiarities, the “political construction with the force of law” (JACKSON 1989a: 180) of different 
population groups was a very racist and racialized undertaking. The legislative basis for the 
classification of the South African society as a whole was the Population Registration Act of 
1950, which initially defined four groups: Whites, Natives, Coloureds, and Indians (cf. SMITH 
1994: 226). The groups varied slightly over time but essentially reified the four basic groups, 
which still exist today as terms of the population census and official statistics. The intention of 
the Group Areas Act was the preservation of racial purity (see POSEL 2001a: 98ff.), but the 
actual acts of classification were purely arbitrary, based on physical appearance and what was 
defined by general acceptance (POSEL 2001b: 64), i.e. social reality in terms of interaction, language, 
religion, recent place of residence, and so on. 
“The system of population classification in South Africa is often referred to as ‘race’ 
classification. Opponents and supporters of this classification regularly refer uncritically 
to ‘race’ as the guiding principle, arguing that the system divides South Africans on the 
basis of color and other physical features. In fact, while stereotypes are likely to be 
concerned largely with physical characteristics, in practice both formal and informal 
classification is on the basis of several factors - appearance, descent, acceptance, 
language, behavior, and so on. Race classification is therefore not based exclusively on 
physical features of race.” (WEST 1988: 100f.) 
Physical appearance was essentially defined by biological aspects with a supposedly scientific 
background based in a racist discourse stemming from European human biology and 
anthropology (cf. HAFERBURG 2007: 91; MACDONALD 2006: 33). However, with the second 
aspect of general acceptance, things became more difficult. Here, race became the result of 
one’s own way of life. “In a tautological denial of the desirability of racial mixing, classifiers 
tended to read off an individual’s race from the dominant racial character of his or her 
residential area and community of associates” (POSEL 2001b: 66). As a result, schools, 
workplace, places of leisure—in essence all the places frequented on an everyday basis—became 
the basis for racial classification beyond the initial ascription through physical appearance. 
HAFERBURG (2007: 87) convincingly proposes the analytical dimension he terms 
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capital” as a means to properly frame and acknowledge the everyday politics of difference and 
practices of differentiation within the South African society. Still today, the practice of 
intersubjective othering persists among South Africans. Framing this power of positionality as 
a kind of capital within the social field—i.e. a trait that can be converted into other social 
relations and hierarchies (cf. HAFERBURG 2007: 92)—recognizes the social ontology of 
reciprocal stratification within the South African society, which had been inscribed as 
manifested dispositions through decades of classifying and being classified. 
The paradox involved in trying to define differentiated and monolithic population groups on 
such grounds is reflected in the legislative attempts to define White personage:  
“‘White person’ means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally 
accepted as a white person, but does not include a person, who, although in appearance 
obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person.” (Population 
Registration Act of 1950 as cited in CHRISTOPHER 2001: 101) 
Once enacted, these classifications became a matter of legal contestation, as the resulting 
population groups were not universally accepted, leading to processes of appeal and in some 
cases successful reclassification (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Changes in race classifications from 1983-1990. Source: (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 102). 
48 
Aside from these discursive obscurities, the actual practice of classification and its social and 
spatial contingency made both the act and the result a commonsensical experience. Racial 
difference became a lived-in as well as lived-out reality, a “self-evident, common-sensical and 
therefore utterly uncontroversial ‘fact’ of life in South Africa” (POSEL 2001b: 70; cf. POSEL 
2001a). This enforcement and thus inscription of the logics of classification as a relationality 
among the subjects of the differentiated groups was only possible because the groups were 
rendered not just racially but essentially culturally different (SHARP 1988: 79). Language, 
distinctive sets of everyday practices, habits, shared beliefs—all became characteristics of 
belonging, not to South Africa but to a certain segment of the population living on its territory. 
In the case of those classified as Black African, the cultural ordering as cultural othering was 
constructed in such a way that being classified as Native became antithetic to indigeneity. The 
orderly African first and foremost had to be an orderly alien to South African society and space. Yet, 
classification alone could not suffice for such a purpose. The politics of difference had to also be 
manifested in spatial segregation on all scales of daily life. 
Spatial segregation and manifestation 
The social and spatial logics of ordering introduced during the colonial period and 
institutionalized during apartheid took hold on different scales of society and space:  
• the macro-scale of national, international, and regional relations 
• the meso-scale of segregated municipalities 
• the micro-scale of segregation in the lived-in places of daily life.  
The latter came to be known as petty apartheid and was legislated by the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act of 1953. Separate premises, separate entrances, hotels for the different 
population groups (plus for guests with international status), and the racial demarcation of 
beaches (see Map 2), all were the result of ordering those spaces which could be possibly shared 
among the population groups.  
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Map 2: Beach segregation and desegregation in Durban. Source: (SMITH 1990: 28). 
The meso-scale of apartheid is the urban scale, represented by the segregated municipalities, 
which were remodeled to become apartheid cities through the governance, creation, and 
demolition of the habitat. On the macro-scale, primarily expressed by the demarcation of 
reserves before apartheid, the African population had been allocated to so-called homelands, 
or Bantustans, which were supposed to gain autonomy in the long run, thus creating pseudo-
federal states with international relations to the Republic of South Africa (EVANS 2012, 2014, 
2009; BALDWIN 1975; BUTLER, ROTBERG & ADAMS 1977; FERGUSON 2006: 55ff.). The 
establishment of a system of social and spatial segregation through policies and planning on the 
urban and regional scale was founded on the legislation of the Group Areas Act of 1950, as well 
as the Group Areas Development Act of 1955, which became the Community Development 
Act in 1966 (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 102f.). The Group Areas Act was the political landmark for 
apartheid planning. It allowed for and regulated the overall demarcation of areas in relation to 
population groups. 
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Map 3: Designated locations for population groups and African reserves before 1948.  Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
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Map 4: Group areas and KwaZulu Homeland in and around Durban in the 1980s.  Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
Maps 3 and 4 show the different spatializations of the Greater Durban Area before and after 
1948, as an example of this process. Reserves from as early as the colonial period represent the 
territorial approach to ordering in the demarcation of indigenous areas. With apartheid, these 
segregated zones and cultural boundaries were extended in their intentional orchestration, 
leading to the forced removals and relocations of the Non-White population groups, thereby 
influencing the lives of all South Africans. For people classified as Coloured or Indian, these 
effects unfolded predominantly on the meso-scale of the municipalities. Relocations took place 
where compliance with the group areas zoning schemes of the apartheid city had been deemed 
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necessary. However, these groups’ right to reside within the White-dominated urban space, and 
thus a certain sense of belonging, were not disputed. Citizenship was still restricted, but there 
were no policies in preparation to demarcate reserves or homelands for groups other than the 
Black African. People classified as Black African were, however, severely limited in their rights 
to reside freely and permanently outside of the homelands. Exceptions for resident of urban 
areas were only possible under one of the following conditions: a person had to be born in that 
area, a person had to have lived there without interruption for fifteen years, a person had to 
have worked in that area for the same employer for ten years (cf. SMITH 1990: 5). Everyone else 
practically became a citizen of a tribally designated homeland, the supposedly natural habitat and 
rural home of the African other. They could only enter urban areas as a sojourner, a migrant 
worker with a half-year or one-year contract (SPARKS 1990: 194), and reside in selected 
locations-turned-townships and new segregated developments. The results were massive, 
countrywide relocations within the municipalities and from urban to rural areas, which largely 
took place in the 1960s and 1970s (see CHRISTOPHER 2001: 81ff.). In terms of belonging and 
citizenship, Africans were driven to the homelands in order to whiten the rural areas and 
eradicate the black spots in the countryside and urban areas (see Map 5) (cf. SHARP 1988: 93). 
“In the consciousness of most white South Africans, these people were merely being sent ‘home’, 
in order to participate in the grand exercise of nation-building” (ibid.:: 94). By the 1980s, more 
than three million people who were classified as Native had been displaced (SMITH 1990: 15). 
“The removals varied from family displacements by individual White farmers to large-scale 
forced removals organized and executed by the government, often with police and military 
coercion” (ibid.: 83f.). 
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Map 5: Forced removals of Africans to homelands (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 85). 
Whiteness became territorialized on a grand scale. The South Africa of the oppressor was 
constituted in White cities connected by corridors, creating a landscape of racialized orderings 
and orderly belongings. DODSON (2000: 155) rightly describes the resulting map of cultural 
orders as a dystopia of the past, whose structured and structuring legacy remains an impediment 
for any transformative attempts. Although her use of the term seems to serve more as a catchy 
title than a conceptual approach, dystopia is the mot juste for the indigenous population’s lived-
in realities resulting from the modernist vision of apartheid. Their states of being and senses of 
place were characterized by inequality, deprivation, and the lack of opportunities for social 
development and transformation. The difference to the glossarial definition of dystopia by 
BROWN & DURRHEIM (2009: 125) as “an imagined place or state in which the condition of life 
is extremely bad, and frequently marked by deprivation, inequality, and an oppressive or 
repressive social order” is that in South Africa, the dystopia was never just an imagining. 
The literature on apartheid cities, their variations and commonalities, as well as their legacy in 
the transformation process of the post-apartheid society has been the focus of a wide range of 
publications, including geographical approaches (amongst others SMITH 1992; HINDSON, 
BYERLEY & MORRIS 1994; MAYLAM 1995; MAHARAJ & LOW 2007; FREUND 2010; SCHENSUL 
& HELLER 2011). The focus of this study lies on the path dependencies and contingencies at the 
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intersections of the homeland/White city with its migratory dynamics. The featured cases are 
situated on those rural-urban outskirts and Black/White fringes. In particular, the ordering 
logics of frontier townships will be discussed further below (see section “Attempting Muslim 
Blackness in KwaMashu”). For a contextual understanding of ordering African indigeneity, the 
socio-spatial history of what is now the region of KwaZulu-Natal is at the hearth of this 
discussion. 
Bantustan: The Orderly Place for the Orderly African 
As argued above, the peculiarities of the South African modes of social and spatial order and 
ordering can be seen in the conflation of the British imperial logics of division and rule on the 
one hand, and the White supremacist self-awareness and subsequent White/Non-White 
dialectic of Afrikaner nationalism on the other. The transformation of reserves for the 
indigenous population into homelands, racialized territories for the African other, is one of the 
many spatial-political results of the union of British and Afrikaner territories. Legislated 
successively to the Group Areas Act through the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954 and the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government of 1959, the homelands or Bantustans represented the 
ideology of grand apartheid (for a concise analysis, see especially BUTLER, ROTBERG & ADAMS 
1977). The intention of these legislative acts was threefold (SMITH 1994: 225): First, they were 
a strategy for territorial purity, with people classified as Native being removed from the White 
cities and farmlands. Second, they were a capitalistic-generative strategy which located the 
homelands in close proximity to the White metropoles and industrial nodes and thereby 
generated a constant influx of cheap labor. And third, they were a strategy to divide and rule 
by controlling the African nodes of governance indirectly through the promotion of tribalization 
in the native territories, ascribing tradition to the African other, and seeding divisions by 
influencing the appointment of chiefs to the houses. 
“The Bantu Authorities system amounted to an elaboration of the old British colonial 
technique of indirect rule […]; its additional divide-and-rule advantages enabled the 
government to break down the black majority into separate tribal entities—or ‘nations’ 
in the making—instead of facing it as a united body, which Western-style political 
development would have led to.” (SPARKS 1990: 194f.) 
The latter fact can also be seen in the light of producing an African middle class, a “petty 
bourgeoisie,” positioned as a buffer between the relatively rich and privileged White minority 
on the hand and the impoverished Black majority on the other (HERMANN 2011: 21f.). 
The homelands were established according to the cultural categories of common language and 
supposed racial homogeneity. The ethno-tribal designations ascribed to them by their names 
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merely reflected the perspective of the White oppressor rather than socio-historical relations. As 
in other colonial contexts, African actors and institutions were made to fit into constructed 
national categories. The political and territorial-ideological background of the homelands’ 
demarcation and the transfer of authority to them was intended to bring about a pseudo-federal 
system of self-governed and supposedly independent Black Native states within the territory of 
South Africa (cf. JACKSON 1989a: 181). If successful, the apartheid state would solve once and 
for all the White/Non-White dialectic and the question of indigeneity on South African territory 
as “there would be no more black South Africans” (FERGUSON 2006: 56). Outside of the 
homelands, indigeneity would be reordered as defined by Afrikaner nationalism.  
 
Map 6: The homelands of South Africa: ‘self-governing territories’ and ‘independent republics.’ Source: (SMITH 1990: 9). 
The processes of transforming the homelands into self-governing territories took place between 
1963 and 1984, beginning with the Transkei and ending with KaNgwane (see map 6). Out of 
ten self-governing Bantustans, four declared their independence: Transkei in 1976, 
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Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981 (SMITH 1990: 16)6. The apartheid 
government progressed with the territorial decoupling of the homelands through the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Bantustan governments were supplied 
with all the insignia necessary in the eyes of the White nationalists: National flags and national 
crests were designed, unifying mottos declared, and anthems composed, while the new native 
state apparatus was subsidized to establish government institutions and embassies (SMITH 1990: 
18). FERGUSON (2006: 57) correctly points out that the conceptual phrase “the invention of 
tradition” (HOBSBAWM & RANGER 1983) had never been more appropriate.  
The homelands may have been self-governing to a certain degree, but even those which 
declared their independence lacked true sovereignty. On the one hand, the South African state 
subsidized the native governments and maintained them militarily (MACDONALD 2006: 15). 
On the other hand, and far more importantly, the nucleus of the separate homeland identities 
had been formulated around tribal categories that did not reflect existing social groups and 
societal relations but fitted the cause of an exploitative system of indirect rule. The ethnic and 
tribal categories underlying the different Bantustans therefore represented “a particular way of 
ordering and grouping certain human populations” (SKALNÍK 1988: 75). Within this system, 
the head of the South African state was the “Supreme Chief of all Blacks” and entitled to 
appoint chiefs to the homelands. Thus, in terms of indirect rule and political control, tying the 
governments of the homelands to the administration of the apartheid state continued the 
Shepstone system put into place in the nineteenth century, making it possible to control the 
indigenous population while presenting the situation as a process of native independence (cf. 
MESTHRIE 1984: 42ff.). Another, more important continuation of the colonial predecessor 
system was the intrinsic meaning of tribal categories as the core identities of each homeland, a 
cultural ordering which reflected and served the White oppressor’s view of the African 
landscape. In order to sustain the hierarchical structure, the modes of order had to be 
legitimized in political and cultural terms. This was done by inventing tradition and constructing 
tribes on the basis of simplified and homogenized realities of indigenous peoples’ history and 
social development (cf. SPIEGEL & BOONZAIER 1988; SKALNÍK 1988). In the case of KwaZulu, 
the conflation of isiZulu-speaking houses under the tribal category of Zulu led to an evolution 
in Zulu ethnicity, which may have resembled elements of the last Zulu kingdom, but which 
 
6An obscure fact in terms of the production of geographical knowledge: Even though none of the bantustans has ever 
been officially recognized by other states on the globe, the National Geographic’s world maps included the Transkei 
as an independent country, at least from 1976 to 1981 (FERGUSON 2006: 58). 
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primarily served the ideology of European nationalism by uniting assigned territory with 
ascribed identity (cf. LAMBERT & MORRELL 1996: 91). Drawing heavily on the construction of 
native tradition and the persistence of traditional practices within the homelands, this strategy 
was most definitely in line with apartheid's vision of separate development, which rendered the 
African subject incompatible with the radical modernity of a White South Africa. By 
legitimizing territorial differentiation based on cultural difference and othering, the 
establishment of homelands and their ordering logics of indigeneity did not serve the indigenous 
population but rather the overall project of Afrikaner nationalism. WAETJEN (1999: 653) 
appropriately names it a “manipulation of ethnicity” to serve the needs of the White 
government. 
Frontier Commuting: Controlling the Movements of the Indigenous 
Population 
With the establishment of homelands, being African became an issue of citizenship. The 
indigenous population of South Africa was not only forcibly relocated but also stripped of the 
right to be citizens of the state. Leaving the territory of the homeland thus became an issue of 
international relations and migration. “Citizens of the Bantustans might, of course, be allowed 
within ‘white South Africa’ as workers, with the proper permissions, but they would be no more 
entitled to political rights there than are foreign workers in other countries” (FERGUSON 2006: 
56). As argued above, providing White urban areas with a constant influx of cheap labor from 
the African areas was one key aspects of the Bantustan policies. As SMITH (1990: 49) points out, 
the control over a disposable workforce was based on a system of frontier commuters,  
“defined as Blacks who reside in the Homelands but travel daily to work in the cities, 
industrial districts or rural areas of ‘White’ South Africa. In apartheid thinking, they thus 
commute across what is now (in the case of ‘independent republics’) or what may 
eventually be (in the case of the remaining ‘self-governing territories’) an international 
boundary.”  
In terms of workforce, the migrant labor system was the backbone of the apartheid economy. 
By systematically and territorially linking the homelands to White urban centers and 
development nodes, a landscape of exploitation of the Black workforce evolved for the 
expansion White prosperity, thus ingraining a racialized dialectical relationship into the macro-
scale of apartheid (BALDWIN 1974: 33). JACKSON (1989a: 182) illustrated this development in 
the case of the KwaZulu homeland in the 1980s (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Frontier commuters of KwaZulu. Source: (JACKSON 1989a: 182). 
BALDWIN (1974: 33) notes in this regard that the border areas—the interstitial areas on the 
territorial outskirts of the White urban areas and corridors—essentially hold the key to an 
understanding of the ordering logics of apartheid. Controlled by a system of countrywide pass 
laws that had African men and women always carry their papers with them, the majority of 
Africans were confined to the status of sojourners (SHARP 1988: 93). Thus, the modes of 
ordering belonging and indigeneity were constantly reproduced and reified by acts of 
administrative control, as well as in everyday lived-in reality. Oppression became a matter of 
daily lived routine. 
Persistent Orderly Indigeneity 
The historical process of putting segregation into practice on all scales of society and space made 
new, segregative modes of order and ordering an everyday reality for those classified as Native, 
Bantu, or Black. Even though categorization along these lines included immigrants from other 
regions of the African continent, it was essentially designed for the Non-White part of the 
nationalist and racist dialectic White/Non-White in South Africa. MACDONALD (2006) argues 
that the reordering of African subjects as foreigners to the South African territory reflects the 
racism as well as racialism of the segregationist system. Racism implies the naturalized 
hegemony of a group that deems itself not only superior to another group (in racial terms) but 
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also more advanced. The distribution of power is defined by this logic: “[…] racists do not 
regard power as the source of their superiority, but superiority as the source of their power” 
(ibid.: 6). Racialism, on the other hand, constitutes power relations which are not based solely 
on the superiority of one side but rather on a race-based understanding of difference: “Racialists 
regard race as the source of identity and identities as the axes of political institutions, and then 
urge that government be organized on the basis of race” (ibid.: 7). South Africa’s colonial and 
apartheid White supremacy was comprised of racist and racialist elements. While the oppressor-
oppressed relationship was most definitely built on an ideological understanding of White 
supremacy and Non-White inferiority (the latter being distributed across different groups to 
stabilize the relationship), the enactment of this understanding on the political, social, economic, 
and spatial levels entailed a strict segregation of people, amenities, governments, opportunities, 
and so on. Everything was based on lawful decision-making processes which even included 
representatives of the oppressed, such as in the demarcation of the group areas. The 
stratification of society entailed an exploitative relationship as it facilitated a constant supply of 
cheap labor, which in turn secured the privileged position of the minority. Again, the legitimacy 
of such macro-scale politics was not justified by racist perspectives but rather through racialized 
argumentation, which moved beyond the South African situation to formulate a future vision 
for the whole of Africa. In this regard, MACDONALD (2006: 8f.) cites the author of the 
segregation policy of apartheid, Jan Smuts as follows:  
“Nothing could be worse for Africa than the application of a policy, the object or 
tendency of which would be […] to de-Africanize the African and turn him either into 
a beast of the field or into a pseudo-European. […] Africans had to be kept different, 
culturally, politically, and religiously.”  
The differentiation of the constructed population groups rested on deterministic meaning that 
was more cultural than biological. The construction of such cultural differences was realized in 
spatial terms by zoning the different groups on different scales, from the micro level of the petty 
apartheid to the macro level of the homelands. The interaction between spatial zoning and 
socio-economic stratification led to a form of racialized landscaping in South Africa, which 
effectuated a lasting segregation of South African society even into the post-apartheid era. 
Direct and indirect rule were used to inscribe these divisions and establish sustained governance, 
meaning that even the rule of oppression was sub-divided. The violence of racialized policies 
thus became symbolically accepted in the establishment of a South African version of division 
and rule: “With Africans bound by obedience to chiefs and with chiefs bound to the white state, 
Africans were subordinated indirectly to whites. Whites controlled the chiefs, and the chiefs 
controlled the people” (MACDONALD 2006: 9). 
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The longer these modes of order evolved, the more difficult resistance to them became, at least 
in terms of resistance from within. Two prominent historical examples can aid our 
understanding of the featured cases on conversion to Islam as a means of resisting and 
transgressing the ordered indigeneity of the orderly African. The first example is the 1960 
Sharpeville massacre, a protest that was crushed with lethal force. It became the turning point 
from peaceful and non-violent protest against pass laws and segregation to a more proactive 
resistance which used force. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African 
Congress (PAC), two major African movements, formed armed groups called Umkhonto we 
Sizwe and Poqo, respectively. With that, violent protest against the everyday modes of order 
and ordering became a viable option and eventually came to characterize the struggle of the 
younger generation, in particular, in many Black African areas during the 1980s (cf. NAIDOO 
1992; for an overview of Non-White political movements worth reading, see HORRELL 1971). 
The second historical incident was the 1976 Soweto Uprising, named after Johannesburg's 
Soweto African township from which the protest spread to other cities in the country. It was a 
reaction to a long line of segregative policies concerning Non-White education, which began 
with the state taking control of these educational institutions under the Bantu Education Act of 
1954. Many of these Non-White schools had been established in the homelands and were run 
by missionaries, arousing the deeply rooted fear that such schools would produce Black 
Englishmen who would in the long run undermine the superiority of the White group. Control 
over education was shifted to the Department of Native Affairs and people classified as Black 
were prohibited to attend the major universities (SPARKS 1990: 195). The tipping point that 
stirred unrest in a new generation of young Black South Africans was the decision to make 
Afrikaans the compulsory language in all schools of South Africa. “To Hell with Afrikaans” 
became a common slogan in the subsequent protest and increasing boycotts rendered any 
understanding of normal school life impossible. The protests influenced a whole generation in 
their political consciousness and became the foundation for contestation of and resistance to the 
everyday modes of ordering. As one of the participants in this research emphasized, “1976 had 
been our uprising, our fight.”7 From that time on, resistance to and transgression of the social 
and spatial order engineered by colonialism and apartheid took hold on a broad scale in society.  
 
7Interview with Solomon Phewa (2015). (Due to ethical reasons, some references to interviews have been anonymized and appear under 
pseudonyms instead). 
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Apartheid's landscapes of oppressive modernism were “fundamentally and profoundly cultural 
and geographical” (DODSON 2000: 148). The acts of differentiation and resistance at the center 
of this study are set against the background of these maps of cultural orderings and historical 
settings. Perceived challenges to the existing modes of ordering and order were aimed towards 
the daily lived routines structured by the path dependency of domination and subordination, as 
well as the dialectic of White/Non-White. Historic contextualization is of crucial importance 
here, as it facilitates an understanding of the prevailing social and spatial power relations by 
linking the researched practices to the embodied and represented struggles over place and 
cultural meaning—over language, religion, or education—which constitute the fields of struggle 
for societal transformation (cf. DODSON 2000: 155). In the case of South Africa, Whiteness is not 
just an ideology or an epistemological category for dealing with race and racism. It is a 
historically contingent, lived-in reality. So too does Blackness constitute a structured and 
structuring field of indigeneity and a shared history of suffering under racial oppression. 
In order to move this discussion closer to the sphere of religion and conversion, the following 
section will discuss the role of religion as a structuring factor in the doxic landscapes of South 
Africa's cultural orderings. Then, a first case study will present the interrelations of Christian 
faith, institutions, and ideologies with the socially and spatially inscribed cultural orders, casting 
light on the paradoxical realities brought about by colonialism, apartheid, and the social and 
spatial sphere of religion. 
62 
Religion and the Ordering of 
Indigeneity 
With the Afrikaner-dominated territories on the one hand and the British-led colonies on the 
other, South Africa's political discourse at the turn of the twentieth century was wedged between 
racist White supremacy and increasing calls for indigenous rights emerging from within a British 
Empire that had amassed a new cultural diversity at home as a result of its colonial politics (NATAL 
WITNESS (ANONYMOUS CONTRIBUTOR) 1931; THOMPSON & NICHOLLS 1993). Thus in the 
South African context, ordering the indigenous population in social and spatial terms was not 
an uncontested, unilateral process among the White minority but rather the political result of a 
public as well as academic discourse. The so-called Native Question became the overall frame, 
or ideologically biased label, of a political debate that reflected a looming conflict among the 
different groups of dominating Europeans over how to deal with the African other beyond the 
existing policies on Native reservations and locations. How could White minority hegemony be 
consolidated in territorial terms while keeping the indigenous population, the numerical 
majority of inhabitants, to less than 15% of the land? The spectrum of the debated approaches 
ranged from draconic repression to calls for the further development of Africans, with the 
Afrikaner territories tending to the former and the British colonies arguing more often for the 
latter. A common chord on both sides was the upholding and continuance of White domination, 
but the Afrikaner perceived any development towards gelykstelling (see above) as menacing to 
their own, still fragile and disputed national identity.  
All such processes, prone as they were to shape the political fate of South Africa and ultimately 
pave the way to apartheid, must be understood by including the religious dimension in the 
larger picture of territorial hegemony and the ordering of the African other. Two aspects are of 
crucial importance in this regard. First, Afrikaner identity formation and the aversion to 
gelykstelling can only be fully understood by looking at the religious foundation of the emerging 
Afrikaner identity and the institution of the Dutch Reformed Church. Second, as the Native 
Question had been intrinsically linked to the question of power over land, all those actors must 
be taken into consideration who had hegemonic control over territory affecting the indigenous 
population in the late nineteenth century. These include not only the White governments of the 
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urban realms and farmers, but also Christian missionary stations situated deep within the 
indigenous territories. Their sphere of influence over the land was, relative to the others, most 
closely tied to the indigenous population. 
Religious aspects, specifically Christianity, played an important role within the processes of 
translating the oppressive modes of ordering and the White/Non-White dialectic of domination 
and subordination into the daily lived realities of the oppressed, as ascribing divine purpose and 
meaning to subordination render it commonsensical. At the same time, religion became a field 
of struggle, shifting loyalties, and contestations of the imposed orders. The position of the 
Amakholwa, converted African Christians among the Zulu, is an exemplary representation. The 
term Amakholwa is difficult to pinpoint as it served not as a self-description but as an ascription 
towards Christian Zulus. Nevertheless, its homogenizing dimension reflects the emergence of a 
“Black Elite” (ELPHICK 2012: 121f.) in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century, which resulted from the educational work of the different mission stations 
among the Zulu. In certain parts of KwaZulu, the Christianized population in the areas 
surrounding the mission stations formed a community distinct from the neighboring population 
in social, cultural, and especially agricultural ways, as they increasingly adopted the practices of 
the missionaries. Missionary education involved not only classical school subjects but also the 
transmission of a European way of life, mostly reflecting the cultural background of the monks 
at the respective stations, i.e. how to dress, how to construct houses, and especially how to farm. 
The fact that personalities who later became prominent leaders in the liberation struggle can 
be linked either directly to the Amakholwa phenomenon or indirectly to the educational work 
of the missionary stations illustrates the effect these had in bringing about a new elite distinct to 
the tribal structures of the ruling houses. Among those personalities were leaders of the African 
National Congress such as Albert Lutuli and Z. K. Mathews, or Clements Kadalie, the first 
national secretary of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union, as well as Steve Biko, the 
founder of the Black Consciousness Movement. This elitism rested on a social and partly 
cultural distinction that was an intergenerational result of the missionary work and its 
subsequent influence on the family structures and modes of social ordering imparted to those 
described as Amakholwa, which ultimately resulted in changing political and economic 
aspirations (ELPHICK 2012: 33). Moreover, these shared changes in self-understanding—with 
regard to cultural orders, political ideas, or the everyday practices of agricultural production—
are often described as a conscious process of modernization. Besides the religious inclinations, 
the missionaries’ way of life, with its associated education and craftsmanship skills, was regarded 
as an opportunity for a transition from a social system increasingly perceived as ancient-
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traditional towards a modern life. This also drew criticism, however, as the lifestyle of the believers 
was seen as a blunt adoption of the ways of the Whites and a break with their own cultural 
history (ERLMANN 1996: 80f.). MUKUKA (2008: 77) sees an opportunistic dimension within the 
rise of the Amakholwa as the change in social, cultural, and religious modes of order brought 
with it significant material gain for the individual and the household. To put it more directly: 
In the nineteenth century, becoming a Christian and joining the territorial sphere of the mission 
stations offered, in most cases, some form of land ownership unbound from the traditional tribal 
structure, be it quitrent or actual freehold. Becoming Amakholwa therefore represented not 
only a shift in cultural ways but also an opting into a slowly but steadily expanding system of 
territorial governance defined by a westernized understanding of land commercialization. At 
last, the power of a new elite, with its members from various social and ethnic backgrounds, was 
undeniably defined by individualized increases in landownership, which served as a form of 
convertible capital within a changing doxic landscape of European-defined territorial hegemony 
based on capitalistic ideologies (cf. ETHERINGTON 1977: 37). 
While the Amakholwa seem initially to have sought the favor of the colonizers by adapting their 
religion and way of life, their loyalty and political influence shifted strongly towards Zulu unity 
and against the White rulers. This must be understood as a result of increasing economic 
pressure and territorial restrictions for Africans. The indigenous population not only found 
themselves increasingly restricted to the specific territories of the locations but also confronted 
with rising taxes and annual rent fees, which had to be paid to the government as well as to 
those who now claimed to own the land on which the indigenous population lived.  
While the previous sections already presented the political developments around the landmark 
Land Act of 1913 and the growing spatial restrictions and social politics of racialization during 
the first half of the twentieth century, it is worth looking again at the developments ordering 
society and space at the turn of that century in order to understand the magnitude of the 
religious dimension’s role in them. The following section will link the path dependencies 
presented so far to religious aspects. First, religion will be discussed as a conceptual dimension 
within social and spatial modes of ordering. This is followed by a contextualization of the 
religious dimension within South Africa’s doxic landscapes of cultural ordering. In a third step, the 
role religion played as a paradoxical sphere of territoriality and the ordering of indigeneity will 
be presented. A featured case study will outline the historical and contemporary developments 
of a selected community living on religiously territorialized land, which was evicted during the 
late days of apartheid. This case study will thus provide a concrete example for the conditions 
in the specific area at the focus of this study, the present-day province of KwaZulu-Natal. The 
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empirical case is an unexpected outcome of the overall research on challenging order by means 
of conversion to Islam. The analysis of its complex entanglements in the spheres of religion, 
racism, and spatial orders helps elucidate the formation and manifestation of cultural and social 
orders at the crossroads of White supremacy, religious territoriality, and the ordering of 
indigeneity. 
Religion in the Framework of Order and Ordering 
“Geography rarely appears in books on religion, and religion rarely appears in books on 
geography.” (PARK 2005: 439) 
Although Park’s remark is largely accurate concerning academic literature, the production of 
geographical knowledge related to religion or religious topics has a longstanding history, 
especially when it comes to spatial visualizations. Geographical designs were instrumental to 
mapping diverse and conflicting cosmological orders while simultaneously setting the standard 
for future disputes concerning cartographical representations: What is up and down, and what 
lies in the center. This long road has its problematic intersections, as KONG (2009a) briefly 
sketches out with an example from the sixteenth century in which the relation between 
geography and religion had a literally ‘ecclesiastical’ connotation—mapping the spatial 
extension and expansion of Christianity vs. other belief-systems. KONG (2009a: 324) terms it a 
“biblical geography”. Even though the theoretical and conceptual vocabulary around this 
intersection has become more diverse, the tension between the geography of religion and 
religious geography persists, and the rift between those who criticize theologically biased scholars 
and those who question the methodological agnosticism within human geography still looms over 
the discipline (see for a discussion worth reading HENKEL 2011). 
Nevertheless, religion has increasingly come into the focus of empirical, analytical, and 
conceptual discussions within the discipline geography over the last decades. Especially in light 
of far-reaching shifts in the practices, epistemologies, and self-image of cultural geography, 
religion has been re-conceptualized in a more diverse and critical-reflexive way, leading to 
contributions which can be seen as inspired by structuralist or post-structuralist perspectives (see 
for example LEVINE 1986; COOPER 1992; BRACE, BAILEY & HARVEY 2005; AGNEW 2006; 
IVAKHIV 2006), or which focus on place and place-making, intersubjective experiences, and 
practices (TUAN 1978; PARK 1994 ; KONG 2004; OLSON 2013). Additionally, partly in reaction 
to the resurgence of perceiving societies around the globe in a cultural-deterministic light, 
religion has also been reframed through geo-political perspectives (amongst others AGNEW 
2006; REUBER 2015), acknowledging the global distribution of religions as 
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“the result of a development that took centuries, characterized by conquest, missionary 
work, colonialism and migration. It is at the same time, comparable to the distribution 
of languages, an expression of economic and cultural, historical and recent power 
relations.”8 (KORF & WAST-WALTER 2016: 97) 
AGNEW (2006) goes as far as to propose the term geo-religious as a concept for geographical 
inquiries into a field that—as he argues—would otherwise be left to neighboring disciplines (see 
also PACIONE 1999). 
For cultural geography, KONG (1990, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2010) presents what she calls 
new geographies of religion in a series of contributions which position the topic as a category of 
geographical analysis alongside such concepts as “race, class and gender” (KONG 2001a: 212). 
The central question she poses on how to deal with religion from a geographical perspective is 
whether to understand it as a separate analytical category or as a symbolic qualifier to existing 
categories or socio-spatial processes. At the same time, KONG (1990, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 
2010) strongly endorses neighboring disciplines, especially religious studies, paying renewed 
attention to the field of cultural geography, thereby counteracting the situation described by 
PARK (2005) in the introductory citation above. Her specific contribution to the conceptual 
debate of religion and order can be found in the analytical category of the poetic in relation to 
place and community. For KONG (2001a: 218), the “poetics of sacred place, identity and 
community” differ from the dimension of politics and power and thus shift the perspective 
towards people’s agency by understanding the religious in terms of personal and inter-personal 
experiences. The first aspect, the poetics of place, points towards a dimension of appropriating 
space through human interaction, which in KONG (1990, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2010)’s 
opinion has not yet been examined in adequate detail. The poetic dimension of place renders 
ordinary places extraordinary on a level of specific consciousness, for example through an 
extraordinary emotional experience that is linked to place and shared by those who ritually 
inscribe it (KONG (2001a: 218) referring to ELIADE (1959)). A certain postmodern romanticist 
perception of space and place surfaces in this understanding when KONG (2004: 370) writes 
that such a place “chooses and is not chosen.” Consequently, poetics would ascribe latent 
agency to place, which can be enacted through ritual interaction—as in the case of sacred 
places. From the standpoint of a relational understanding of space and place, this 
 
8Original: “Die aktuelle weltweite Verbreitung der Religionen ist das Ergebnis einer jahrhundertelangen Entwicklung, 
die von Eroberungen, Missionierungen, Kolonialisierungen und Migration geprägt war. Sie ist damit ebenso wie die 
Verbreitung von Sprachen Ausdruck von wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen historischen und aktuellen 
Machtverhältnissen.” 
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argumentation is difficult to follow. Nevertheless, it helps to facilitate an understanding of 
religion by differentiating between the locative and the utopian dimensions of space (KONG 
2004: 370). The locative requires the maintenance of one’s place in order to fix ascribed 
meaning, its reproduction, and the accessibility of the emotional experience, while the utopian 
signifies a spatial dimension that transcends particular localities and social orders. These 
dimensions cannot be separated from each other as together they constitute the relationality of 
religious place-making. Thus, in terms of analysis, dealing with religion entails being constantly 
aware of the intertwined scales that are in place when people ascribe religious meaning to the 
social order of their everyday life. Nevertheless, the overdetermination of the aesthetic 
dimension and the subsequent overemphasis of poetics is a trait of postmodernist geography 
that is open for critique, as it unnecessarily opens up the possibility of spatial essentialism, 
ascribing agency to space (cf. JACKSON 1989b: 176). 
This point resonates with the take on uncritical borrowings from a postmodern paradigm in the 
production of geographical thought explored above. In their stead, a relational 
conceptualization of religion can contribute to the discussion by juxtaposing structuralist and 
humanistic perspectives within the context of order and ordering. The move is inspired by 
BURKARD (2011) and his extension of Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion, which will be 
presented here first, as a point of departure. In his original account in The Interpretation of Cultures, 
GEERTZ (1973: 90) defines religion as  
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting 
moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”  
Based on his elaborate discussion of the anthropology of religion deriving from Tylor, 
Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss and Geertz, BURKARD (2011: 173) modifies this definition as follows: 
“Religion is (1) a system of symbols that is (2) at the same time model of and model for 
reality by (3) establishing emotional dispositions, as well as (4) formulating concepts of a 
general order of existence, while (5) confirming the congruence of both through ritual 
with (6) the possibility to retrieve their webs of significance in a perspective of the 
everyday life.”9 
 
9 Original: “Religion ist (1) ein Symbolsystem, das (2) zugleich Modell der und Modell für „Wirklichkeit“ ist, (3) indem 
es emotionale Dispositionen erzeugt und (4) Vorstellungen einer allgemeinen Seinsordnung formuliert, (5) deren 
Übereinstimmung im Ritual bekräftigt wird, und (6) deren Deutungsmuster in der „Alltags-Perspektive“ wieder 
aufgerufen werden.” 
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This definition is valuable for a renewed understanding of religion in the context of culture and 
cultural modes of order and ordering, as it maintains Geertz’s original emphasis on religion as 
a symbolic system, while also encompassing the relational perspective of structure and agency 
(the “model of and model for reality”), as well as the dimension of meaningful practices and 
shared experiences (“through ritual”). To apply such a relational perspective on religion, two 
aspects need to be taken into consideration: (1) the understanding of religion as an ideological 
structure and symbolic system and (2) the understanding of the sacred as experienced through 
ritual and the interrupting of routine. 
To the first point: Viewing religion as a model for and model of reality reflects a classical Marxist 
approach to ideological structures. Here, societies are constitutive of the level of infrastructure 
(i.e. the economic base) and the level of superstructure, with the latter being divided into the 
instances of the politico-legal of the state and the ideological. Religion, then, is part of the 
ideological superstructure (PEET 1998: 122). This represents—within a Gramscian 
understanding of superstructure as hegemony—the internalizing effects that bring about the 
common sense of ordering and order and constitute the socialization in the lived-in places of 
everyday life (cf. ibid.: 129). However, this process is not to be understood as unilateral, i.e. a 
world being structured in its totality on economic foundations. Even though economic and 
cultural factors entail the greatest amount of power to differentiate, especially within capitalistic 
societies, “the fact remains that the potency of economic and social differences is never so great 
that one cannot organize agents on the basis of other principles of division - ethnic, religious, or 
national ones, for instance” (BOURDIEU 1989: 19). Thus, there is an overt as well as a subversive 
aspect to the dimension of religion when it comes to modes of order and ordering in society and 
space. In this regard, a relational geographical perspective on religion should also pay attention 
to the classical formulation by ISAAC (1962) that the task of the geography of religion is to 
“separate the specifically religious from the social, economic and ethnic matrix in which it is 
embedded, and to determine its relative weight in relation to other forces in transforming the 
landscape” (PARK 1994: 198). Or, as LEVINE (1986: 437) puts it, a “historical materialist 
approach will lead to a fuller appreciation of religion as an agent in the cultural landscape. It 
challenges geographers to seek deeper explanations of the profound phenomenon they are 
studying.” In one way or the other, understanding religion as a mode of expression means 
framing the cultural dimension of religious and spiritual practices as a modus operandi that is 
simultaneously structuring and structured by society and space. 
For the second characteristic of a relational approach on religion, the understanding of the 
sacred as experienced through ritual and the interrupting of routine, the roles ritual and routine 
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play in the production of stability and chaos in the lived-in places are of importance. TUAN 
(1978: 84; 1975) offers the discipline of geography an early and intriguing idea of the sacred 
space by discussing sacredness on the level of spatial experience. CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 
(1995: 32, Fn 36) highlight his approach for paying attention to “the experiential, imaginative, 
and poetic dynamics of sacred space.” By posing the simple question of the meaning of the 
sacred, TUAN (1978: 84) explores various dimensions of experience, definition, wholeness, 
order, and power in order to understand the entanglements of sacredness and space beyond 
traditional, culture-bound images. At first glance, sacred space is nothing more or less than 
space of apartness and definition—separated, delineated, and cut off from the surrounding 
homogeneity of space otherwise experienced as profane10 (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 255; 
KONG 2009b: 661). “Sacred phenomena are those that stand out from the commonplace and 
interrupt routine” (TUAN 1978: 84). This concept of sacred experience can be extended in terms 
of social and spatial ordering by borrowing from the idea of the carnivalesque (FOLCH-SERRA 
1990; CRESSWELL 1994; COLLINS 1999; HOLLOWAY & KNEALE 2000). While Tuan 
emphasizes the commonplace, the routine, and their respective interruption, authors like 
CRESSWELL (1994: 38ff.) understand times and places of “the carnival” as a societal safety valve, 
an enacted and participatory phase of anti-order, set aside from the normality of everyday life 
and rendered as contingent, unfinished, and relative through carnivalesque social processes. 
Nevertheless, this safety valve effect ultimately acknowledges and manifests the order of the 
everyday and makes it bearable—at least until the next carnivalesque moment. Tuan’s 
understanding of the sacred along the lines of ambiguity, power, and what he terms the 
polarized pair of structure and anti-structure (1978: 90) can thus be extended by recognizing 
that the interruptive experience of the sacred legitimizes the interrupted routine, making the 
commonplace and profane bearable until the next sacred experience (see also ELIADE 1959). It 
keeps people sane—and profoundly in their place. Sacred space questions the profanity and 
routine of everyday life and is therefore itself an arena of contestation and struggle in defining 
the holiness and wholeness of the sacred anti-order (cf. CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995: 6). 
Moreover, religion as ordering practices and experiences in the lived-in place is intrinsically 
linked to the sphere of ritual and routine, as formulated in the definition by GEERTZ (1973: 90). 
ESCHER & WEICK (2004) can be seen in line with the modifications proposed by BURKARD 
(2011), where the aura of factuality is put into perspective via affirmation through ritual. It is the 
 
10The literal meaning of profane is the ground before and outside the temple (TUAN 1978: 85). 
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ritual that brings about the aura of factuality and is so essential to the existence of religions. 
ESCHER & WEICK (2004: 254, 262) argue that routines—understood as the regular or orderly 
repetitions in lived-in places—ascribe order and meaning to everyday life, while rituals frame 
or embed this setting, providing harmony, order, and security. At the same time, it is the ritual 
which—in case of changing circumstances in the lived-in places—leads to a incongruent 
relation between known routines and stability, facilitating the transition from one mode of 
routine to another, or better from one mode of ordering to another one. For it is the ritual that 
reveals the intrinsic, intersubjective logics of order and ordering enacted, practiced, shared, and 
experienced in society and space. Vice versa, observing a shift at the level of the ritual most 
definitely points to a situation where the modes of order and ordering are about to be changed 
or challenged. This also explains the overall ordering capacity of religion in times of societal 
instability. Religion’s meta-narratives present situations in which modes of order and ordering 
are threatened, where there is a lack of societal order, or—as in the case of colonialist missionary 
effort—where an absence of order is imposed. Then, new modes of ordering are presented and 
legitimized by the mere presence of God, which in turn legitimizes the existence of a divine 
being (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 254).  
Religion is simultaneously a symbolic system and ideological structure, as well as a dimension 
of intersubjectivity that provides meaning through practices and experiences. It is, as DODSON 
(2000: 145) writes, “a cultural practice and a material presence in the cultural landscape.” Its 
ordering capacity enables religion to transcend the scale of lived-in social and spatial order and 
ordering and therefore interrupt—even if just temporarily—the routine through rituals and 
territorializations. As previously mentioned, the specific quality of religious order and ordering 
is that it always takes place in illo tempore and in illo loco (see section “Approaching the Conceptual 
Dimension of Social and Spatial Order and Ordering” above). In other words, religion supplies 
heterotopia through constantly promising a utopic experience as an interruptive routine. 
Depending on the quality of the specific religion’s meta-narrative, the practices and experiences 
offering an-other order can either stabilize the positionality—despite changing socio-historical 
circumstances—or allow the formation of resistance to and transgression of the daily lived-in 
modes of order. Nevertheless, these processes and possibilities do not exist per se but are 
intersubjectively produced and reproduced, rendering religion an experiential part of the lived-
in social word (LEVINE 1986: 431). The necessary knowledge comes in the form of ritualized 
socio-cultural knowledge, offered by religious institutions or institutionalized personalities. In 
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the words of LEVINE (1986: 434f.), which take a similar vein as BOURDIEU (1991)11, these 
institutions are 
“world-founding, world-maintaining, knowledge-transmitting, legitimizing and 
controlling entities. They are special because they grapple overtly with the profound 
desire to comprehend the significance of life. The institutionalization of the 
comprehension of the sacred cosmos leads to a well-defined doctrine, the differentiation 
of religious roles and the enforcing of doctrine and ritual by special agents.” 
At the same time, the existence, outreach, and social influence of institutions always unfold 
against the backdrop of the particular societal and socio-political situation within which these 
are positioned. For the South African case, religion as a socio-cultural and cultural-political field 
must therefore to be cast in the light of European colonialism, the ordering of indigeneity, and 
the social as well as spatial racialization of society at large. The following section will therefore 
deal with the religious dimension of the production of South Africa’s maps of cultural orderings. 
A Piece in the Mosaic: Religion in South Africa’s Doxic 
Landscapes of Cultural Ordering 
The social and spatial modes of ordering in South Africa’s doxic landscapes would not have 
evolved and continued in their dispositional embeddedness were it not for the ideological 
underpinnings and divine justifications of religious belief systems, Christianity in particular, and 
the rites thereof. These provided a sense of routine to the settlers’ and colonialists’ acts and 
politics of difference. For the first Europeans at the Cape, oppression and enslavement had not 
merely been an issue of skin color but of “Christians” enslaving “heathens” (MACDONALD 
2006). Converting the Khoikhoi, slaves, or prisoners in the Cape Colony therefore became an 
issue: “If slavery was permissible because Christians were enslaving heathens, it became 
impermissible if slaves converted to Christianity, as happened not infrequently” (ibid.). For the 
dominating settlers, who were almost exclusively members of the Calvinist Dutch Reformed 
Church, the situation became even more complex when the British Empire took hold of the 
Cape. The British brought with them the gospel of religious and social equality, which the 
London Missionary Society preached to the oppressed population, as well as the abolition of 
slavery in 1836 (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 388f.). At the same time, various other missionary societies 
from Europe and North America started their outreach among the indigenous population in 
 
11For a further discussion see especially (REY 2007; SWARTZ 1996), among others. 
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the cities and especially in the countryside and the established reserves. Moreover, the slave 
trade, the transport of political prisoners from other colonies, and the global connections of the 
British Empire brought religions other than Christianity, predominantly Islam and Hinduism, 
to South Africa. Religion became an aspect of structure and hierarchy for the settlers' and 
colonialists' claims to permanent hegemony. Therefore, it also became a field of contestation 
with the social surroundings. It was no longer merely a system of belief or a sphere of rituals 
attached to a specific group but a social and spatial realm where everyday practices, emotional 
cohesiveness, and collective identity were constituted and expressed. At the same time, against 
the background of colonial orderings of society, religion became a field of struggle over those 
powerful social and spatial relations defining the meaningful practices and place-making 
processes. 
Manifold aspects arose from these interrelations that were relevant to understanding the South 
African situation, and scholars began putting emphasis on the role of religion when studying 
the processes of democratization, transformation, and de-racialization in politics and society 
(see amongst others TAYOB & WEISSE 1999; MITCHELL & MULLEN 2002; CHIDESTER, TAYOB 
& WEISSE 2004; COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991; COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1997; ELPHICK 
2012). These studies bring historical insights on questions on religion, racism, and colonialism 
together with contemporary accounts of politics, culture, and society from the perspectives of 
anthropology, political sciences, cultural studies, and geography, among others. This turn 
towards the importance of religious actors and institutions in South Africa can generally be 
associated with four aspects: 
• Religion and colonialism: The religious landscape of South Africa reflects religious-territorial 
differences between Afrikaner political ideology and British colonial modes of ordering. 
• Religion and racism: The ideologies and politics of racism and racialization and the 
principles of apartheid were strongly interwoven with Christian theology, Calvinist social 
thought, and personalities and institutions of the Dutch Reformed Church.  
• Religion and plurality: The post-apartheid era saw an enlarged and overt religious pluralism 
throughout South African society as well as a resurgence of ‘traditional’ spirituality and belief 
systems. 
• Religion and inequality: With the state’s inability to break with the history of social, 
economic and spatial inequality, religious institutions have gained more influence in the 
spheres of service delivery and societal order. 
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The first two aspects are in the primary focus of this section, while issues of plurality and the 
challenging of inequality will be explored in the chapter on conversions to Islam as 
transgressions of orderly indigeneity. Here, the segregative policies and racist ideologies of 
colonialism, Afrikaner nationalism, and apartheid will be discussed in the light of their 
interrelations with religion. This also touches on the question of reproducing the order of the 
oppressor within the African homelands and townships through policies and practices aimed at 
the religious sphere. Moreover, Christian missionary stations in the countryside and on the 
fringes of urban centers had complex and, in some cases, contradictory relations to the colonial 
and apartheid regime. This topic will be discussed in detail within the coming section, in which 
the featured case study presents developments in religious territoriality around a mission station 
and the micro-processes of ordering the African other through missionary work. First, a 
contextual overview is provided in order to gain a better understanding of the related cases, 
which move Islam into the debate around South Africa’s doxic landscapes in the coming chapters. 
Religion and Colonialism 
“Conquerors did not raze a city to the ground simply out of wanton fury; in such 
destruction they appropriated a people’s gods by rendering them homeless, and in 
appropriating the gods the conquerors acquired a civilization.” (TUAN 1977: 150f.) 
The diverse interlinkages of White domination and religion in South Africa reflect a common 
scheme within the history of European colonization. Moving cultural-religious aspects into the 
realm of social distinction served the overall aim of classifying and conquering, with local 
religions often being discovered, demarcated and devalued to enable the distinguishing of the 
same and the other (WOODS 2012: 218). Religion therefore played an essential role within 
colonization processes: In most cases, the indigenous population was first described as lacking 
true religion, making the discovery of supposedly primitive belief systems, such as fetishism, 
possible. This projected lack of legitimate religiosity first served as a signifier of difference, 
whereas later on “it was precisely the presence of religion that signified that difference” (IVAKHIV 
2006: 170). In the South African context, Europeanized religious understanding played an 
important role from the very beginning of the settler colony. As CHIDESTER (2008: 351f.) puts 
it: 
“From a South African perspective […] ‘religion’ did not come from Greco-Roman 
antiquity or the European Enlightenment. It came from the sea in ships. It was carried 
as an instrument of denial, reporting that Africans had no religion, but it was eventually 
deployed as an instrument of colonial containment, making a ‘religious system’ the 
spiritual supplement to the colonial magisterial system, action system, or reserve system 
for keeping people in place.” 
74 
The African other, whether indigenous or enslaved, was viewed as primitive in order to make the 
religious sphere of the primitive heathens accessible for British and Boer imperial ambitions, while 
justifying the cruelty towards the residing population on the way farther inland (cf. CHIDESTER 
2008, 2004). The overall setting is just slightly more complicated due to the fact that, between 
the Dutch Boers and the British colonialists, there were two different and conflicting regimes of 
domination present, each with its distinct logics of religiously based and justified modes of 
ordering. Furthermore, what TUAN (1977: 150f.) ascribes to the scale of the city in the 
introductory citation applies to a wider territorial perspective in the South African situation, 
where the conquerors—White settlers, colonialists, and their political descendants—racially 
territorialized enormous parts of the land on the basis of a religiously mythologized ideology of 
supremacy. REY (2007: 81ff.) observes that religion particularly facilitates the building of social 
hierarchy within colonial societies in a two-fold manner: On the one hand, it legitimizes the 
authority of the dominant group by directing the basis for domination into a realm of 
indisputable logics of order, while on the other hand, supplying the dominated with meaning 
for the violence in their life, i.e. enabling them to “make sense of their place in the social order” 
through religion (REY 2007: 83). Both aspects, legitimizing authority and making sense of 
domination, are linked to each other and are in most cases facilitated by institutionalized bodies 
like churches or missionary societies. 
In the South African case, the one religious body that predominantly defined this relationship 
is the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, or Dutch Reformed Church. As a religious institution 
rooted in Calvinism, it provided the ideological backing and religious sanction for the policies 
and practices of segregation during apartheid (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 385). TIRYAKIAN (1957) 
further argues that the Huguenots, who fled to South Africa in 1688, had a decisive influence 
on the settlers’ Dutch Calvinism. The Huguenots brought with them the religious notion of pre-
destination, which could have served as a precursor to the Boers’ chosen people narrative and 
self-perceived superiority. Christianity had long been a firm aspect of the settlers’ perception of 
themselves as inherently different from the enslaved and indigenous populations. This had 
structural implications as well, particularly concerning the limitation to missionary efforts 
among the early slaves: If converted to Christianity, the slaves’ children could themselves no 
longer be enslaved. The spread of Islam among the early Cape slave population has to be 
understood in this regard (see SHELL 1993). Furthermore, Africans encountered by migrant 
farmers were associated with the sons of Ham and the biblical curse of Cain (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 
392). The arrival of the British Empire around 1800 and their subsequent takeover of power 
confronted the burghers of the colony and the trekboers of the countryside with Britain’s ideology 
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and policy of full economic and partial social equalization, gelykstelling in Afrikaans, which was 
perceived as a threat to the evolved supremacy of the Dutch settlers (MACDONALD 2006: 37; 
ELPHICK 2012: 228f.). Together with the historical process of the Great Trek, this strengthened 
the link between Christianity and superiority. Moreover, religious affiliation became conflated 
with race defined by skin color, which subsequently led to the ultimate rejection of equality. 
The constitution of the Boer Republic of Transvaal (the South African Republic) reflected this 
political ideology very clearly: “The people desire to permit no equality between coloured 
people and the white inhabitants, either in Church or State” (ELPHICK 2012: 178). The Boers’ 
migrations and expansionism farther inland continuously strengthened their link to the Dutch 
Reformed Church. As the politically dominant religious institution among the Boers, it 
introduced segregation in the congregation with a resolution passed by the Cape Synod in 1857, 
the result of a prolonged dispute over the equal rights of Christian-born White and proselytized 
Non-White members of the Church to communion (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 390; FREUND 1976: 63; 
CHRISTOPHER 2001: 145). This move resulted in the founding of four separate congregations 
with separate institutions and structures: The Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk for Whites, the 
Nederduits Gereformeerde Sending Kerk for Coloureds, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk 
in Africa for Africans and the Reformed Church of Africa for Indians. A paradoxical 
relationship between evolving Afrikanerdom and Christian belief took hold, foreshadowing the 
situation during apartheid. The African other and members of the intermediary groups could be 
Christian but could not be equal with White Christians, and therefore had to be separated. 
Thus, the colonizers’ Christian beliefs did not condemn their oppression of the African other; 
instead, their domination came to be reflected in and through their Christianity as well. 
Afrikaner nationalist ideology built upon a politically constructed mythology of group loyalty 
and attachment (groepsgebondenheid) the premise of an Afrikaner volk, which served as the all-
uniting narrative of belonging, and beyond that, a firm belief in this Afrikaner volk existing and 
prevailing in God’s favor (SHARP 1988: 82f.). While the influence of Calvinism and the Dutch 
Reformed Church on the Boer National Movement is indisputable, the question remains 
whether the early trekboers’ racial ideology actually rested on Calvinism or if the historical 
narrative was later religiously mythologized. FREDRICKSON (1981: 170ff.) strongly argues for 
the former, while DU TOIT (1983) comprehensively dismantles the construction of the thesis 
that he calls the “myth of the calvinist origin.” Less disputed is the role of the Dutch Reformed 
Church within the formation of Afrikaner Nationalism in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century, as well as the role of the church in the foundation of apartheid (see GILIOMEE 1983: 
85). Besides political mythologies, the importance of religious ritual and sacred space for the 
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emerging cultural commonality can be retraced along the lines of its development from the 
Dutch colony to the Boer and finally to Afrikanerdom: “For the Dutch settlers who penetrated 
the country’s interior, the establishment of a kerk (church) and the monthly nagmaal (Communion 
service) were important territorial and cultural markers, a claim to space as well as an 
affirmation of identity and belonging” (DODSON 2000: 146). In the form of the Calvinist 
Christianity of the Dutch Reformed Church, religion served in its ritual and place-making 
dimension to generate a sense of order and normality in the unknown social and spatial 
environments on the way farther inland. Under constantly changing circumstances and 
necessitated changes in routine, it offered a sense of stability, a raison d’être, and a sacred order 
to the Boers (cf. TIRYAKIAN 1957). The kerk became the homey heterotopia within an unsettling 
topography of lived-in places, a sacred space for an-other order, while the nagmaal became a 
facilitator for rites as acts and representations of orderly, civilized, and superior self-awareness. 
“Being white and being Christian were the distinguishing features of belonging to the superior 
in-group—it was a cherished privileged status which justified the frontier farmer's attempt to 
subjugate the barbarians who surrounded him” (ibid.). Afrikaner nationalism was not a result 
of Calvinist Christianity, but it became enhanced, justified, and mythologized through it. That 
is because Afrikaner nationalism was rooted in the historical narrative of the Great Trek, 
understood as an exodus similar to that of the Israelites (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 392), and offered an 
evolved ideology of belonging based on racial inclusivity and superiority. Aspects of Calvinism 
such as the doctrine of predestination and an emphasis upon the “community of the elect” 
(TIRYAKIAN 1957: 291) supported this cause. Under these circumstances, Calvinist 
Afrikanerdom can be interpreted as almost its own variation of Christianity, a social identity of 
inherent religious quality with the Dutch Reformed Church as the volkskerk, contributing “more 
to the social history of the Afrikaners than to theology” ELPHICK (2012: 222). Yet, the racist 
and racialized ideology of apartheid that evolved out of this sphere is not to be understood as a 
religious racism but rather racism backed by ex post religious interpretations and a religious 
mythology of the Afrikaner volk as a chosen people. 
Religion and Apartheid’s Racial Orderings 
Oliver Tambo, the president of the African National Congress exiled during apartheid, saw in 
the religious-political web of apartheid South Africa a terrain “in which the human was poised 
between the super-human claims of the apartheid state and the dehumanization suffered by the 
majority of the people in South Africa within a capitalist economy” (CHIDESTER 2008: 325). 
The forced removals, migratory implications, enforced routines of racial group classification, 
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and everyday lived-in injustices brought about by petty apartheid rendered the modes of 
ordering and order as an almost indisputable reality.  
The chosen people narrative became an effective political mythology in the early years of the 
apartheid government, especially under Prime Minister Verwoerd and during the 
implementation of the grand apartheid scheme of macro-scale segregations. However, this 
mythology is less a religious motif and more the product of contemporary nationalism projected 
onto the preceding historical developments. The religious mythology behind the Afrikanerdom 
that led to apartheid has other points of reference linking it to the emergence of European 
nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This is exemplified apartheid’s 
first Prime Minister and minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, D. F. Malan. Malan studied 
from 1900 to 1905 in the Netherlands, a period when the Calvinist leader Abraham Kuyper 
headed the government, implementing a policy of segmentation (verzuiling) that aimed at 
ordering the Calvinist, Catholic, and secular parts of society, offering each segment the right to 
its own newspapers, parties, schools and so on (GILIOMEE 1983: 85). “Kuyper championed the 
‘little people’ […] and thus inspired Afrikaner nationalists’ to rescue poor white Afrikaners from 
‘Anglo-Jewish capital,’ cosmopolitanism, and racial equalization, or gelykstelling—all, in their 
view, dangerous twentieth-century manifestations of liberalism” (ELPHICK 2012: 240). The 
underpinning neo-Calvinist ideological influence, understanding orderly governance as the 
separation and ordering of society, became visible within Malan’s advocacy for the 
institutionalization of separate nations for separate people, justified by religious obligation: 
“God had ordained separate nations, each with a unique destiny” (ibid.: 86). This analogy to 
the Old Testament’s Genesis would inevitably pave the political way for the discourse and policy 
of separate development (or distinct development as the Dutch Reformed Church would name it), grand 
apartheid, and the establishment of pseudo-independent homelands within the national 
territory of South Africa. 
With the actual policies of separate development in place and the removals and relocations 
being orchestrated, apartheid became a more and more controversial issue within the Dutch 
Reformed Church. The church may have argued in favor of separate development of nations 
or races, but it did not see the law of God justifying oppression. Nevertheless, it had been 
fatefully linked to the ideological narrative and historical emergence of Afrikaner nationalism 
and apartheid. Indeed, the church’s own institutional development served as grounds for 
bringing other denominations in line with apartheid as well. As the segregation of congregations 
in the nineteenth century became the twentieth century blueprint for  apartheid policies, the 
institutional bodies of other denominations did not comply with the separation. In most cases, 
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however, the removals brought about by the Group Areas Act led to a de facto segregation of 
church-goers, as people attended the churches in their respective relocated places of living. Only 
few made their way from their allocated areas to their original congregational places and houses 
(cf. CHRISTOPHER 2001: 145). Other religious groupings, such as the Order of Ethiopia, were 
hardly affected as they had already situated themselves among a rather exclusive group and 
lacked a certain degree of institutionalization, making them hard for the apartheid 
administration to grasp. 
At the same time, the religious foundations of apartheid led to a paradox when it came to the 
sacred spaces of those areas demarcated for relocation and subsequent demolition. A political 
ideology that saw itself fulfilling divine will could not touch the sacred spaces. The religious 
dimension within apartheid’s modes of ordering provided a fuzzy variance to the radical spatial 
segregation of the people living in South Africa, which is to be understood, as has been argued 
so far, as a uniquely modernist approach to society and space (DODSON 2000: 155). In scale 
and scope, it stands without comparison to other nationalist modernist undertakings on the 
globe, as it developed along an orderly line of remodeling society and space at the same time 
and in relational reference to each other. The habitat structured the inhabitants, who structured 
the habitat again, and so on. The cause: to secure the dominance of a numerical minority while 
creating an orderly territory within which the constructed cultural distinctiveness of the African 
other, above all others, guaranteed a steady stream of cheap labor—initially for the gold and 
diamond mines in Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand, and later for the growing White urban 
industrial centers. In self-protective, hegemonic opposition to the African other stood the Afrikaner 
self, interwoven with Calvinist religious thought, serving as the ideological roots of the state and 
the dominating part of White South Africa. In contrast to the other spheres of daily life, only 
sacred space was handled with reservation, rendering the socio-spatial modernity of South 
Africa a simultaneously religious one. People may have been removed from their areas of 
residence and forcefully relocated somewhere else, but due to apartheid’s interlinkage with 
religion, the religious buildings were not to be touched by the bulldozers. Cape Town's District 
Six stands as such an exemplary place, where up until today the only original buildings left 
standing are the religious ones. The Methodist church there has been turned into a museum as 
a reminder of the history of dispossession and relocation. A more socio-cultural example is the 
well-documented case of the so-called Zanzibari Muslim community of Durban (SEEDAT 1973; 
OOSTHUIZEN 1982; SICARD 1981; OOSTHUIZEN 1992; KAARSHOLM 2014, 2010). In that case, 
the relocated community was granted continuous access to their Muslim graveyard, still located 
on ground that had been demarcated a White area. During apartheid, the graveyard allowed 
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them a practical connection to their former site of living . It seems as if it was less difficult for 
apartheid planners and administrators to segregate benches and beaches than religious places 
and related practices. These cases of religious territoriality in South Africa exemplify the 
paradoxical untouchability of religious places within the spatial ideology of apartheid, which 
under certain circumstances enabled some oppressed groups to maintain a sense of belonging 
to their former places of residence and a practical connection to the land from which they had 
been forcibly removed. In this context, the forced removal not only had spatial, economic, and 
social effects on people’s lives; it also entailed a ripping away of one’s psychological bonds to place 
in terms of one’s belief (cf. GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016). SOUTHWORTH (1991: 10) 
cites an inhabitant from Durban who had been affected by removals during apartheid saying: 
“People form deep and lasting attachment to the places in which they live, and such attachments 
are rooted in emotional association with homes, temples, churches, mosques, schools, burial 
places and [years of friendship] with neighbors.” The racist modernity of apartheid evolved in 
all aspects of life in different ways and with different intensities. Apartheid's paradoxical relation 
to sacred space made the religious sphere a gateway, though a very limited one, for claiming 
and upholding place-bound identities. Still, the result is what DODSON (2000) calls a dystopian 
cultural landscape, in which people are left in a constant state of unsettlement and uprooting: 
“South Africa’s cultural geography has to be understood in terms of power relations and 
social constructions, rather than simply maps and material artifacts. Such an 
understanding provides insight into the struggles over place, space, and meaning, as well 
as over language, religion, and education, that are part of the country’s ongoing post-
apartheid cultural transformation.” (DODSON 2000: 155) 
The struggle to belonging and the challenging of existing modes of social and spatial ordering 
is therefore a struggle against a background of daily, lived-in dystopic order, a socio-spatial 
setting that constantly reifies subordinate Blackness vis-a-vis dominant Whiteness as politics of not-
belonging and alienation within the experiences and perceptions of everyday life (cf. WALTER 
2001: 22f.). The uprooted self becomes an intrinsic part of the cultural knowledge of the Non-
White subject. Resisting those subjectified and institutionalized dystopic orders therefore 
requires breaking with the incorporated, experiential, and shared cultural knowledge. It 
requires the questioning of the structuring structures as well as the structured self within the 
daily constructions of the world in the interplay of realizing and acknowledging the relation 
between the objective and the symbolic world. To understand the magnitude of such an 
undertaking, the following chapter will present a case study, in which the religious aspects of 
the colonial endeavors in South Africa, the British policies towards religious groups, and the 
socio-spatial logics of Afrikanerdom and apartheid came together, creating a vivid example of 
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the religious dimension’s place within the mosaic of racialized territorializations and the 
ordering and spatialization of indigeneity. 
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Apartheid and the Paradox of 
Religious Territoriality—the Case of 
the Mariannhill Mission 
After 250 years of continuous European presence at the southern tip of the African continent, 
the public and political arena in the White territories was characterized by agitating changes 
and contradictory moves regarding the efforts to consolidate White minority rule vis-à-vis the 
numerical majority of the indigenous population. The position of African societies and 
communities was no longer just an issue of local conflict and dispute, nor limited to the 
governmental realm of the colonial administration; it was an issue of territorial dominance and 
the spatial ordering of Whiteness on a macro-scale. Two major factors contributed to these 
complexities: One was the increasing pull-effect that the rapidly growing urban centers across 
South Africa had on the indigenous population (cf. MABIN 1992: 13f.). Restrictive, racialized 
policies of land acquisition and commodification, such as the Poll Tax introduced in 1906 or 
the Land Act of 1913, further accelerated this process. The other major factor concerned the 
countryside, where White farmers demanded policies to protect their spatial and economic 
interests in their expansive outreach into the indigenous land. The overall discourse reflecting 
these developments consolidating White minority hegemony by ordering the African other thus 
had an urban/rural dimension, as well as a dimension of dispute around farming 
territory/indigenous location territory. The two Afrikaner-dominated regions, the Orange Free 
State and the Republic of Transvaal, tended to deal with these issues with maximum restriction 
and segregation. Whereas, in the British-controlled areas, such as the Natal colony, the so-called 
Native Question was at the center of a political debate at the end of the nineteenth century, 
with far-reaching implications already discussed in the introduction to this study. These 
discussions and policies were situated in between the local pathways of superiority defined by 
Whiteness and the expectations formulated by the central British government abroad, emerging 
as a result of the global British colonial network, which translated into the South African realm 
a discourse of indigenous rights to self-determination, self-government, and territorial 
sovereignty. The systematic demarcation of the land in the colonies into farms and the resulting 
commodification—which transformed the indigenous population already living on the newly 
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demarcated sections into annual-rent-paying tenants (cf. HUGHES 1996: 300)—brought the 
Native Question down to a central issue: Should the indigenous African population be granted 
rights of tenure outside of designated native locations, and if so, how could White supremacy 
still be maintained? “The ‘Native Question’ was about control and power. With rare exceptions, 
black voices were never heard. The African people were spoken about but not listened to” 
(DENIS 2013: 146). This inevitably led to another question, namely how a steady flow of cheap 
workforce for the White economy could be maintained, if tenure rights were granted (cf. DENIS 
2013: 146; THOMPSON & NICHOLLS 1993: 58f.). Reflecting similar developments in British 
colonies around the globe, the discourse could also be translated as follows: What would better 
serve to maintain territorial superiority—restricting the oppressed, subaltern indigenous 
population from any kind of equalization concerning land rights, or trying to transform, to re-
order, the indigeneity at hand to fit the capitalistic model of land ownership?  
The Native Question was not at all limited to public or political debates. Instead, model schemes 
were implemented at various places, and a union of political and academic actors turned these 
areas into experimental realms for trying to align the African other with the White/European 
cause. At the end of the nineteenth century, a model location in Bloemfontein approached the 
rural/urban dimension of the debate by making it possible for indigenous people to purchase 
land or rent sites for indefinite periods (NATAL WITNESS (ANONYMOUS CONTRIBUTOR) 1931). 
At the same time, the Glen Grey district of the Ciskei (today the area around Lady Frere in the 
Emalahleni district municipality of the Eastern Cape) came to be known for a similar situation, 
though its focus was more on the relation between the rural indigenous population and White 
farmers. The Glen Grey model granted African individuals conditional freeholding or quitrent 
tenure of four to five morgen (equivalent to four to five acres) for agricultural use (DAVENPORT 
& HUNT 1974: 75). The central conditions were that the land could not be vacated without 
notification, that transfer was only possible among the indigenous population, and that the land 
could only be inherited to the oldest son. That final condition kept the majority of the indigenous 
population without land ownership and therefore reliant on wage labor, thus guaranteeing the 
White minority a steady supply of cheap workforce. Importantly, the initial results of this model 
were amalgamated into the Glen Grey Act of 1894, making it possible to extend the scheme 
beyond the model district. The Act sought to override the communal territorial land use system 
of the indigenous African societies of South Africa, introducing a spatialized idea of 
individualism through tenure instead (THOMPSON & NICHOLLS 1993: 58).  
By the 1920s, neither the Bloemfontein experiment nor the Glen Grey Act had gained any 
momentum, which left the tenure question unresolved, giving way for those arguing for a 
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continuation and further strengthening of restrictive policies. In the lead up to apartheid, the 
Land Act of 1913 and the developments and decisions in its wake rendered the indigenous 
population increasingly immobile. Thus, the different approaches discussed above represented 
early attempts to solve the political debate around the White/Non-White dialectic by delivering 
results through spatial planning and territorial administration. Moreover, these different models 
focused on creating individual ownership or other forms of permanent land appropriation by 
the indigenous population, thereby moving them towards a European understanding of land 
commodification.  
At the same time, near the harbor city of Durban in the Natal colony, another model in answer 
to the Native Question discourse formed around a newly founded Catholic mission station. The 
Trappist abbot Franz Pfanner of Mariannhill Monastery became a prominent religious actor 
within the discourse on the Native Question. In various newspaper articles as well as his own 
pamphlet, he published his own ideas regarding an ideal answer for the African population 
(PFANNER 1894). His concept and the activities of the mission station were not limited solely to 
discursive terms. Instead, a model for what Pfanner termed ideal African villages developed on 
the land owned by the Mariannhill Monastery, which resembled the modes of ordering found 
in Bloemfontein and Glen Grey. The aim was to move the indigenous population away from 
communal-oriented tenure and land use systems and towards an individualized form of 
ownership, thereby attempting to break the existing land tenure structures linked to traditional 
authorities, such as the chiefs. In contrast to the state-run experiments, the approach of the 
Trappist monks was not limited to land tenure aspects alone but built on a model of social and 
cultural re-ordering of the indigenous African population which applied idealized European 
concepts of Christian lifestyle, such as the nuclear family, subsistent agriculture, and westernized 
layouts for houses and the living spaces therein. The aim was to permanently inscribe the spatial 
modes of social ordering into the micro-landscape by re-arranging the homesteads and 
associated plots of land, which would in turn inscribe a new sense of cultural order into those 
leading their daily lives in those places (cf. DENIS 2010, 2013, 2015). The experiment of creating 
ideal African villages was aimed not only at the African population already living on the land 
but also at those willing to move onto the mission’s territory under the condition they become 
Christians.  
The empirical and analytical focus of the following section centers on an area that the 
missionaries had named Emmaus, a section of land southwest of the city of Pinetown, in the 
hinterland of Durban, as well as on the communities living on that land. Together with the 
settlements of Nazareth and St. Wendolin’s (see map 8 further below), Emmaus became one of 
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Pfanner’s ideal African community areas, consisting of orderly model villages for re-ordered, 
soon-to-be Christian Africans.  
Apartheid and its racial segregation and spatial segmentation of the land through group areas 
put the experiment to the test and led, in the very late stages of apartheid, to its ultimate failure 
and the forcing of most of the indigenous population off the land. The eviction of the 
Amanganga people from Emmaus is exemplary for so many other biographies of eviction and 
the accompanying loss of home and belonging, in which the combination of material 
dispossession, symbolic disarray, and territorial uprooting results in an unsettledness that 
stretches over generations of Black South Africans. The area’s specific path—from becoming 
the homing territory to communities of Amakholwa under the territorial-religious sphere of the 
Mariannhill Mission station during the first half of the twentieth century to the slow, steady, 
and heavily contested forced removals in the late 1970s and early 1980s—represents a unique 
land biography of reordered and disordered indigeneity and belonging. The case of the eviction 
of Emmaus points to the paradoxical relationship of the racist hyper-modernity of apartheid’s 
politics of spatial ordering to sacred spaces, as discussed above, while at the same time shedding 
light onto the interlinkages of Christian missionary work and White settler colonialism. The 
adaptation of the indigenous population to the missionaries’ modes of ordering is explored 
below through a critical perspective on South Africa’s racialization of space in the context of 
the White/Non-White dialectic.  
A historical perspective will bring the existing academic literature together with selected texts 
deriving from the extensive historical material produced by the Mariannhill Mission and its 
affiliated scholars. In addition, archival documents provided by the Pietermaritzburg Land 
Surveyor Office are also taken into account. The more contemporary aspects of spatial 
contestation and eviction during apartheid are illuminated through qualitative interviews with 
descendants of former Emmaus residents. The cartographical reconstruction of the households 
and the phases of removal from Emmaus was made possible through a collaborative approach 
within the interview sessions, which employed historical aerial photography and walking 
interviews in the former area of living (see section on methods above). 
Divine Modernization: Settler Colonialism and the 
Ordering of African Indigeneity 
On December 21, 1882, the Trappists, a reformed Benedictine Catholic order, purchased the 
property of Farm Zeekoegat, near Pinetown in the hinterland of the city of Durban, from the 
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Natal Land and Colonisation Company for £7,871 in order to establish a mission station in 
South Africa(EDLEY 1991: 177; DAHM 1949: 41). For the Trappist monks under the leadership 
of their prior Franz Pfanner, this was a second attempt to establish such a mission: The first 
one, at Dunbrody (Cape Colony), failed in 1880 due to an early shortage of funds as well as 
severe difficulties in applying their known agricultural techniques to the local climatic and soil 
conditions (SCHIMLEK 1953: 14ff.; cf. DENIS 2013: 137). The location of the new mission station 
close to a major urban hub of White South Africa was an unusual development. Whereas most 
mission stations were established within or next to an African location, the Mariannhill Mission 
Station was not restricted to an allocated mission reserve: 
“In Natal the Trappists, unlike most other mission societies, were able to select and 
purchase their land in a convenient place and were not dependent on a Government 
grant which would require them to occupy a mission reserve perhaps far from the urban 
centers.” (BRAIN 1983: no pagination) 
Most missionary societies were assigned to specific native reserves by the administration of the 
colony; however, the Trappists acquired their land through purchase on the regular land 
market. This positioned them within a development corridor connecting the harbor of Durban 
via Pinetown to Pietermaritzburg. Such transects were prone to become the spatial lifelines of 
apartheid South Africa, corridors of Whiteness connecting the urbanized White minority, neatly 
delineated by the group areas (cf. SMITH 1990: 5). 
The initial purchase of 6,000 acres for Farm Zeekoegat was extended by the purchase of the 
neighboring farms of Klaarwater and Stockville (ENGLAND 1996a). By 1894, the land controlled 
by the mission had grown to an extent of 11,000 acres and was home to about 700 people 
(DENIS 2015: 278f.). It was then the largest of the four mission stations within the same District, 
two of which belonged respectively to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Mission and the New Germany mission belonging to the Berlin Mission Society (ibid.). In the 
following years, a network of offshoot missions from the Mariannhill Monastery evolved 
throughout the region (see map 7). 
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Map 7: Mission stations of the Mariannhill Monastery in the Natal Colony around 1907. Source: (FREY 1907: Annex). 
By 1909, Mariannhill had been made an abbey and had created a network of twenty-eight 
settlements in native reserves of Zululand, Pondoland, and Tembuland (DENIS 2010: 2), owning 
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more than 95,000 acres of land. According to DENIS (2013: 138) and DAHM (1949: 149), this 
network encompassed more than half of all Catholic mission stations within the colonial 
territory of South Africa, which underpins the outstanding importance of the Mariannhill 
Abbey and its expansive outreach to the overall position of missionary Catholicism within the 
religious landscape of South Africa. That overall position was strong despite the numerical 
marginality of Catholics compared to other Christian denominations, especially among the 
indigenous African population. 
With the beginning of the First World War, the Mariannhill monks (most of whom were of 
German descent) and the monastery found themselves in a troublesome position relative to the 
British-dominated government, which instituted large-scale restrictions on the outreach 
activities of the missionaries and their movements across the country. Reacting to this threat to 
their existence, in 1916, the Vatican declared all the property of Mariannhill “International 
Ecclesiastical Property” solely to be used for missionary efforts. This move was intended to 
prevent the South African government from declaring that the mission property belonged to a 
hostile power, making it subject to expropriation (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 37). In fact, the 
declaration produced a religious territoriality which proved to be of recurring importance over the 
course of the subsequent historical developments, particularly concerning the fate of the 
indigenous population living on the land owned by the mission station. Especially during 
apartheid, the paradoxical stance of racist policies relative to sacred space was not limited to 
the micro-scale but touched territoriality at large, thus shifting the planned re-orderings of the 
socio-cultural landscape. Spoken in legal terms, the intervention of the Vatican was likely 
reflected in the special clause added to the title deed of the property, which reads as follows: 
“B. This property was transferred to the Superior General on the condition that the same 
shall be used solely for Religious, Educational and Benevolent purposes, but with the 
power and authority to the Superior General of the Mariannhill Mission Institute and 
his successors in office with the written consent of the Senior Councillor and the 
Procurator General of the said Institute to sell, mortgage or in any other manner to 
administer the said property as he and they may consider to be in the interests of the said 
Mariannhill Mission Institute (as set forth in the said Deed of Transfer No. 757/1912 
dated 25th April 1912).” (Consolidated Title Deed of Farm Zeekoegat 937 (1929)) 
Such title deeds are central to understanding the spatial consolidation of White minority rule in 
South Africa in the early twentieth century. As a formal, institutionalized process for the 
commodification of the occupied land, the deeds help to retrace the manifold steps of the social 
and spatial ordering along the White/Non-White dialectic. A graphic example of this can be 
found in the introduction in 1922 of title deed clauses preventing people classified as Indian 
from purchasing any land, thereby enabling the White minority to secure economic superiority 
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through territorial exclusivity (DAVIES 1991: 78). The section quoted above is part of the 
original 1918 title deed of Farm Zeekoegat (succeeding a deed of transfer from 1912), and it 
names the Mariannhill Mission Institute as the sole property owner, bound to the religious 
conditions ascribed by the territorial administration.  
The administrative ascription of religious territoriality to the land owned by the Mariannhill 
Mission underscores an approach to re-ordering the indigenous African population in social 
and cultural terms specific to the missionaries’ work. The mission provided not only religious 
belonging but also an identity redrafted on the basis of shifted modes of material and symbolic 
order within everyday life. Driven by their firm belief , the Mariannhill missionaries understood 
themselves as obligated to develop and modernize the pagan African population by removing 
from them their own social and cultural modes of ordering and shifting them towards a 
capitalistic, industrial, and Western way of life. The overall undertaking was therefore aimed at 
different scales, including education, lifestyle, bodily appearance, cultural significations, as well 
as the practice, spatiality, and materiality of the lived-in places. 
Education as Socio-Cultural Ordering of Indigeneity 
Looking at Christian missionaries as an element of nineteenth century colonialism, COMAROFF 
& COMAROFF (1997: 29) describe the work of “colonial evangelists.” In the case of the Trappist 
monks of Mariannhill, a more fitting term might be pioneer proselytizers. Strongly driven by an 
ethos of Catholic settler colonialism as propagated by their religious and administrative leader 
Franz Pfanner (cf. for example PFANNER 1878), the early work of the Mariannhill missionaries 
was dedicated to the unconditional modernization of the local population in all their social and 
cultural ways of life, including their use of the landscape for agricultural intensification. 
Compared to other missionary societies, the general attitude towards the when and where of 
proselytism differed (MUKUKA 2006: 52f.): For the Trappist monks under Pfanner’s leadership, 
the development of an operating farm and workshops was to take precedence over any actual 
missionary work, until the level of self-sufficiency had been reached. The missionary strategy 
was thus aimed at bringing the local population to the economic space of the mission station, 
where the propagation of Christianity could take place. Beginning in 1887, different workshops 
were operated on the grounds of the monastery. These included a printing workshop with a 
printing press imported from Europe in order to reproduce religious publications and other 
sociological, geographical, or mission-related texts. These texts were printed in various 
languages, including German, English, isiZulu, and isiXhosa, among others (DAHM 1949: 190; 
DENIS 2013: 138). The missionary reports and the newspapers and journals of Mariannhill were 
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circulated both in South Africa and abroad in order to raise funds. Up until the present day, 
the major journal Vergissmeinnicht attracts people from the European continent to the missionary 
work of the Mariannhill Mission’s institutional successor (cf. DAHM 1949: 187). The general 
desire to impress upon the surrounding population the technical superiority and agricultural 
efficiency of the monastery’s methods found a lasting expression in the annual agriculture and 
farming fairs hosted throughout the early twentieth century to demonstrate the missionaries' 
capacity to modernize the indigenous population. 
The agenda of the missionaries of Mariannhill was based on the premises of modernization and 
rationalization along the lines of Western capitalism and aimed at the social transformation of 
the African other away from their heathenism and ancestral worship. The indigenous way of life 
was perceived as an inefficient waste of resources. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Bernhard Huss, one of the most politically active priests and missionaries of Mariannhill, 
express this sentiment during a public lecture in Durban in the follow words: 
“[When] I travel through your Reserves, it is like walking through a huge hospital where 
one sees only the weak, the sick and the dying. Your fields are weak, sick and dying, and 
soon you yourselves will be in a similar plight, because in those sick fields of yours lies 
the root of malnutrition. My friends, this country is like a leaking tank. For thirty years I 
have been watching this tank, and it is still leaking all over.” (SCHIMLEK 1953: 198) 
In contrast, the monks’ self-perception reflected a conviction that they were the perfect fit for 
Christianizing and civilizing the indigenous population of South Africa, due to their specific 
approach focused on agricultural work and craftsmanship (see PFANNER 1886: 9). In the interest 
of developing the missionaries’ more passive, “people-attracting” approach into a pro-active, 
broadly based transformation of the local society, great importance was laid on the provision of 
schooling services to the younger generation. The mission’s own economic spaces facilitated an 
educational model that included traditional school teaching in the first half of the day and 
instruction in industrial craftsmanship and trade in the second half. Schooling was made 
available in separate schools for the boys and girls of those indigenous families willing to bring 
their children to the mission station. This educational offer was strongly endorsed by Inkosi 
Manzini, the chief of the local Amanganga people, who wanted to see the younger generation 
become able to read and write, though he opposed their Christianization (SCHIMLEK 1953: 57). 
When an isiZulu-speaking Basuto catechist, Benjamin Makhaba, joined the mission station, the 
language barrier to the local population was overcome (SCHIMLEK 1953: 56). The curriculum 
consisted of classical subjects such as reading and writing, taught with the help of religious texts, 
together with instruction on the practical skills of various trades and agricultural techniques, an 
element which was extended as more workshops were created. Additionally, the schooling 
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process also included re-clothing the children, who were disparagingly described as “animal-
like,” “filthy,” and generally uncivilized in the eyes of the European missionary settlers 
(SIHLOBOSAMI [=FR. DAVID BRYANT] 1887: 48,55). This rendered the school experience less 
a complement to their everyday life than an intersubjective and spatial experience that was 
socially and culturally different to the life they had known thus far: 
“But the boys could not be left in the dirty and primitive state in which they came from 
the kraals. They had to be taught to put away all that was loathsome and disgusting. For 
this reason a shed of galvanized iron and tarpaulin was erected, and the class was held 
there. In the meantime white clothes of a light material were prepared, and a new, and 
very important and necessary, part of education was able to commence. […] The 
loincloth of tails and rags was removed, and the boys were made to wash the whole body 
and put on clean clothes — and this was a metamorphosis fit for an Ovid to picture in 
immortal verse.”12 (SCHIMLEK 1953: 58f.) 
In the eyes of the monks, a full-fledged Europeanization could only be achieved if the children 
were prevented from returning home to their indigenous surroundings each day. Consequently, 
the educational work became intensified by the opening of a boarding school in 1884, and then 
a vocational school in 1889 (DAHM 1949: 187). Those enrolling in the boarding school system 
were to be baptized as soon as possible, leading to conflicts with the parents who in many cases 
did not want their children to become Christians. The intense ideological influence of the 
missionaries and their religious message imbued with the fear of hellfire led the children to 
refuse to return to their parents. The missionaries regarded this development as a success for 
their approach. It broke the social structures of the indigenous families, however, leaving the 
children in a state of questioning their belonging and having to choose between the old and the 
new (PFANNER 1886: 48f.). “It is evident that the monks wanted the schools to be one of the 
means to convey Christianity and civilisation to children at an early age. The children had to 
think like the Germans, and at times they became alienated from their own cultural 
background” (MUKUKA 2006: 54). The overall aim was to create a situation where the new 
converts would not want to return to their former homes. The boarding school system was 
meant to disrupt the social, cultural, and bodily inscribed ties to the kraal of the family and 
 
12It is worth mentioning here that the writings of SCHIMLEK (1953) bear close resemblance to those of Fr. Bryant 
(compare for example the given citation to SIHLOBOSAMI [=FR. DAVID BRYANT] 1887: 47f.), though when writing 
about the indigenous population, Schimlek refrains from using the same derogatory undertone that can be found in 
the publications of the Mariannhill Mission's self-proclaimed anthropologist David Bryant, who called himself 
Sihlobosami. 
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therefore to the overarching ideologies of the larger family and of indigenous African 
communitarianism. 
The agenda for the social and cultural re-ordering of the indigenous population was far from 
limited to educational work with children. It was geared towards shifting the everyday lives of 
the adults as well. That included everything from their rites and routines to their clothing, with 
a specific emphasis placed on the latter: 
“We insist that the Natives on our farm dress decently, and we help them to achieve this 
object. It is only a short time since we have tried to apply these rules strictly, and one can 
already observe a great change among our Natives. The main feature of it all is that 
changing conditions and modern demands are inducing the Bantu to stop their eternal 
loafing and apply themselves to work, a fact which we consider to be the foundation of 
all civilization and culture, and even of Christianity.” (SCHIMLEK 1953: 114, citing 
Abbot Franz Pfanner; see also BRAIN 1983) 
How the missionaries regarded the use of the Iscoco, a black headband worn by married men, 
is a vivid example of this processes. Irrespective of the cultural signification, the headband was 
deemed by Franz Pfanner as heathen, unhygienic, and wholly incompatible with Western-style 
dress: 
“That’s why I ordered those two married men whom I baptized last Sunday to take off 
the headband and I will order everyone to break with this last remnant of heathen 
reminiscence. Furthermore, and given that all baptized are obliged to wear European 
clothes, it would be ridiculous to continue with the use of the headband as it does not 
allow any head gear. I won’t go after the chief in this regard as I am chief on Farm 
Zeekoegat.”13 (PFANNER 1886: 33) 
A far more intrusive effort of the missionaries’ work creating an orderly indigenous population 
can be found within the realm of family politics. For those living on the land of the Mariannhill 
Mission, family structures based on polygamous relationships were forbidden. An order issued 
by the monastery in 1885 allowed those already living in a relationship with more than one 
spouse to continue doing so, but forbade extending the structure, while those households 
wishing to move onto the Mariannhill farms and those planning to marry had to conform to a 
monogamous family model (cf. SCHIMLEK 1953: 114). It became necessary to construct an 
Altweibertrost as a home to those women who had been divorced in an effort to fulfill these 
 
13The original text in German reads as follows: “Deshalb habe ich die ersten zwei Ehemänner, die ich letzten Sonntag 
getauft habe, verpflichtet, diesen Ring abzulegen und werde alle verpflichten, auch mit diesem letzten Reste 
heidnischer Erinnerung zu brechen. Zudem wäre es lächerlich, bei europäischer Kleidung, die ja alle Getauften zu 
tragen schuldig sind, den Ring zu belassen, der keine Kopfbedeckung zulässt. Dem Chief aber trage ich nichts nach, 
denn auf dieser Farm Zeekoegat bin ich Chief.” 
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demands of the monestary (BRAIN 1983: no pagination). Breaking with traditional family 
structures brought with it another side effect: Suddenly the social reality of orphandom arose, a 
concept previously unknown to the Amanganga people due to their practice of polygamy and 
the social system of larger families.14 
Regarding their educational approach, the missionaries of the Mariannhill Institute showed a 
specific affinity for cultural-religious hybridization, translating African ideas and ideologies into 
their institution and negotiating themselves and its ordering logics into the socio-spatial 
surroundings in order to multiply the effects of their missionary efforts. Nevertheless, their 
promise of modernization entailed breaking the social and cultural modes of ordering on a far 
wider scale than just providing schooling services to the younger generation and giving rise to 
an African Catholic clergy. Beyond these dimensions, the undertaking to bring about orderly 
Africans for a westernized twentieth century South Africa was perfected by spatial inscription 
into the material landscape of the lived-in places. 
Spatialization of Orderly Indigeneity: Ideal African Villages 
What started as social, bodily, and material re-orderings through re-clothing and reeducation 
brought about a new generation of isiZulu-speaking African Christians among the Amanganga, 
who constructed their places of home along the lines of the ideal images of orderly landscapes 
projected by the German-speaking missionaries of Mariannhill. This process of place-making 
was supported, encouraged, and at a certain point required by the missionaries. Not only were 
the subjects to be re-ordered; their lived-in places were also obliged to comply with European 
standards of homey, modern, and effective space. The desired pull-effect on the indigenous 
population could only be produced through an exceptional display of the monastery’s own 
activities and the offer of attractive spaces for new settlements. In this regard, the mission’s initial 
failure at Dunbrody, situated as it was in a sparsely populated part of the Cape Colony, and its 
subsequent migration to Natal offered the Mariannhill Institute in an indispensable role within 
the discourses on how to consolidate the territorial hegemony of the White minority through 
the spatial manifestation of orderly indigeneity. This hegemony stemmed predominantly from 
two dimensions of power over land: The first was oriented towards other actors among the 
White minority, while the second was geared towards the indigenous population. The extensive 
 
14Group interview with former residents from Emmaus/Mariannhill (2013). 
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purchases of farms by the Mariannhill Mission therefore reflects a religious-territorial strategy 
to first create a space large enough to attract people from the surrounding area to the activities 
of the mission station and to thus become a counterweight to the territorial power of the 
surrounding chiefs: 
“But I have explicitly explained why I bought such a large piece of land. It is not for us 
but for the kaffirs in order to get them onto our premises where they can convert to 
Christianity in a manner that is free and independent from the influence of their chiefs—
where they come wholeheartedly into our hands.”15 (PFANNER 1886: 50) 
Franz Pfanner’s spatial vision of ideal African villages for future Christian communities was 
meant to be the homey perpetuation of the educational work at the institute. Joining in on the 
public and political discourse of the so-called Native Question, Pfanner proposed the 
development of decentralized settlements for the indigenous African population in the Natal 
colony, which should consist of a plot of land per family sufficient for building a house and 
pursuing agricultural activities. The lots were to be grouped together to create ideal villages for 
self-sustaining communities of Christianized Africans, with European-style houses to replacing 
the round homes of the indigenous population. These ideal villages would apply European 
techniques in agriculture and trade and feature a modernized infrastructure and social ordering 
system with schools, churches, public buildings, and a communal commons (cf. ENGLAND 
1996a). Pfanner’s idea was “to transform his African converts into Austrian farmers” (DENIS 
2015: 292). Although the scheme was presented to the colony’s administration and discussed, 
as well as being publicized via articles written by Pfanner for the local newspapers, it was never 
put into practice beyond the mission station’s territory. On the contrary, because the social 
development vision was coupled with a comparatively inclusive and counter-racist approach 
uniting the indigenous population with the European colonialists, it provoked anger and dispute 
among the settlers and farmers in the greater Durban area, who deemed it too revolutionary 
and unsuitable for the colony’s subordinate majority population. Still, it represented an attempt 
to create a transformative realm of new spaces of modernization of the African population and therefore 
reflected the socio-spatial utopian attitude and approach aimed at creating a better, re-ordered 
world.  
 
15The original text in German reads as follows: “Aber ich habe schon ausdrücklich erklärt, warum ich so viel Boden 
gekauft. Es ist ja nichts für uns, sondern für die Kaffern, um sie auf unsere Besitzung zu bekommen, wo sie frei und 
unabhängig von ihren Häuptlingen zum Christentum übergehen können, wo sie also ganz in unsere Hände kommen 
und teilweise gekommen sind.” 
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This orderly indigeneity envisaged a landscape strikingly similar to the monks’ own rural 
backgrounds, in particular that of Franz Pfanner (DENIS 2013: 152f.). Modeling ideal African 
villages onto the landscape reflected an ideology of modernization rooted in the principle of re-
ordering space for the orderly African. Within this ideology of modernization, the missionaries 
defined the values and conditions of a modern life, uniting cultural and social aspects with the 
idealized physical form of European rural homesteads. The mission’s own system of land tenure, 
based on the individual title deeds they handed out, was also an attempt to embed the freehold 
structure of the African population into a larger ideological framework of capitalistic individual 
ownership. It thus differed from the native location/reservation strategy, which was later 
replaced by the grand scheme of apartheid and the political aim of creating pseudo-independent 
homelands. Freehold titles were sold by the mission to Africans between the 1930s and 1960s, 
thus defying the 1913 Land Act forbidding any purchase of land by Africans outside their 
designated areas (ENGLAND 1996b; CROSS, BEKKER, CLARK et al. 1992; WERKMAN 1995). 
This handing out of title deeds expressed the monk’s major critique of the policies of the colonial 
government, i.e. the hardline prohibition of unconditional tenure to the indigenous population: 
“Pfanner did not question in any way the legitimacy of the colonial enterprise. What he 
condemned was the hypocrisy of the white settlers who claimed to advance the cause of 
civilisation and Christianity but behaved in a manner that was neither civilised nor Christian” 
(DENIS 2013: 144). Nevertheless, the approach entailed a racialized perspective with the aim of 
modernizing the indigenous population—according to a westernized-progressive worldview—
in everything from their social structures to their ways of making use of the land. As the 
ideological effort put into practice in the schools could not be properly sustained outside the 
realm of the mission or the boarding school, the re-ordering of culture and social structures had 
to be complemented by the re-ordering of the lived-in places. 
“Any tenant who wishes to live on our farm [Zeekoegat] may do so free of rent for the 
first year, and later on he pays £1 instead of the customary £2. The money thus saved 
must be invested in the construction of a house, not a beehive hut. The house must have 
a door and windows, a table and at least one chair. All the furniture required, including 
the door and the windows, can be obtained at our shops for £1. We do not believe that 
a man is civilized as long as he crawls on all fours into his hut like an animal.” (SCHIMLEK 
1953: 114, citing Abbot Franz Pfanner; see also BRAIN 1983) 
Such elements of unconditional cultural imperialism characterized the socio-cultural sphere of 
missionary work at the beginning of the twentieth century. “If [Pfanner] tolerated some African 
customs, it was not because he appreciated them but because he felt it was too early to remove 
them” (DENIS 2015: 292). The overall attitude was to Christianize and systematically civilize 
the indigenous population, which was portrayed as underdeveloped, heathen, and wild. Thus 
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orderly Africans would be produced by means of orderly places, which in turn served the 
ordering regime of the colony. Partly influenced by a growing body of African clergy, this 
colonial attitude of unquestioned cultural superiority would change and give way to a critical 
reflection of the colonizer’s own cultural development. In his publication on missionary work 
among the indigenous Africans, SCHIMLEK (1953: 323ff.), himself a Mariannhill monk, writes 
in a cautiously critical manner: 
“There is a problem of Bantu Collectivism (not Communism) and the Christian 
approach. When the Mariannhill Missionaries arrived in Natal, they found the Bantu 
comparatively well organized in a tight social structure […]. An individualistic or 
eccentric behavior has always been regarded with suspicion, or denounced as sorcery 
and witch-craft and punished accordingly. […] The missionaries realized that they were 
not helping the Natives socially by undermining their old loyalties, and they tried to 
preserve the old system intact as far as possible. Yet they could not prevent the disrupting 
consequences of the impact of Western civilization. […] For ages the Bantu lived their 
group life, in which the individual counted nothing. Being accustomed to quite a 
different state of things, the European individualist can hardly realize what a 
revolutionary doctrine Christianity must be to the African collectivist. […] There is such 
a thing as a ‘larger family’ in Bantu social organization, with a large sense of communal 
responsibility. […] It certainly would have been wise in Christianizing the Bantu not to 
have thrown overboard those instincts of community and group solidarity that have 
always provided the most congenial background for the development of their life.” 
This critique exemplifies how Pfanner’s scheme for ideal African villages resembled the Glen 
Grey system or the Bloemfontein experiment: Beyond their socio-cultural implications, they all 
rested on the same basic principles. In essence, Pfanner’s model aimed at shifting the worldview 
of the indigenous population from the existing communitarianism—deemed to be fully 
incompatible with and even threatening to capitalistic modes of order—to individualism. The 
territorial entitlement of the African subject’s individualized ownership over land was meant to 
manifest this shift. It was believed that the spatial dimension of a commodified landscape would 
then inscribe Western-capitalistic principles into the indigenous population, thus rendering 
them fit for and sustainably compliant with the worldview of the White minority, whose 
hegemonic position would in turn be consolidated. The apartheid politics of spatial segregation 
according to racial categories must therefore be seen as aligning with the discourse and 
experiments surrounding the Native Question. The major difference was that the earlier 
attempts at re-ordering and invoking compliance with the symbolic violence of the oppressor 
were replaced by apartheid’s approach of planned and enforced spatial violence, executed by 
imposing a racially segregated layout onto the South African landscape. Still, the assumption 
that spatial manifestation would lead to the bodily inscription of hegemonic relations is an 
element mutual to both eras. 
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The concept of the ideal African village and its social, spatial, and cultural magnitude were very 
much linked to the biography and personality of Franz Pfanner. He is portrayed today as a 
religious-charismatic figure whose actions and authority had far-reaching historical 
implications. These aspects are reflected in the existing academic accounts, which, as DENIS 
(2015: 277, Fn. 226) correctly notes, have—in sum—a distinctly hagiographic perspective. On 
the other hand, the interviewed descendants of the families once living on the land of the mission 
also took this stance, constantly affirming Pfanner’s divine qualities and the importance of his 
work for the indigenous people who lived with him. The general approach of Pfanner, the first 
abbot of Mariannhill to the development and subsequent success of the mission station can only 
be fully understood by looking at his work before coming to South Africa. In 1869, Pfanner 
established the Mariastern Monastery near Banjaluka in Bosnia, an area then governed by the 
Ottoman Empire and socio-culturally characterized by Muslim communities. There, he 
developed his settler-colonialist and modernist stance in the light of European-centered 
progressivism (see PFANNER 1878). As during his time in South Africa, he used printed 
publications to attract financial supporters as well as followers for his colonial enterprise. During 
his time in Bosnia, his message was primarily aimed at disillusioned Catholic workers from the 
urbanized areas of an increasingly industrialized central Europe, as well as poor Catholic 
farmers from the countryside—in other words, those who would be willing to start anew and 
would therefore be drawn to follow a settler movement (PFANNER 1878: 3f.). For Pfanner, the 
situation in the vicinity of Pinetown had certain similarities to his situation among the Bosnian 
peasants. Echoing his view of Bosnia as an auspicious territory and a resource-rich natural realm 
in contrast to the industrialized places in Europe, his work among the indigenous Africans was 
driven by a narrative of developing a landscape and its inhabitants still untouched by the 
disruptive inventions of the nineteenth century. This explains why the central pillars of the ideal 
African villages scheme consisted of cultural re-ordering together with the modernization of 
agriculture and trade (cf. BRAIN 1983: no pagination). 
However, developing a settler-colonial heterotopia did not comply with the rule set of the religious 
order to which the mission belonged. The reformed Benedictine approach of the Trappists 
aimed at concentrating the monks’ work on manual labor, crafts and trade, and intensive 
agricultural cultivation of large areas of land. Moreover, the strict monastic rules also prescribed 
a life of seclusion and espoused the principles of non-interference and silence, disallowing direct 
proselytizing activities. The extent of Mariannhill’s missionary work, its intense interaction with 
the local population, and its rapid expansion into other places in the colony could only be made 
possible by breaking with rules central to the Trappist order concerning the ratio of time spent 
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on religious activities versus work-related ones, as well as the rule of silence among the monks. 
This and the increasingly autocratic attitude of Abbot Pfanner led to conflict with the central 
organ of the Trappists and the subsequent suspension of Pfanner as abbot in 1892 (for a vivid 
account on these issues, see DENIS 2014). However, these developments did not put a stop to 
the work of the monastery and its mission stations in their interaction with the local population 
of the colony. Whereas the central organ of the Trappist order intended to bring Mariannhill 
back into conformity with the order’s rules, it instead triggered a process leading to the 
separation of the Mariannhill Monastery and its network of mission stations from the Trappist 
order altogether. This process began in 1909 and lasted until, in 1936, the final approval of the 
Vatican transformed the mission station into an independent institution, the Congregatio 
Missionarum de Mariannhill (CMM) (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 33ff., 64f.). From then on, the 
administrative mandate for the religious territory rested with the Mission Institute, making it an 
actor within the contested developments manifesting and consolidating White minority rule in 
South Africa in the twentieth century. On the one hand, the specific spatial ordering of the 
mission allowed it to circumvent the increasing restrictions on land ownership and residence 
rights of the indigenous African population. While on the other hand, the Mariannhill Mission 
quickly found itself an actor within the group areas negotiations and therefore liable for the 
decisions resulting from that process. The religious-territorial intricacies of South Africa's doxic 
landscape of socio-spatial and cultural order made it possible for the African communities on 
mission land to hold onto their places of home for a time. In the end, however, it merely delayed 
the spatial realities of racial segregation. Pfanner’s ideal African villages ultimately became 
subject to apartheid's dis-ordering of lived-in places, resulting in the eviction of most of the 
indigenous population from the farms of Zeekoegat, Klaarwater and Stockville.  
The following section will shed light on these circumstances of territorial administration, racial 
zoning, and the eviction of the indigenous African population from the land of the Mariannhill 
Mission. By presenting an in-depth empirical example of one particular area developed within 
the framework of Franz Pfanner's ideal African villages, the peculiarities of the religious sphere 
within the social and spatial ordering of indigeneity during late colonialism and apartheid will 
be brought into the focus. This step serves our conceptual understanding the religious-territorial 
intricacies of South Africa's doxic landscapes of socio-spatial and cultural orders, hence the 
backdrop for the contestation and transgression of modes of ordering through conversion to 
Islam. 
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Apartheid and the Dis-Ordering of Religious Territoriality 
Within the fifty years between the Trappists’ arrival and founding of the Mariannhill Mission 
and the beginning of apartheid, a profound community set-up was established on the farms of 
Zeekoegat, Klaarwater, and Stockville. People from all population groups resided in the vicinity 
of the mission station and within the Institute’s administrative realm, with the majority of 
inhabitants being isiZulu-speaking Amanganga people who had already lived on the site east of 
the Umhlatuzana river before the monks’ arrival. The missionaries named the places designated 
for the development of ideal, modernized African societies and households Emmaus, Nazareth, 
and St. Wendolin’s, in reference to biblical or mission-related contexts. The situation can be 
described as a microcosmic model of the Amakholwa communities described above, converts 
to Christianity among the Zulu, who had been socially, spatially, and culturally ordered around 
the mission station. Mariannhill offered a distinctive land tenure system which enabled the Non-
White population to opt into the White minority’s capitalistic modes of social order. Another 
similarity to the Amakholwa phenomenon can be seen in the relative social distance to the other 
spheres on the colonial map of the White/Non-White dialectic. The communities on the 
mission territory that had developed along the lines of Pfanner’s ideal African villages found 
themselves to a certain degree caught in-between, becoming increasingly alienated from their 
African indigeneity, while also being socially and spatially confined by the widespread racism 
of the White population and institutions beyond the religious-territorial sphere, leading them to 
interact primarily with the missionaries (cf. MUKUKA 2006: 54). Nevertheless, this realm offered 
protection against the effects of the Group Areas Act for a time, although it only delayed the 
final reality of being uprooted and relocated. Working with a mix of empirical data consisting 
of archival research; the analysis of land tenure documents, historical maps, and aerial 
photographs; as well as qualitative data deriving from interviews with descendants of the 
communities once living on the mission land, these historical territorial developments are 
illuminated in order to demonstrate the paradoxical religious facet of the processes ordering 
indigeneity. The specific case of the households living in the area of Emmaus will serve as a 
micro-example. Within this case study lie three dimensions: The first dimension is of significance 
for the conceptual understanding of the overall study, as it highlights the entanglements of 
colonialism and religion in the realm of ordering indigeneity, therefore representing the scale 
of modes of social and spatial orderings. The second dimension can be seen in the descriptive-
analytical value of the socio-historical data presented here to the contemporary processes of 
redress and redistribution. The third dimension tries to do justice to the social reality of the 
people of Emmaus—of being uprooted, of losing home—and therefore to a distinct identity lost 
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to the dubious experiment aimed at achieving racist modernity through White minority 
domination in twentieth century South Africa. 
The end of World War II brought increasing industrialization to the Borough of Pinetown, a 
place which had been a mere farming village when the Trappist monks arrived in the late 
nineteenth century. The settlement rapidly grew to the size of a small secondary town of the 
city of Durban and attracted a multi-ethnic workforce. The increasing industrial development 
in the Boroughs farther inland from the harbor city were a direct result of South Africa’s 
isolation during World War II, which lead it to produce more goods for everyday use and 
become less dependent on imports (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 84). Apartheid’s racist 
policies put the matters of micro-to-macro-scale segregation and spatial delineation onto the 
daily agenda, and it became clear that the Mariannhill Mission territory would find itself located 
on a new socio-spatial map right in between a thriving White urban area and the African 
location destined to become the de facto homeland of KwaZulu. In the spatial logics of 
apartheid’s segregative policies, Mariannhill was within an area prone to become a buffer zone, 
segmented along the lines of the population groups. For the spatial planning of White South 
Africa, the African communities around the mission and southwest of Pinetown came to be seen 
as living too close to the actual city. In order to avoid territorial and administrative 
incorporation into the Pinetown municipality and thereby avoid the Borough’s taxation 
scheme, the Mariannhill Mission declared the farms in their ownership a health board area in 1951 
(ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 91). Establishing a health board with a governing committee 
rendered Mariannhill a de facto independent, though limited, local authority in terms of their 
rights of territorial administration. This made it possible for the mission to act as a separate 
institution within the negotiations with the apartheid regime over the racial zonings of the 
Group Areas Act developments. Without the declaration of a health board, the decisions on 
zoning would have been subject solely to the Pinetown municipality. First attempts to racially 
zone the area between Pinetown and the Umhlathuzana river under the Group Areas Act in 
1957 failed due to unresolved and diverse oppositions to the scheme (ENGLAND 1995). During 
the negotiations with the Natal Group Areas Committee, which declared the whole of 
Mariannhill a White area, the health board representatives strongly argued for leaving the 
mission land “unzoned,” though in White ownership, in order to be able to continue their work 
among the Africans (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 128f.) (see map 8). 
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Map 8: Mariannhill group areas zoning as proposed by the Mariannhill Mission in 1957. Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
With Group Areas Act Proclamation 126 of 1966, the race groups laid out by the Department 
of Community Development in 1964 were put into territorial practice (see map 9). The whole 
section northeast of the Umhlathuzana River towards Pinetown had been classified as White. 
Land belonging to the Mariannhill Mission beyond the river had been expropriated and re-
zoned as the Mariannridge township for the Coloured group. Effectively, the area between the 
Umhlathuzana and the Umlazi river farther to the south—the physical boundary to the 
KwaZulu homeland—functioned as a racialized spatial buffer zone consisting of townships 
zoned as Coloured and Indian placed between the indigenous African and the White territories. 
While the major effort in securing land for as many people classified as members of Non-White 
groups as possible were successful for the southern communities, such as Nazareth or St. 
Wendolin’s, the territories to the northwest, i.e. Emmaus on Farm Zeekoegat and the whole of 
Farm Stockville, were lost to zonings reserved for industrial development.  
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Map 9: Mariannhill group areas zoning as declared by the Department of Community Development in 1964. Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
The developments southwest of Pinetown are an example of how the racial-territorial policies 
of apartheid were meant to spatially order economic relations and tensions by ascribing a racial 
dimension to class differences. In other words: Future economic development would be reserved 
for the dominating White minority by (a) removing Non-White-classified people from valuable 
land and (b) keeping the Non-White workforce at such a distance that it could still serve the 
dominator’s economic cause without being able to stake any claims to the overall development. 
The final zoning of the Mariannhill territory perfectly represents the apartheid hierarchy of 
spatial segregation and the ideology of division-and-rule, as Coloured-classified people were 
placed towards the Black African areas and Indian zonings were situated closer to the White 
urban districts. In congruence with the use of existing barriers as dividing lines, the 
Umhlatuzana River became the natural buffer delineating the White/Non-White dialectic onto 
the landscape (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 130). The indigenous Africans residing on 
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Mariannhill land were relocated to one of two Black African townships on the border of the 
homeland and thus under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu—either to KwaNdengezi farther 
southwest or to KwaDabeka farther north of Pinetown (cf. ENGLAND 1995, 1996b).16 The 
actual removals of the population classified as Black African from the Mariannhill territory took 
place over the period from 1974 to 1980, following the cancellation of the additional religious 
clause to the Mariannhill title deed on December 18, 1973 (see figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Stamp removing the religious clause from the title deed of Farm Zeekoegat. Source: Consolidated Title Deed of Farm Zeekoegat 937 
(1929). 
As long as the title deed bore that legal amendment limiting the use of land in religious-territorial 
terms to the land, the actual processes of eviction, relocation, and partial expropriation could 
not set in. In the case of Mariannhill, the course of negotiations, various zoning propositions, 
and regulatory changes to the legal basis of territorial administration exemplifies the obscure, 
orderly modernity of planning and enacting racist segregation on all scales of life in South Africa 
and the paradoxical relationship of the apartheid regime to sacred space and religious territoriality. 
As long as the land belonging to Mariannhill had a legally verifiable religious quality ascribed 
to it, the planned racialized zoning could not be implemented. Ultimately, apartheid's social 
and spatial modes of ordering, which brought severe inequalities and injustices to the majority 
of the population, still followed a lawful—if highly unjust—course, providing the symbolic 
power of consecration to the acts of violence against the Non-White population. The outcome 
of the Group Areas Act in the Borough of Pinetown may have been inevitable from the 
beginning, but it is the removal of the clause by a simple stamp that signifies the de facto end of 
the line of negotiations. The removal of the communities indicated on maps 7 and 8 began with 
 
16Interviews with Solomon Phewa (2013); Group Interview with former residents of Emmaus/Mariannhill (2013). 
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Kipi in 1974, whose inhabitants were first removed to a provisional settlement in Klaarwater, as 
the developments in KwaNdengezi had yet not been finished. Their final move to the Black 
African township took place in 1976 (for a specific take on Kipi, see BOYCE 2003). Next, the 
indigenous African populations of Nazareth, Mosley Park, Shallcross, and Burlington were 
forced to leave for KwaNdengezi as well, with some from Nazareth being removed to 
KwaDabeka. The Coloured community of Motala was evicted in the late 70s from Richmond 
Farm and relocated to the newly established Mariannridge township. Finally, and after a first 
arttempt in 1976, the people of Emmaus were forced to leave their homes and resettle in 
KwaNdengezi. St. Wendolin’s was the only settlement within the territory of the Mariannhill 
Mission in which Black African–classified people were able to withstand complete eviction (cf. 
WERKMAN 1995: 75ff.). Constantly seen as an informal development in the eyes of group area 
planning institutions, St. Wendolin’s became an epitome for resistance against further removals 
from the 1980s onwards. Among other factors, this process can be linked to St. Wendolin’s 
resident Protas Madlala, who went to study Anthropology in the United States before the spatial 
re-orderings came into effect, returning—together with his wife, who was classified as White—
to his place of home at the height of the resistance to relocations.17 
Compared to other removals and relocations in urban centers of apartheid South Africa, the 
eviction of the Non-White-classified population from the Mariannhill territory and the 
subsequent expropriations occurred at a relatively late stage. Until then, the Mariannhill area 
disrupted the meso-to-micro-scale vision of apartheid planning substantially, leaving a section 
in immediate vicinity to a White corridor on the racialized segregative map of orders in constant 
dispute and disarray. The efficacy of religious territoriality played a decisive role within this process. 
The area maintained a state of exception as long as the administrative mandate over the land 
belonging to the Mariannhill Mission derived from being declared international ecclesiastical 
land, which grounded the sphere of socio-spatial governance in the specific religious quality of 
the area. The additional clause of the title deeds limiting the use of the land to religious and 
benevolent purposes manifested this situation in legal terms. It rendered the area a religious 
territory for solely religious purposes and thus temporarily protected the people living on it from 
the racist and capitalistic developments afoot elsewhere. Through their specific path 
dependency, the indigenous communities of Nazareth, Emmaus, and St. Wendolin’s were 
intrinsically, religiously linked to the mission, representing the missionaries’ core of religious 
 
17Interview with Skaykh Dawud Cele (2015). 
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work. With the territory’s path dependency and the accumulated religious quality ascribed to it 
through its declaration and demarcation as ecclesiastical land reserved for benevolent and 
missionary purposes only, the overall process of group areas zonings, negotiations, and 
enforcements reflected a relatively unique dynamic, subsequently securing the land to the 
indigenous population for a longer time than was possible in non-religious contexts. 
Nevertheless, the indigenous African population living on the land administered by the 
Mariannhill Mission health board were not (only) evicted because of the revocation of 
Mariannhill’s religious territoriality as described above, but ultimately because the negotiations 
concerning the group areas had been unsuccessful. The CMM put substantial effort into 
negotiating the Mission Institute’s land out of the apartheid scheme and enabling the resident 
Africans to reside on their territory. As it became clear that it would not be possible to secure 
the land as “unzoned,” Mariannhill made a final, unsuccessful proposition in 1967, which 
recommended rezoning the Indian area for the Coloured group and subsequently placing the 
African population in the soon-to-be Coloured township of Mariannridge (ADELGISA 
HERRMANN 1983: 131). At the same time, the Mariannhill Institute tried to uphold the 
administrative health board status of the land belonging to the mission, a process that went as 
far as to engage with their own ideas for industrial development on the land (ADELGISA 
HERRMANN 1983: 131). Ultimately, however, the Mission Institute could uphold neither its 
exclusive status of territorial administration, nor the religious territoriality of the areas, with the 
result that the sections of Zeekoegat and Klaarwater between the Umhlatuzana River and 
Pinetown, together with Stockville, became White areas and were incorporated into the 
Borough in 1970. 
The Eviction of Emmaus: Turning the Indigenous 
Population “Alien in Their Own Land” 
The re-ordering of lived-in places according to the ideal African villages scheme ascribed a 
religious quality to both those places and the sense of belonging of the people living there. 
Consequently, the residents’ subsequent removal was also contextualized against a religious 
background. The promise of a homeland on religious-territorial foundations had been broken, 
and the inability of the Mariannhill Mission to permanently safeguard the African population 
from the spatial effects of apartheid was translated into a diasporic experience of being cast out 
from the promised land of their forefathers: “Look what they did: all you see. Gone. They turned 
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us aliens in our own land!”18 This experience symbolizes the dimensions of losing not only the 
material place of home but also the emotional, social, and cultural connection to it and to the 
localized routines of everyday life in the lived-in place, which manifest belonging and identity. 
The scale of evictions in South Africa during apartheid was massive in terms of both the number 
of people evicted and the spatial dimensions of removal and relocation, including the amount 
of planning necessary to carry out such an undertaking nationwide. At the same time, the spatial 
dimension of relocation relegated the evicted people and communities to a state that can best 
be termed a short-distance diaspora, as the former places of home were sometimes only a few 
kilometers away. However, they were rendered utterly unreachable by the racist segregation of 
apartheid and have remained unreachable, due to the intervening developments, into the post-
apartheid era as well. Those who were removed to other places in the townships and homelands 
found themselves in close vicinity to their former homes in spatial terms; however, their actual 
lived-in places were demolished and built over. Land redistribution processes in the new South 
Africa seem to be able to compensate the loss, but they cannot reverse the experience and 
aftermath of having been uprooted. 
From a conceptual perspective, uprooting implies a relatively intangible reference and points to 
the contested nature and fluidity of identity politics, as the often cited dualism of roots and routes 
GILROY (1993: 9) signifies. Such an epistemological stream of post-structuralist thought 
underscores the magnitude of the socio-spatial injustice that took place in South Africa, i.e. the 
systematic and institutionalized oppression, dispossession, and large-scale eviction of people 
from their places of home, whether from city quarters or peri-urban outskirts. Here, uprooting 
stands for the very structural and material effects of White supremacy, specifically in the form 
of its modernist perfection in apartheid’s mass removals of the indigenous African population from 
their urban and rural homes nationwide to designated group areas (cf. especially BALDWIN 
1974). PORTEOUS & SMITH (2001) provide a more suitable conceptual term for such injustices, 
calling them domicide, i.e. “the planned, deliberate destruction of home causing suffering to the 
dweller” (PORTEOUS & SMITH 2001: 19). The aspect of deliberation points to the human agency 
behind the cause of this suffering. The scale of domicide ranges from more indirect and politically 
intangible instances, e.g. the rearrangement of public places for urban development which limits 
and hinders practices of belonging to place within everyday life, to overtly brutal forms such as 
forced resettlements in the wake of war (BLUNT 2009: 342). In his exemplary case study on 
 
18Interview with Solomon Phewa (2013). 
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territory, community, and home in South Africa, SMITH (1994: 223ff.) consequently applies the 
term (though still using the neologism topocide that preceded—and was ultimately superseded 
by—domicide (see PORTEOUS & SMITH 2001: 12)). He thus emphasizes that the central concern 
of his analysis lies in the experiences of destruction and deprivation of place, as well as the 
experiences and expressions of what it means to lose one’s own place (SMITH 1994: 254). 
Domicide calls explicit attention to the loss of home and the annihilation of place, to having one’s 
place in the world undermined, threatened, and possibly destroyed. It is a moral undertaking 
to which geography has devoted much less attention than required (BICKFORD-SMITH 2009: 
275), despite humanistic geography’s recognition of the depths of attachment of people to 
territory and place. TUAN (1974: 99) makes a point in this regard when writing that to be 
“forcibly evicted from one’s home and neighborhood is to be stripped of sheathing, which in its 
familiarity protects the human being from the bewilderments of the outside world.” This 
perfectly reflects the conceptual understanding of home in the work of PORTEOUS & SMITH 
(2001), including home as place, symbol, and psycho-social meaning. Domicide thus affects all 
these spheres at the same time, while also denoting the actual loss of space and the destruction 
of the physical foundation for acting out one’s own identity. Domicide subsequently inquires into 
the disruption of the “depths of attachment people form with territory and place” (PORTEOUS 
& SMITH 2001: 275). 
For the majority of people removed from the Mariannhill territory, the distances between 
former places of home and new locations conforming to racist segregative planning entailed the 
above-mentioned qualities of relative spatial proximity. However, one area is of specific 
significance, because it was irreversibly redeveloped immediately after the evictions took place: 
The Amanganga people living in Emmaus, one of Pfanner’s ideal African villages north of 
Mariannhill and in direct vicinity to the urban realm of Pinetown, were the last to be removed 
in 1980; subsequently, their former places of home were turned into what is today Westmead 
Industrial Park. Their fate will serve as a micro-example, a more detailed perspective into the 
spatial order of events in apartheid’s disordering of religious territoriality. It may appear a 
common case of spatial dispossession and territorial exploitation through apartheid, but its 
implications in terms of ordering religion under apartheid make it a case emblematic of the 
peculiar entanglements of colonialism, missionary work, racism, and religion. Through the shift 
in the material realities of place, this uprooting became a loss of home, a loss of the place of 
identity, and their replacement with a diasporic situatedness. Applying the concept of domicide 
thus seems to be more appropriate than the postmodern equivoque of uprooting and re-grounding 
(cf. AHMED, CASTAÑEDA, FORTIER et al. 2003). Understanding uprooting as forceful eviction 
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and domicide, re-grounding becomes a forceful struggle in itself, for home as both territory and 
belonging.  
Accessing these dimensions of social and spatial eviction and alienation from a contemporary 
perspective through qualitative research necessitated an essential extension of methods at hand. 
Though supported by historical documents, photographs, and maps of the area, the relatively 
static qualitative-interviewing settings in the homes of the participants were limited in their 
narrative impulses when it came to details about the lost places of home. This led to the initial 
decision to carry the qualitative interviews into the place that had been Emmaus and is now 
Westmead Industrial Park and to extend the interviews through a mobile dimension. The idea 
behind carrying out consecutive interviews by walking along lines and locations of a former 
everyday life was inspired by methodological approaches on rescue geographies (see section on 
methods above).  
The walking interviews were geo-coded with a GPS watch in order to track their transects, 
which were determined by each individual participant (cf. EVANS & JONES 2011: 850). Along 
the walks, pictures were taken, which were also geo-coded. These represent an attempt to 
capture the specific perspective of the interviewee during the narration. Additionally, historical 
aerial photographs from the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, provided by the Land Surveyor Office in 
Pietermaritzburg, were made available via iPad throughout the interview. The participants 
could easily zoom into the aerial pictures and pinpoint specific housing structures and places, 
which further assisted the narration. With the consent of the participants, two recording devices 
were used: A smaller, common sort of device was applied in the interviewing situation with the 
microphones set at a narrow angle and kept as close as possible to the interviewee, while an 
additional, high-sensitivity device capable of record the transects’ sound in stereo quality was 
always pointed in the direction of movement, capturing and storing the transect as an audio 
experience. The walks navigated old, long-lost paths that once defined common movement 
within the lived-in places. It was up to the interviewee to decide where to start, given the impulse 
of attempting to re-walk an everyday situation, such as shopping for groceries. With 
unanticipated immediacy, the memories of the lost places became projected onto the 
contemporary landscape. The participants insisted to trying to get as close as possible to the 
former locations of specific places such as houses, trees, or meeting places.  
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Picture 1: Moving along an old path leading from the northern side of Emmaus uphill to the location of former homesteads Picture: M. Gebauer. 
Visiting his former home-site, from which his family was evicted in the 1980s, interviewee 
Solomon Phewa started to draw lines into a sandy field, representing the old house that stood 
on what is now an industrial area. He explained: 
“This is my homestead here, right where this factory is. I grew up here. This is home, 
this is my home. It is very sad. Each time I pass here. I was born here, the sixth 
generation. My great-great grandfather had his house here. He was the elder. The main 
house was there, but we were staying in it. It was a brick house. This is my home. I 
haven’t been here since my youthful days.”19 
Phewa’s family had significant status because his father, Alfred ‘Sququ’ Mhlushwa, had been 
an Induna—a headman to the king of the Amanganga people. Their homestead was situated at 
the very top of the hill upon which the community of Emmaus was settled. That hill represented 
the central place within the scheme of the ideal African village and included a group of trees 
(see map 10 further below) that functioned as a meeting place, where the elders of the 
households would solve the socio-political issues of the community. Solomon Phewa attended 
the boarding school of the Mariannhill Mission together with other children from Emmaus and 
later worked as a clerk at the Durban Bantu Administration Board. After the end of apartheid, 
he began to call Emmaus’ scattered former inhabitants to gather—a process strongly spurred 
 
19Solomon Phewa (2013). 
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by the burial of his father in 1994—with the intention of initiating a legal process of land claim 
and redistribution under the post-apartheid conditions.  
“I would operate every weekend anyway because there was the administrating part of it. 
Every weekend, every day in actual fact because I used the phone from work and so on 
and to get in contact and getting people that I know. I was at First National Bank in 
Durban. The movement grew, so the next meeting we had it was about 50 people. We 
felt we organized enough, now we must launch a movement.”20 
It took him about three years from the initial drawing out of a manifesto at one of the first 
meetings until the claim was deemed valid. As one of five trustees, he now heads the 
Mangangeni Emmaus Westmead Returners Community Trust, which has 250 members. The 
trust is a continuation of the struggle to re-order the social and spatial belonging of the people 
of Emmaus. 
 
 
Picture 2: Material realities of domicide: Emmaus as the lost place of home is now Westmead Industrial Park. Picture: M. Gebauer. 
The walking interviews had an unanticipated effect: Besides elucidating the spatial 
contextualization and social meaning of living on the Mariannhill land and the experiences of 
having been evicted, the process re-mapped the former community of Emmaus, providing the 
locations of the various homesteads and the names of the heads of the households. The use of 
 
20Solomon Phewa (2015). 
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an iPad was therefore of invaluable importance, as it stimulated a participatory mapping 
approach. At each stop along the transect chosen by the interviewee, it was possible to 
methodically cross-reference the location in the world of today with photographical layers from 
three different time periods. The participants of the walking interviews could easily zoom into 
the photographs, which resulted in a re-discovering of the past and stimulated a process where 
the interviewees increasingly tried to be as precise as possible, as far as the photo resolution 
would allow. The ability to mark and annotate the digital photograph further supported the 
mapping. 
 
Figure 5: The area of Emmaus in the center of a segment from an aerial photograph of Farm Zeekoegat from 1967 with annotations and markings 
highlighting the former households and their heads. Aerial photograph: Land Surveyor Office Pietermaritzburg. 
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Figure 6: Participatory mapping with the help of digitalized aerial photographs and the ability to zoom into the pictures and add annotations and 
markings on an iPad. Aerial photograph: Land Surveyor Office Pietermaritzburg. 
A part of the mapping process can be seen in pictures 3 and 4, in which Pinetown is situated to 
the east and the Mariannhill Monastery to the south of the annotated section representing 
Emmaus. Industrial and infrastructural developments that would become Westmead Industrial 
Park can already be seen on the western side of the road leading from Pinetown to the 
monastery. These pictures represent one step of the overall mapping process. Together with the 
audio records from the walking interviews and the geocoded pictures taken during the walks, 
the results of the mappings helped to further contextualize the data gathered in the qualitative 
interviews before the go-alongs. Bringing together this diverse data made it possible to 
cartographically recreate a settlement of Amanganga people that withstood the effects of 
apartheid’s group areas for some time under the peculiar conditions of religious territoriality 
discussed above, before being removed in the early 1980s. The following maps show the 
compiled results of these empirical approaches.  
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Map 10: Emmaus community with homesteads in the early 1970s. Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
Map 10 represents the Emmaus settlement, which was home to about 250 indigenous Africans. 
The households and the names of their heads reflect family and kinship ties, as well as the 
memory of belonging. The locations of the different lots, fields, and places are mapped as 
precisely as possible based on the interviewing and participatory mapping material. However, 
the aerial photography lacked the resolution necessary to reveal their exact locations. Therefore, 
the result should be understood as a representation of the memories of belonging shared during 
the interviewing sessions. The overall layout of Emmaus reflects the Mariannhill missionaries’ 
model for ideal African villages with square houses and homesteads grouped around an 
imagined center of the village on top of the hill, i.e. the homestead of Alfred ‘Sququ’ Mhlushwa, 
the Induna. The groups of trees on each side of that house functioned as a kind of gate to the 
central homestead. Industrial developments had already begun on the land of the people of 
Emmaus prior to the final evictions. Thus, map 10 shows the first industrial buildings as well as 
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the Westmead racecourse. Even though these initial developments started as early as 1960, they 
only began to expand after the removal of the religious clause from Mariannhill’s title deed in 
1973. Still, the changing circumstances were already felt by the people of Emmaus prior to their 
removal. 
 
 
Map 11: Westmead Industrial Park on the former homeland of the evicted people from Emmaus. Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
Map 11 shows the situation in the area today. Emmaus has been completely built over by 
Westmead Industrial Park. Only a pocket of housings has been left standing on the slope of the 
hill on the southern fringe. This small, informal settlement became known as New Emmaus. 
Though some of the people living there were part of the original communities living on the land 
of the Mariannhill Mission, the majority are newcomers. A new national road runs through the 
built-up areas, and the Westmead racecourse south of Emmaus/Westmead, which still existed 
in 1973, has also been turned into an industrial development. The Umhlatuzana River once 
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demarcated the border between the White and the Non-White group areas. The western area 
displayed on the map was a Coloured area before the end of apartheid. Today, Tshelimnyama 
is located there, an informal housing area with rural character, which has experienced high in-
migration rates from former Black African areas since 1994 (cf. CROSS, BEKKER, CLARK et al. 
1992: 14). Map 11 also indicates the land southwest of the original Emmaus area that has been 
allocated to the Mangangeni Trust as a compensatory territory through the land claim process. 
As the original place Emmaus has been turned into a vibrant industrial park, the former 
homeland was not on the table during the redistribution negotiations. Instead, the members of 
the trust received financial compensation amounting to 27,080 Rand per claimant and the right 
to settle on the neighboring territory instead. Their diasporic detachment therefore continues 
in a spatial context that brings the former inhabitants of Emmaus into maximum proximity to 
the place from which they were ejected, while confronting them with the everyday reality of 
their definite inability to return. Outliving the end of apartheid’s racist spatializations, the 
industrial development thus becomes a material manifestation of the persistent spatial regime 
of ordered indigeneity. 
Despite all the efforts of the Mariannhill Mission Institute, the racist spatial politics of apartheid 
shifted modes of material and symbolic order, turning the religious identity of the indigenous 
population in the administrative sphere of the mission into a religiously signified experience of 
exploitation, dispossession, and the loss of home. For the Amanganga, Emmaus and the other 
lived-in places on the land of the Mariannhill Mission came to stand for the promise of a safe, 
sacred home territory amidst the racist spatial dis-orderings of apartheid. Because their daily 
lives had been shaped by religious territoriality, the experience of domicide led them to question and 
contest Christianity and the work of the missionaries. This aspect is even described by some of 
the interviewees as a form of religious betrayal as it caused estrangement to Christianity in 
general and the Catholic church in particular (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 131f.).21 Similar 
conclusions can be found in the reevaluation of the direct and indirect roles and positions of 
missionaries in the colonial enterprise. COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1991: 237) reference 
indigenous Africans’ resistance to Christian missionary efforts in South Africa based on their 
perception of Christianity as a threat to their modes of social and cultural existence. 
(KHANDLHELA 1995: 59) accordingly terms the work of the missionaries within the context of 
colonization a colonization of consciousness. Regarding the Mariannhill Mission, it can be added 
 
21Group interview with former residents of Emmaus/Mariannhill (2013). 
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that this colonization of consciousness was effected through the colonization of land as territory by 
changing the place-making modes of existence. However, the developments leading to the 
eviction of the indigenous population from Mariannhill also quite clearly indicate that the 
analysis and conclusion may not be as simple as such catchy terms would suggest. Instead, they 
represent a set of changing power relations within the sphere of the White dominator together 
with contestations of how to define and enact modernization upon the African other. 
The interviewed descendants of the communities once living at Emmaus often pointed to 
Bishop Martin Elmar Schmid, an ordained priest who had been present at the Mariannhill 
Mission since 1938 and served as bishop from 1970 until his death in 1980 (cf. ADELGISA 
HERRMANN 1983: 96). He was either portrayed as the person who failed to protect the African 
people or even accused of having actively contributed to the developments leading to the 
removal of the religious clause from the title deed and the subsequent revocation of the mission’s 
religious territoriality with its protective sphere: 
Interviewee: “I will tell you how they treated us. Not religious! For us to be removed. 
The missionaries had the land, but it belonged to us. But they did what they did.” 
Interviewer: “Could they have avoided it?” 
Interviewee: “With ease! With ease! You see, what they did was in 1973, a clause that 
was protecting us in the title deed here. They cancelled it. It was the Bishop who knew 
about it, but he didn’t take any action. This land is given to [the mission] for educational, 
religious, and benevolent purposes. So, we couldn’t be moved because of that. At least it 
was a bit of protection. But when they cancelled that clause, it became industrial and no 
longer religious. And from an industrial area, you go to a township because you don’t 
belong here. They shouldn’t have removed us. It was a religious area.”22 
This highlights the intricate roles and powers of religious, state, and economic actors when it 
came to the spatial and material manifestation of colonial and apartheid orderings of 
indigeneity. The oppression and marginalization of the indigenous African population under 
the apartheid regime persists within South Africa’s doxic landscapes and the subsequent inability 
to identify oneself with a specific place of home.  
However, it is neither possible nor is it the intent of this case-related example to pinpoint the 
source of these developments in the actions of a single person or institution. What is of relevance 
is the location of the religious sphere within the modes of ordering indigeneity (see also 
ETHERINGTON 1977). That is the necessary foundation for understanding the background of 
 
22Solomon Phewa (2013). 
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religiously based strategies for transgressing the persistent modes of ordering the African other. 
The major challenge in post-apartheid South Africa is the continuous re-ordering of segregation 
and injustice on all scales of life, space, and politics, from the micro- to the macro-scale. The 
religious dimensions reveal a conflict in the moral re-ordering of these scales in addition their 
material re-ordering. Dispossessed land can be redistributed, political structures re-modeled, 
urban space de-segregated, and the society strengthened through de-racialization and 
integration (cf. HARRISON, TODES & WATSON 2008 ; NDLETYANA & MUZONDIDYA 2009). 
Still, the need for a dialogue around belonging in terms of religious identity and ideology 
remains. Religion played a decisive role in the genealogy of White oppression and still lacks 
proper reconciliation and public debate. In this regard, RASOOL (2004: 100) argues for a 
theology of transformation to support the post-apartheid project, pointing to the necessity of 
overcoming ideological divides and orthodox religious traditions, as “orthodoxy cannot push 
back boundaries it merely confirms.” Religious groups from various congregations and belief 
traditions position themselves within the political narrative of post-apartheid South Africa by 
pointing to their role in the struggle against oppression, while others do not contextualize those 
issues at all, referring themselves and their actions to a religious realm that exists beyond earthly 
politics. Within the context of Black African resistance, some groups highlight the paradoxical 
relationship between colonial and apartheid oppression and religion—in particular, 
Christianity and its intricate interlinkages to White domination—by arguing for the potential 
and revolutionary role of Black liberation theology. Others engage with the historical context 
of Christianity’s colonial and apartheid roots in a far more critical way, perceiving the 
dismantling of Christianity as far more liberating and revolutionary. 
Finally, the role played by the Trappists of Mariannhill within that paradoxical framework 
cannot be fairly described as being a willing tool of the colonial enterprise; it was more the result 
of shared colonial attitudes, visions of divine modernization, and the spirit of settler colonialism. 
Nevertheless, as presented above, they were ultimately yet another actor within the grand 
scheme of consolidating White dominance over people and land. 
The ordering of indigeneity in colonial and apartheid South Africa and the entanglements with 
the religious sphere discussed so far forms the background against which conversions to Islam 
among those classified as Black African have taken place since the 1980s. The practice of 
drawing on Muslim identity formations to redefine the meaning of Africanness as Black and 
Muslim thus becomes a field of new emerging orders, as well as a struggle against the 
subjectively embodied and spatially ascribed modes of social ordering. The following chapter 
will present the modes of resistance to social and spatial ordering through conversion to Islam, 
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while also providing an overview of the role of Islam in South Africa. As in the study at large, 
the focus rests on the region of KwaZulu-Natal, although the developments presented are 
contextualized within the overall history of Muslims in South Africa. As with Christianity, the 
field of Islam in South Africa is a complex and contested one in terms of interlinkages with the 
modes of social and spatial ordering. Yet, as will be explored in the featured cases, this 
contestation is the very key to creative adaptation through conversion and the attempts to bring 
about a new, self-defined sphere of belonging through the re-ordering of meaningful actions, 
i.e. the ideology of everyday life. 
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Black and Muslim: Transgressing 
Orderly Indigeneity 
Looking at the developments since the nineteenth century, Christianity has spread widely 
among the indigenous African population. This is due less to the efforts of the Dutch Reformed 
Church or the mission stations than to African Christian Zionist Churches, which have 
promoted a more vernacular approach to Christianity (ELPHICK 2012: 37f.). A field of struggle 
and contestation over ideological powers has spread across the cultural landscape of South 
Africa, making the translation of religiously justified positions of domination and subordination 
and the preaching of equality and resistance to White oppression possible simultaneously. With 
the turn to apartheid, particular formations of Blackness, Black Power, Black liberation 
theology, and Black Consciousness arose within the field of religion as a mode of ordering 
society and space. Writings with an Anglo-American background of Black Power and 
Liberation, such as works by James Cone or Paulo Freire, gained popularity among people with 
a Christianized religious background who were looking for a counter-hegemonic, Pan-
Africanist train of argumentation based on Christian belief and theology. For others, such 
writing represented an incomplete break with oppression and the oppressor’s religion, making 
them unsuitable for establishing a truly revolutionary perspective on political Blackness and 
African indigeneity. As MALULEKE (2008: 121) points out in his account on religion and Black 
Consciousness in South Africa, Christianity arrived there as a “cold cruel religion” whose early 
proponents preached “a theology of the existence of hell, scaring our fathers and mothers with 
stories about burning in eternal flames and gnashing of teeth and grinding of bone. […] Down 
went our cultural values.” For Maluleke, the central writings of Steve Biko, founder of the Black 
Consciousness Movement, were of great importance to the formulation of a South African Black 
Theology: 
“By drawing on the work of Touré, Fanon, Malcolm X and Kaunda, Biko wanted to 
locate his thinking and nourish his intellect in Africa. His notion of blackness was one 
that included Africanness and African culture. His idea of BT [Black Theology], quite 
amazingly, did not totally exclude what has come to be known as African Theology. This 
is how Biko defined African religiosity, pointing out the discords with Christianity, but 
always holding out the hope of a fusion in the process of making Christianity relevant to 
black people.” (MALULEKE 2008: 120) 
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For Biko, himself a graduate of Mariannhill’s St. Francis High School, the missionary message 
came with a derogatory stance towards the existing African religiosity, which was set in contrast 
to a more developed and almost scientific Christianity (BIKO 2005 [1978]: 49). Nevertheless, he 
upheld the possibility of formulating a counter-hegemonic and Black African position on the 
basis of an Africanized Christian theology. This is where FREDRICKSON (1995: 57) locates the 
essential contradiction in Christianity as well as its limitations to be a solid foundation for Black 
resistance and counter-hegemonic re-orderings—for both the US and South African contexts. 
“The gospel of human solidarity preached by white missionaries and abolitionists was 
egalitarian in an ultimate theological sense, but in practice it normally placed whites in 
a position of cultural superiority and validated paternalistic attitudes toward the blacks 
who were allegedly being rescued from heathenism and oppression.” (FREDRICKSON 
1995: 57f.) 
Hence, Black liberation theology in the South African context always found itself in the 
problematic and paradoxical situation of formulating a liberation ideology on the basis of an 
oppressor’s religiosity which, in more than just spiritual ways, legitimated segregation and 
everyday racisms. Christianity continued to be a White man’s religion for a White man’s reign. 
For those looking for an ideology of resistance, freedom, and Black liberation on a religious 
foundation, “cold and cruel” Christianity became more and more difficult to uphold. Solomon 
Phewa, head of the Mangangeni Trust and former inhabitant of Emmaus (see section “The 
Eviction of Emmaus” above), who had been relocated during apartheid to the township of 
KwaNdengezi on the border to the then-White urban realm of the Durban Metropolitan Area, 
explained it in these words: 
“You see, I lived here, when in KwaNdengezi there was never a day when a person 
would not die. There was no street in KwaNdengezi where a person was not killed or 
whatever. So, things that we were seeing every day. And we just would ask ourselves, 
where are we going? So, we needed a particular policy here, but what is it? And you look 
at what you have, and all is empty. It has no answers. Christianity was totally empty; it 
could not provide answers. Say, pray to god somewhere. And what you do in life here?”23 
What he describes are the upheavals and unrest in Black African townships during the 1980s, 
when the colonial and apartheid system of division and rule reached its climax: As the apartheid 
state and system of racist governance declined, the systematically undersupplied and 
underdeveloped areas of the indigenous African population became hotspots for violent 
conflicts among the indigenous population, especially in the urban and border townships of 
 
23Solomon Phewa (2015). 
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KwaZulu-Natal. After four decades of apartheid, the different factions of those conflicts 
delineated two general attitudes towards the system of White minority rule, i.e. accommodation 
or confrontation (see amongst others BONNIN, HAMILTON, MORRELL et al. 1996; FREUND 
1996). In this context, new forms of media, such as cassettes and video tapes, disseminated 
various works of counter-hegemonic ideology from across the globe among the youth of the 
Black African townships, who were highly politicized by the developments surrounding them 
in their everyday lived-in places. Among these ideas, the political and spiritual message of Islam 
became increasingly perceived as a truly revolutionary theology, in contradiction to a 
misguiding liberation theology framework based on the oppressor’s Christian faith. Here again, 
political ideologies of counter-hegemonic Blackness from the Anglo-American context played a 
decisive role: 
“Malcolm X, the Malik al-Shabazz. He was more in a political line of Islam and that is 
what we needed at that time as a youth. His speeches, you know, I’d buy them and listen 
to them. They were very inspirational. Malcolm X, most of us influenced a lot. […] 
Many embraced Islam because of hearing of Malcolm X. So, there were video tapes, 
audio tapes that were there, some books that were written.”24. 
Concepts of Black Islam from outside the South African arena must be understood as traveling 
ideas whose messages had inspirational quality without agenda-setting capability and provided 
meaning as they became translated as transgression and resistance into the local realm of the 
politics of Blackness. The Nation of Islam, particularly during the era of Malcom X, is an 
exemplary case in this regard. While the Nation of Islam was highly influential in terms of its 
political message and consumable media, its actual structure of chapters and temples did not 
permanently materialize on the South African scene. Attempts were made to create chapters in 
Cape Town as well as in Durban in the 1990s.25 The Islamic Nation Foundation, founded by 
the former affiliate to the Durban based Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI), Adam 
Mncanywa and having its own youth wing based in the African township of Inanda near 
Durban,26 can be clearly seen as styled after the Nation of Islam (KAARSHOLM 2011).27 While 
the Nation of Islam may not have taken hold in terms of forming an organization or establishing 
 
24Solomon Phewa (2015). 
25Interview with Rozanno X (2015); Interview with Cassiem Christians (2015); Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015). 
26Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015). 
27An upcoming publication on global passages of racialized Muslim identities and the construction of African indigeneity 
in a post-colonial society will deal in more detail with the issue of traveling ideas of Muslim Blackness, with a specific 
focus on the Nation of Islam in South Africa (GEBAUER 2019). 
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a chapter, it inspired a generation of young South Africans in the townships and homelands, 
who were searching outside of their lived-in places for role models and exemplary ideas that 
espoused a more revolutionary and more liberating approach to the oppressive situation, which 
included the radical rejection of the established realities of the African self. As one respondent 
pointed out, the Nation of Islam “brought the message but did not fit the South African 
cause.”28 The Nation’s concept of Muslim Blackness evolved out of the Afro-American 
situation, whereas since the 1970s, Black Consciousness had provided a discourse of re-ordered 
Blackness that was distinctively linked to the South African situation.  
In the South African context, the Black Muslim ideology reflected in the texts and speeches of 
Malcolm X was translated into the homegrown framework of Black Consciousness. Steve Biko’s 
“Black Man, you are on your own” (BIKO 2005 [1978]: 100, 108; see also MAGAZINER 2009) 
was amended by Malik al-Shabazz’s declaration that “the black race needs today to get up off 
its knees, and to get on its feet, and get rid of its scars, and to take a stand for itself” (HALEY 
1964: 382). For others, the Iranian revolution of 1979 became a more tangible blueprint for the 
formation of a new Islamic order on a nationwide scale. In contrast to Black Muslim ideologies 
from the North American context, it seemed to be more applicable to the South African 
situation in which post-colonial, post-White nation-building within a Pan-Africanist framework 
played a far greater role than cultural identity politics.29 Islamic thought challenged not only 
Christianity but also Marxism as the ideological foundation of the established resistance 
movements to White supremacy, such as the ANC, the PAC, or the different Unions. 
“At those days we were these Marxist, Communist, we didn’t want to hear about 
religion. Also, we were, like he said an Opiate. That was Karl Marx. So, we didn’t want 
religion. […] Then a guy was teaching me in high school, standard six. He came, he saw 
me watching Farrakhan [the leader of the Nation of Islam]. He was asking are you 
interested in this? I said ja, but my problem is about the struggle, ANC and so. What 
does this religion say about this struggle? He said no, Islam say fight oppression until 
there is no oppression.”30 
Islam offered a foundation for thinking Blackness anew—as an ideology of resistance in the 
struggle against White oppression. Again the words of FREDRICKSON (1995: 298) ring true: 
“American Black Power advocates were clearly a stimulus, but the adoption of African-
American concepts and slogans was selective rather than wholesale, and the ideas that were 
 
28Interview with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015). 
29Interview with Cassiem Christians (2015). 
30Interview with Moosa (2015). 
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appropriated were often reinterpreted to fit South African conditions.” For example, Black 
Muslim and Black Power ideologies from outside South Africa brought a broader audience to 
Biko’s Black Consciousness—a political discourse of Blackness which had circulated among a 
more educated part of the population but failed to gain prominence beyond a relatively 
intellectual sphere: “A lot of us didn’t even know about Steve Biko, but we got to find out due 
to the Nation of Islam actually.”31 Islamic ideologies of counter-hegemony and post-colonial 
liberation seemed to fit the various scales of spatial racisms, as the American Black ghetto 
paralleled the Black African townships and the Iranian theocracy served as an inspiration for 
potential solutions on the macro-scale of the nation state and beyond. As discussed above in 
reference to NASH (2003: 186), becoming Muslim and Black offered a possibility to transgress 
the fixing of Blackness to race and move into a realm of ethnic fluidity. The link to questions of 
social conditions, the framework of anti-oppressive resistance, and the invitation to pro-actively 
challenge and object to injustices within Islamic thought became portrayed not only as a 
liberation theology but a revolution theology (cf. PALOMBO 2014; ESACK 1987, 1997). Islam 
offered a revolutionary spiritual home beyond the oppressor’s religious sphere and an 
alternative to or extension of Black liberation theology as a liberation from the spiritual 
foundation of ill-defined Blackness (cf. COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991). 
While Black Muslim and anti-colonial Islamic thought gained prominence starting in the late 
1970s, this did not imply that all those who were interested in such discourses converted to 
Islam. Grounding the social and political self in a new framework of religious thought needs 
more than discursive interaction; it requires institutionalized, structural support. The racist 
segregation of apartheid severely limited access to religious spaces and facilities other than those 
ascribed to the respective areas, which in the case of Black African group areas were Christian-
based. At the same time, through the colonial entanglements discussed above, Muslim 
communities and Islamic institutions were present in South Africa, and Muslim actors were 
very much involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. However, translating Islam into the Black 
African realm meant transgressing the racist orderings of society and space. For indigenous 
Africans converting to Islam, such as Solomon and his friend and political companion Moosa, 
their embracing Islam was based on a growing skepticism towards the ideological foundations 
offered to them in political as well as theological terms. Getting in contact with Black Muslim 
thought, such as that of the Nation of Islam, facilitated an understanding of indigeneity that was 
 
31Interview with Rozanno X (2015). 
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embedded in larger ideas of global Blackness and Africanness. Moreover, for Solomon Phewa, the 
experience of removal from the religious territory of the Mariannhill Mission entailed a conflict 
with his own spirituality and religious foundation, which led him to translate his personal history 
of dispossession into a larger frame of oppression towards Africans. However, for Solomon, 
Moosa, and all other Muslim converts who participated in this research, “embracing Islam” 
and therefore “embracing the African self,” as they expressed it, demanded an intensive amount 
of theological and ideological self-appropriation and networking in order to stabilize the 
foundations of their becoming Muslim and Black.  
The following section will contextualize the uniting of Blackness and Muslimness and discuss 
conversion to Islam among those classified as Black African in the light of transgressing social 
and spatial modes of ordering indigeneity. First, conversion as transgression must be discussed 
on a conceptual level before the heterotopic situatedness of Islam in South Africa is presented 
as an-other order. Following this discussion, the rare contact zones that enabled conversion will 
be presented, before a specific case study from the township of KwaMashu in the Durban area 
is used to pinpoint the contestations of a grassroots-oriented Black Muslim emergence stemming 
from the field of Islamic actors. 
On Conversion: A More-Than-Religion Topic 
Much has occurred since Horton’s thesis of monolatric conversion theorized the conversion of 
Africans to a monotheistic religion such as Christianity or Islam as a rational process and act in 
the face of modernization (see ELPHICK 2012: 32ff.; SHELL 1993; COMAROFF & COMAROFF 
1991: 249). Inquiries into the political representation of religious conversion, the meanings of 
conversion practices, and biographical narratives stem from different fields of study—social, 
political, and most definitely religious. While empirical accounts are given, the field still awaits 
a renewed discussion of conversion’s theoretical framing, which develops an understanding for 
the meaning of its practices, rituals, experiences, politics, and representations from a social 
science perspective, beyond the different religious debates and away from the modernization 
perspective. From a geographical perspective, WOODS (2012) set an example with his valuable 
and concise yet comprehensive discussion of the topic, arguing that conversion is more than an 
act of individual belief that implies modifying effects for the subject as well as his or her social 
and spatial surroundings. He also points to the silence of geography when it comes to expanding 
the existing mode of analyzing the why and how of conversion by interrelating it with the where 
in territorial as well as place-making terms (cf. ibid.: 446f.). 
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In order to contribute to resolving this ongoing deficit, this study will situate the topic of 
conversion to Islam within a framework informed by discussions on the modes of order and 
ordering in society and space, as well as the analysis of dimensions of order, resistance, and 
transgression. The socio-spatial dimension of religion is thereby transferred from serving as the 
ontological entry point to the level of an analytical category in the production of geographical 
knowledge (cf. LEVINE 1986: 431). Approaching conversion from a cultural geographical 
perspective entails exploring the practices transforming the social field, the self, as well as the 
routines of the lived-in places. Dealing with conversion does not imply working on religion per 
se or sketching out a geography of religion. Following BOURDIEU (1983) and LUKES (2005), 
religion can be understood as a field in which everyday practices, emotional cohesiveness, and 
collective identity are constituted and expressed in society and space. Thus, religion is 
simultaneously a field of forces and a field of struggles through which powerful social and spatial 
relations and place-making processes are produced, challenged, transformed, and reproduced. 
It follows that conversion is an intentional act of accumulating symbolic capital and accepting 
alternate modes of order through the exchange of forms of capital. Conversion is therefore not 
only about the respective positionality in the field but also the endeavor to change it, to shift the 
modes of order and ordering in the lived-in place through practices, experiences, and 
representations. 
Conversion in Geographical Perspective 
In analytical terms, conversion entails converts as well as preachers. The latter term is not 
necessarily meant literally, referring instead to the distributors of symbolic capital and grand 
narratives (cf. BOURDIEU 1989). Converts may become preachers themselves, if they have 
accumulated enough symbolic power to be acknowledged and recognized by others as such. 
From the perspective of Christian missionary work, conversion is “a type of social recruiting in 
which the convert yields his or her body and soul to a power deemed superior” (DANNIN (2002: 
266). It is therefore most essentially an act of domination and subordination, of ordering and 
being ordered. Yet, at the same time, it is also—aside from oppressive forms of enforced 
conversions—a dialectical process and practice, bringing those modes of order and ordering 
otherwise taken for granted into explicit focus as topics of discussion.  
WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999: 353) argues for a differentiation between conversion as a “conflictive 
mode” of change and alternation as a more “developmental mode,” with the former being 
based in the converts’ search for a radical change in worldview and identity as symbolic systems. 
This differentiation is especially valuable in relation to the converting/alternating subject’s 
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relationship to his or her own past and former commitments (ibid.). Based on her research on 
conversion to Islam in Germany and the U.S., WOHLRAB-SAHR conceptualizes both 
dimensions through the modes of syncretism (i.e. alternation) and symbolic battle (i.e. 
conversion). She thereby poses a very important methodological question, placing accounts of 
conversion into the realm of an interpretive-qualitative paradigm of methods focused strongly 
on narrative and biographical interviews. 
In his invitation to further geographical conceptualizations of religious conversion, WOODS 
(2012: 440) argues that “religious conversion is a phenomenon that goes beyond the 
reorientation of individual belief, and is instead a process of change that involves the 
(re)definition of self and other,” thus highlighting the realm of change and transformation 
through conversion. In empirical terms, he criticizes the dominant focus on micro-explorations 
of personal narratives and the subsequent failure to synthesize knowledge on the scale of 
communities, organizations, and localities. This corresponds with the invitation by KONG 
(2010: 763) to research and analyze religion and geography beyond insights on the micro level 
of politics and space in order to understand religious conflict and change on a global level (cf. 
KONG 2010: 763). With his insightful compilation of existing literature on religious change and 
religious conversion from the scientific fields of sociology, religious studies, and political science, 
WOODS (2012) convincingly combines the structural and structuring dimension with aspects of 
human agency, thus engaging conceptually with motivation and intent on an intersubjective, 
psychological, and emotional level. However, as mentioned above, a conceptual advancement 
from the standpoint of geography requires that the why and how of religious conversion be 
accompanied by the where, the locale of the context of conversion. This can be brought together 
with the differentiation of space and place by AGNEW (2005, 1987), as discussed in the 
conceptual chapter (see section “Approaching the Conceptual Dimension of Social and Spatial 
Order and Ordering” above). Accordingly, geographies of religious conversion should deal with 
the location of conversion (i.e. its territorialized spatial and material translatability), the locale 
of conversion (i.e. the field of structuring and structured social relations that are the foundation 
for the actual acts), as well as the sense of place of conversion (i.e. the embodied positionalities 
of the respective subjects, as well as their bodily and sensual implications).  
Bringing these two perspectives together, religious conversion can be framed as a ritualized and 
in most cases institutionalized process and practice of convincing and being convinced in 
ideological, material, symbolical, and place-making terms. It entails far-reaching effects of the 
de-signification and re-signification of the everyday self as well as the social and material 
environment. Hence, it seems appropriate to talk about a converted representation as well as a 
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converted subject. New meanings are adopted and inscribed upon the body and into the social field, 
with the latter being re-ordered through a change in routines and rituals (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 
2004). The observable result is the attachment of altered or new values to common structures, 
experiences, networks, and desires. The ritual of conversion is not just one act but a series of 
interlinked reaffirmations of conversion, necessary to stabilize the self in the altered 
representation of the social, psychological, and material setting of the lived-in places. Thus, 
conversion never ends, it is never fulfilled or accomplished. It is an ongoing differentiation of 
the momentary self in contrast to the prior subject and previous intersubjectivity. Only those 
individuals who are socialized, educated, and ordered within the new setting, for example the 
children of converts, are truly able to start anew. 
Beyond Rationality and Intention: Conversion as Resistance and 
Transgression 
“Resistance […] cannot simply address itself to changing external physical space, but 
must also engage the colonised spaces of people’s inner worlds […]. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the production of ‘inner spaces’ marks out the real break point of political 
struggle…maybe.” (PILE 1997: 17) 
Conversion as resistance and transgression is, in analytical terms, a mode of expression, a modus 
operandi of dis- and re-ordering. It brings about a state of exception in ritual and territorial 
practices and politics of change and transformation, which applies to both the individual and 
his or her social and spatial surroundings. This aspect has already been explored by WOHLRAB-
SAHR (1999: 361), who points to the fact that conversion is a reaction meant to resolve 
disintegration and social alienation within the social field. Re-ordered belonging is expressed 
through what she calls the double frame of religious conversion. So far, approaches to 
conversion from the field of geography have highlighted this social aspect in terms of 
rationalization, cultural adaptation, or the politics of representation in geo-political perspectives 
(cf. WOODS 2018), while other researchers, primarily from the field of anthropology, have focus 
on the motivations behind conversion being defiance of social orders or emancipation from 
them (cf. amongst others LEE 2007, 2002; WOHLRAB-SAHR 1999; WAHL 2014; LEE 2001). Yet 
all have in common that they take conversion as an entry point for the explanation of either 
rationalized or at least intentional social effects, thus implying an input-output model of 
conversion. This study intends to argue beyond these conceptual logics by engaging with 
conversion as a mode of transgression of social and spatial ordering, an induced state of 
exception to the daily lived routine which creates a window of opportunity for re-ordering the 
sense of place as a sense of orderly place-making and orderly being. Accordingly, conversion 
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can be understood as a heterotopia of the self, opening up the possibility to dismantle the embodied 
dispositions by re-ordering the very routines of everyday life and lived-in places. Thus, 
conversion is at the same time a modus operandi of ordering and the opus operatum, the ontology of 
order—not in terms of religion, proselytism, or the spiritual self, but of the real, the actual, and 
the empirical (SAYER 2000: 11ff.) of experienced space and society. In the context of colonialism 
and post-colonialism, conversion can be understood as a radical and revolutionary act of 
transgressing those orders brought about by decades of domination and subordination. In the 
case in South Africa, this mean the transgression of the knowing of one's place within the 
dialectic of White and Non-White. Thus, as conversion is an ontology of the self, it is all the 
more an ontology of order, because it is the ideological means and meaningful practice for 
change that already is, that it already happened. Conversion is transgressive, because it 
irreversibly shifts the subject away from the social and spatial modes of ordering and order and 
aims at an irreversible challenge of these modes. In both cases, conversion is more than just a 
“measure of hope” for change (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 99).  
WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999: 361) concludes that it is adoption of the “other” or the “foreign” 
religion of Islam that motivated conversion in the cases she studied. The desired uprooting from 
one’s own context is made possible through what she terms the “symbolization of maximal 
distance with one’s own social context.” Though this conclusion seems to be valid for her own 
empirical examples, it cannot be extended in a generalized way to other contexts of conversion 
to Islam. What WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999) is missing is the embeddedness of the conversion in 
relation to the overall social context, on the one hand, and the feeling of rootedness or up-
rootedness, i.e. belonging or not belonging to the order of the surrounding context, on the other. 
In the cases she presents, the converts experienced alienation originating from their own social 
environment (e.g. social stigmatization for behavior deemed inappropriate, like being called a 
whore for having diverse relationships). This ultimately led, in the analysis provided by 
WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999), to the conversion. In the cases presented here of Muslim converts in 
South Africa who had once been classified as Black African, these extrinsic effects are turned 
upside down: While the social environment signifies the subject’s belonging (as for example 
being African entails being Christian), this social and spatial ordering of the self is plagued by a 
constant feeling that the offered belongings are essentially false. The process of conversion is 
embedded in the subject’s realization that his or her embodied sense of place may be shaped by 
the very politics and practices of classification and the spatial manifestation of White 
domination. The conversion to Islam is thus not motivated by a search for the greatest distance 
to the given center but by the inherent feeling that the social position and identity of the self is 
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on the far periphery of where it should be, that the given means of existence entail a constant 
state of alienation, and that conversion to Islam would enable the subject to understand and 
attain the imagined center of the self and share it socially. In other words, converting to Islam 
means questioning, deconstructing, and reconstructing the embodied dispositions and therefore 
the role of the self within the oppressive and segregated reality, rooted in centuries of political 
and missionary work by a White, Christian colonialist minority. In contrast to that reality, Islam 
is understood as a radical anti-colonial ideology, on the one hand, and the way of the 
authentically African, indigenous self, on the other, rendering the religion of Christianity the 
foreign or alien one. 
Understanding conversion as transgression implies reframing the main research question as 
follows: What are the practices and acts of transgression and which boundaries are transgressed? 
In this light, the South African particularities of segregation, oppression, social and spatial 
alienation, and physical relocation shift the perspective’s focus towards both the boundaries of 
belonging, reaching for emotional and personal order, and the boundaries of citizenship, 
reaching for structural order. As will be presented and discussed in the following section, Black 
Islam South Africa entails both shaping the politics and practices of territorialization and re-
ordering, while also questioning the very foundations of the South African state and society’s 
potential for transformation after apartheid. 
Islam in South Africa: An-Other Order? 
The history and genesis of Islam and Muslim communities in South Africa is an extraordinary 
example of the power of cultures, ideas, and ideologies traveling along the global passages of 
colonialism and imperialism. Islam was initially brought to South Africa by the global 
entanglements of the Dutch colonial network, maintained under the harsh restrictions of the 
various oppressive regimes, institutionalized throughout the racist and racialized period of 
apartheid politics, and finally discovered, redefined, hybridized, translated, and transformed into 
the social and cultural structure as the indigenous African population came into contact with 
Islamic ideologies and practices.  
It is helpful to sketch out a roadmap of Islam in South Africa in order to illustrate the path 
dependencies and formations of this particular religion within the larger picture of colonial, 
imperial, and apartheid rule in South Africa. With regard to this study’s main objectives and 
research scope, the focus will be on South Africa’s so-called Indian Islam or Indian Muslims in 
the region of KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, to avoid a too narrow discussion, connections will 
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be made to other locations of Muslim identity practice and socio-spatial ideology, primarily 
those found between the developments in colonial Natal and the Cape colony, now known as 
the KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape. Islam in South Africa developed along different strands 
in different areas and at different times, always reflecting the social, spatial, and cultural 
background of the diverse communities in question. The decision to locate the major part of 
the research in KwaZulu-Natal, especially in the vicinity of the eThekwini metropolitan 
municipality (Durban), was the result of a process that entailed empirical undertakings at 
various places across South Africa. Most of them have been integrated in this work. The history 
and daily life of converts to Islam in KwaZulu-Natal may constitute the specific local religious, 
cultural, and political developments of Indian Islam that took place in that region of South 
Africa, but the converts’ lived realities as Muslims are not at all restricted to the locale. As will 
be discussed further below, their sense of place as Muslim and Black is connected to places, 
actors, and institutions across the country, as well as on a global scale. 
Colonial Passages, Local Groundings 
To a certain extent, religion and religious affiliation only became an issue of socio-political 
magnitude with the arrival of European settlers and colonialist. This does not at all imply that 
religion, spirituality, or sacred space were not present before the time of the foreign conquerors. 
Spiritual expressions and religious rituals were manifold among the different population groups 
indigenous to the region, but the ideas of believer and heathen and of proselytism and 
conversion—very much translations of ideas of religious structure and practice, rooted in the 
European history of institutionalized and hierarchical Christian political rule—first appeared 
with the ships arriving at the Cape. Also imported alongside Christianity were other 
monotheistic religions from around the globe, particularly Islam. The impact that these religions 
had on the indigenous population is linked to an idea that these religions share: the construction 
of cultural identity through differentiation to the religious other, combined with an intrinsic 
motivation to spread the religious message among the non-believers, i.e. to raise awareness and 
convince the other of the believer’s own faith. This entails persuading those others of a different 
way of life in terms of social and spatial orders, as well as bodily and intersubjective experiences. 
In other words: These religions offered competing grand narratives of ordering the self in the 
lived-in places, produced and reproduced by ritual and routine. For Islam to gain a strong 
foothold within South African society, these logics of competition and missionary engagement, 
or da’wah as it is called in the Muslim context, were of crucial importance from the very 
beginning. In no way indigenous to the Southern African region, the religion of Islam came to 
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the Cape with slaves brought as workforce to the colony. The involvement of the Dutch East 
India Company in the global slave trade facilitated a steady flow of slaves from the Indian 
Ocean world, which stretched from Madagascar, the East African coast, and India to Indonesia 
and the Malayan Archipelago (cf. BRADLOW & CAIRNS 1978: 102). SHELL (1993) provides an 
extraordinarily detailed account of how Muslim communities and Islamic teaching and 
preaching gained prominence in the Cape Colony, due to the religion’s particular attractiveness 
to slaves from other regions of Africa. Still, there is another side to the story, as Dutch settlers 
endorsed the conversion to Islam among their slaves to a certain extent, instead of encouraging 
them to become Christians, in order to be able to enslave their children as well (cf. BADEROON 
2014: 11). Along with the slaves came political prisoners from other Dutch colonies, some of 
whom were charismatic personalities and Islamic scholars who formed the nuclei for Muslim 
communities, and whose graves became sacred places of pilgrimage. Early Islamic practices at 
the Cape reflected a mixture of the many vernacular and contemporary rites and rituals 
stemming from the diverse areas of origin. DA COSTA (1994) provides insights into the various 
geographic backgrounds of those Muslims brought as slaves to the Cape in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and up until slavery’s abolition in 1834 (though slaveholding only came to 
an end with the emancipation of slaves in 1838) (SHELL 1993: 421). The abolition of slavery led 
to a process of urbanization among the former slaves, and Islam became an urban religion 
within the settlements of the Cape Colony, which were by then under the reign of the British 
empire. Muslim ex-slaves were quickly perceived as a comparably homogenous group and 
gained something of an aristocratic status among the Non-White population (cf. ibid: 421f.). 
Malay became the ascription frequently used for the early Muslims at the Cape, a description 
which in terms of cultural essentialisms persists until today, constituting an imagined community 
(VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 254; BADEROON 2014). Under the domination of the Dutch settlers, 
Muslims were extraordinarily restricted in the public expression of religious rituals, rendering 
Islamic practice a hidden worship (MATTHEE 2008: 77). With the shift to British colonial 
administration, Islamic practices were tolerated and sacred places such as mosques and 
madrasas (Islamic schools) could be established. This happened with some pace during the 
nineteenth century. In most cases, the founding of mosques in that era was related to a central 
personality, a trend which created a field of contestations among the different congregations 
and subsequent spin-offs and separations of mosques (TAYOB 1995: 46ff.). The allowance of 
public observance under British rule also meant that Muslim activities were moved into the 
realm governed by the logics of the colonial regime, leading Islamic practice to become 
increasingly ordered within the hierarchical social structure of dominating European settlers 
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and subordinate others. In addition to these developments, Sufi orders had become the 
epicenters of religious practices and Islamic discourse during the rule of the Dutch, in part due 
to their less institutional character, and they continued to thrive among the Muslims at the Cape 
under British reign (cf. DANGOR 2009: 108f.). 
When the British Empire took hold of the colonial territory in South Africa in the nineteenth 
century, it established a second passage, which enabled the movement of Muslims and Islamic 
practice. Lying on the eastern side of the coast, the Natal colony was thus properly linked to the 
sea route across the Indian ocean and along the East African coast under the British 
administration, and the colonial harbor city of Durban became a vibrant and quickly expanding 
node in the global network of the Empire. The indigenous isiZulu-speaking societies found there 
were relatively homogenous in social, cultural, and political terms compared to the diversity of 
societies at the Cape. Contrary to the plans of the colonial administration, the indigenous people 
of Natal refused to become a cheap and disposable workforce on the sugarcane plantations of 
the newly empowered White farmers. In response to this refusal, a system of indentured labor 
migration was instituted with workers arriving from the Indian subcontinent from 1860 to 1911. 
This brought more than 150,000 Indians to Natal across kala pani, the black waters, as the Indian 
Ocean was metaphorically described (VAHED 2001: 306; EBR.-VALLY 2001; for a 
comprehensive account on the history of indentured laborers worth reading, see DESAI & 
VAHED 2010). This indenture system consisted of two five-year-contract periods. The workers 
were primarily Tamil, Telugu, Bhojpuri, Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali speakers from lower-caste 
communities (HANSEN 2012: 27f.; with reference to EBR.-VALLY 2001). After the first term, 
they could either continue with a second contract or seek work elsewhere. After ten years, the 
workers were offered a free passage back to the Indian subcontinent or the ownership or lease 
of a piece of crown land in the colony (TAYOB 1995: 55). The colonial administration initially 
expected the formerly indentured Indians to pursue jobs with the sugarcane planters. Instead, 
the majority engaged in trade, selling their own agricultural produce on the markets, or started 
to purchase and rent out land. The majority of the laborers were Hindu, and less than 10% 
were Muslims. From the 1880s onwards, a second group of Indians, the so-called passengers, 
came to Natal of their own expense in order to get involved in the colonial economy. Of these, 
around 80% were Muslim, most of them wealthy traders from the Indian subcontinent. This 
group, comprised of primarily Gujarati-speaking Muslims with Memon or Surtee background, 
was smaller than the formerly indentured population and made up around 15% of the total 
Indian population in Natal. However, due to their different economic background, they quickly 
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made their way to other parts of the region, such as the Transvaal or the Cape Colony (cf. 
HANSEN 2012: 28). 
The allocation of land in the colony to indentured laborers and the regional trading activities 
of passenger Indians had a decisive effect upon the hierarchical position of Indians within the 
classificatory system:  
“In this regional diaspora, Indians tended to supplant Africans in position and authority. 
On farms, Indian men were often given responsibility for difficult tasks, or served in the 
elevated position of family cook. In the African locations, Indian traders concentrated 
on the ‘kaffir trade’. While they provided goods to an otherwise poorly served 
constituency, they came to occupy a social position distinct from and superior to that of 
the Africans.” (MORRELL, WRIGHT & MEINTJES 1996: 41) 
While the migrants were portrayed as a homogenous group situated between the White elite 
and the dispossessed and territorially ordered Africans, the social reality among Indians was far 
from reflecting a uniform Indianness. Indentured migrants and passenger Indians were divided 
by religion, cast, language, ethnicity, and culture, reflecting the diverse origins and logics of 
social and spatial segregation on the Indian subcontinent (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 260). 
Nevertheless, these social positionalities had been brought into a realm where status along these 
lines did not automatically reproduce the familiar stratifications. VAHED (2001: 327) argues that 
the situations of Indian Muslims from the group of indentured laborers differed radically to 
those with a Hindu background, as “occupation and social mobility no longer depended on 
caste, while race played a pivotal role in shaping social relations.” The situations of Muslim 
traders varied as well, as they organized their religious communities around mosques founded 
and built by this wealthier group shortly after their arrival in Natal (ibid.: 328).  
Both groups, Muslims from the indentured labor background and those from among the 
passengers, lived in the same areas within the territorial order of the segregated colonial city of 
Durban. Thus, while Indian Muslims found themselves stratified by new aspects of race and 
class within the political realm, in the private sphere, the familiar divisions along the lines of 
caste, class, and ancestry still ordered the different communities, making social interrelations 
such as marriage almost impossible (VAHED 2001: 328). From the very beginning, a social 
distance had existed between the mainly Urdu-speaking Muslims among the former indentured 
laborers, one the one hand, and the Muslim traders from areas in India such as Gujarat, Kutcch 
or Kathiawad, on the other. This was also expressed in the religious practices, with the former 
laborers organizing themselves mainly around Sufi rituals and teachings of Islam (most 
prominently Chishti and Naqshbandi), while the former passengers practiced a more orthodox 
Islam. With the establishing of mosques and madrasas, as well as a higher degree of formalized 
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religious-organizational structure, the latter group dominated the overall Muslim community 
in structural, religious, and cultural terms. Aside from the Sufi-oriented communities, three 
broad Islamic traditions have gained traction among Indian Muslims, especially since the 1960s 
(VAHED 2000: 45ff.; VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 261): First, reflecting the aim of bridging Islamic 
and secular knowledge, a modernist stream influenced by Pan-Islamic revivalist scholars such 
as Muhammad Iqbal and Sayyad Qutb was influential in the formation of organizations that 
attracted converts from the Black African population group (see also DANGOR 2009: 113). 
Second, a reformist Deobandi tradition was influenced by personalities such as Muhammad 
Nanautawi or Rashid Gangohi. It pursues a pure and purified Islam and can primarily be linked 
to passenger Indians from Gujarat. This reformist approach became associated with the middle 
class and oriented towards modern economy. Third, a Sunni stream influenced by Ahmad Raza 
Khan of Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh was mainly associated with indentured Indian Muslims, 
coming to stand for maintaining the social as well as religious status quo. The differentiations 
and conflicts among the Deobandi, Sunni, and Barelvi traditions are linked to historical 
developments on the Indian subcontinent. In the South African context, these translated into 
differences of class and economic status among the growing diaspora of Indian migrants, 
reflecting and reproducing their places of origin and ethnicity: Gujarati traders from western 
India, on the one hand, and Urdu indentured laborer from North or South India, on the other 
(cf. HANSEN 2012: 245). 
Islamic scholarship in KwaZulu-Natal was and still is strongly connected to the Indian 
subcontinent, a relationship that was only gradually impeded by the restrictive migratory 
policies and travel restrictions between India and South Africa established under apartheid. In 
the 1960s, this scholastic connection brought the Tablīgh Jamāt to South Africa, an Islamic 
revivalist movement which evolved in India in the early twentieth century in reaction to 
Christian missionary efforts among Muslims (cf. MOOSA 1997; ALI 2010). HARON (2005) 
classifies the Tablīgh Jamāt as a second-tier da’wah movement, as it mainly targets the activities 
of Muslims, reminding them of Islamic duties while preaching a scriptural way of Islam, 
oriented according to the life and projected purity of early Muslim communities. “The emphasis 
in the movement is therefore heavily on hadith, on an ethics of sincerity of purpose (niyyah), on 
living in the spirit and remembrance of Allah (dhikr), and on showing respect and care for other 
Muslims” (HANSEN 2012: 244). The processes of removal, relocation, and segregation under 
apartheid contributed to the growing support of the movement’s message among Indian 
Muslims. It provided an Islamic identity of cultural and religious distinction and ummah-
oriented unity to Muslims who found themselves in a rapidly changing environment of social 
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and spatial reordering. At the same time, the movement’s presence and activities progressed 
polarizations and dividing conflicts among the different groups following different Islamic 
traditions, which led to the separation and division of mosques as well (VAHED 2003). 
Residential segregation also had an immanent effect on the formation and building of religious 
Islamic communities, a process that intensified during apartheid. Aggregated and classified as 
one of the Non-White population groups under the Population Registration Act, Indians were 
granted the right of permanent residency in urban South Africa in 1961, an right denied to 
them under the colonial system in which they held the constantly contested status of foreign 
migrants and temporary sojourners (JEPPIE 2007: 4). Nevertheless, this new right to citizenship 
was second class from the very beginning. Indians were continuously regarded as a subordinate 
group “in need of paternalistic care and education in order to evolve more fully” (HANSEN 2012: 
35). With the political shift to apartheid and the subsequent reordering of the segregationist 
colonial city on the basis of the Group Areas Act, people now officially classified, statistically 
recorded, and documented as Indians were positioned spatially next to Black African townships 
and on the fringes of White areas, effectively serving as a socio-spatial buffer zone and therefore 
representing in spatial terms a hierarchical position lower than Whites but dominant to the 
indigenous population. In terms of Islamic places and institutions, this racial territorialization 
can still be seen today by layering the former group areas on top of the presence of Islamic 
places of worship and religious education. This is exemplified in map 12, which represents the 
situation in and around the former colonial and apartheid city of Durban (for a comparable 
and in depth undertaking with the example of Cape Town, see FLÖEL & HAFERBURG 2002).  
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Map 12: Islamic religious places in Durban in relation to the former group areas.  Cartography: M. Gebauer. 
Map 12 shows the demarcation of today's eThekwini municipality together with the former 
boundary of apartheid’s Greater Durban Area and the demarcated group areas for the White, 
Coloured, Indian, and African groups. It also pinpoints the three largest Black African border 
townships of Umlazi, KwaMashu, and Inanda, which were officially under the jurisdiction of 
the KwaZulu homeland. The dots on the map represent the positions of Islamic religious 
buildings such as mosques, madrassas, and prayer houses (musallah or jamāt khane).  
The highest concentration of such religious places can be found in the former Indian townships, 
such as Phoenix, Newlands, or Chatsworth. The racial segregation of apartheid affected the 
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cultural ordering of the re-ordered population quite intensively. However, an intermediary 
position such as that of the Indian population group did not translate into social and cultural 
fluidity. On the contrary, the lived-in reality in South Africa’s racially grouped areas was 
characterized by spatially manifested and socially inscribed boundaries, not only between those 
classified as White and the indigenous Non-White population, but also along the gradually 
differentiated population classifications. The Indian population group not only found 
themselves positioned in between Whites and Blacks in terms of economic activities and 
locations of living but also segregated on the scale of structural belonging, i.e. citizenship. The 
ordering logics of racial classification, segregation, and the ideology of division and rule led 
people classified as Black African to experience economic exploitation in their daily lives, e.g. 
when renting real estate or buying goods, at the hands of those classified as Indian. Anger 
against the structure of systematic injustices was therefore frequently directed towards the 
Indian population group (cf. NAIDOO 1992; HINDSON, BYERLEY & MORRIS 1994). The map 
therefore also reveals an intriguing effect of the transformation from apartheid to post-
apartheid: New Islamic religious places were established almost exclusively within the former 
White areas, whereas almost none can be found in the former Black African areas. Two 
exceptions, a mosque and a jamāt khane, are indicated in KwaMashu, both founded by 
indigenous Africans. Their background will be dealt with later within this chapter (see section 
of “Attempting Muslim Blackness” further below). Another exception, the Greyvillea mosque 
sits on the border between the former homeland and the Indian township of Chatsworth. The 
establishment of new Islamic religious places within the former White areas is likely the result 
of formerly Indian-classified people moving towards the major economic centers surrounding 
the Central Business Disrict of Durban after the end of apartheid.  
This gradient subordination and race group relationality, resulting from indirect rule and White 
racist logics, became even more evident in the field of education. While people classified as 
Black were confined either to ill-equipped schools in their townships and homelands or to those 
run by missionaries, Indians gained a certain level of educational mobility and liberty from the 
1960s onward (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 261). Moreover, 1963 saw the establishment of the 
University of Durban-Westville, an institution of higher education for the Indian population 
group. The Indian population group may have been viewed paternalistically by the White 
oppressor, but it was at least cast in the light of structural development at all, in contrast to 
perceptions of the indigenous African population. Outside of these segregated realities, a zone 
of contact to Islamic practices and social and cultural exchange between Indian Muslims and 
the indigenous population classified as Black African did exist, and it facilitated the travel of 
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Islamic knowledge in terms of religious practice and way of life. The active involvement of 
Muslims in the struggle against apartheid, as well as the growing number of anti-colonial 
narratives stemming from Muslim scholars and Islamic da’wah organizations, further 
contributed to this process. 
Muslim Resistance to Colonialism and Apartheid 
Global developments, such as the Iranian Revolution, Muslim Black Power movements in the 
United States, and the global Islamic resurgence beginning in the 1970s (TAYOB 1995), played 
an important role in the genesis of various strands of counter-hegemonic positions to apartheid 
which emerged from the field of Muslims in South Africa. While informed by global 
developments, South Africa’s Muslims primarily approached the confrontation of apartheid 
“from within," either from a nationally oriented South African perspective or a Pan-Africanist 
one. Yet, whereas some Muslims got involved in the struggle based on an Islamic viewpoint, 
others refused to do so, arguing that their status as a minority meant their involvement in kāfir 
politics, i.e. the politics of Non-Muslims, would not be in line with Islamic thought. These 
differences strongly characterized the discourses at the Cape as well as in Natal and continued 
after the end of apartheid, including the request for a fatwa, an Islamic ruling concerning the 
South African situation (see JHAZBHAY 1991). The question of Islam and resistance to apartheid 
is thus at its core a controversy over whether Muslims, as a minority that came along the colonial 
passages to South Africa, should get politically involved in contestations of the oppressive racial 
regime at all. The different approaches of Muslims in South African to dealing with resistance 
to social and spatial oppression and ordering thus clearly reflect the hermeneutics concerning 
Muslim minorities outside of the Islamic heartland and the differentiation derived thereof 
between dar al-Islam, as the symbolic and physical territory of undisputed Islamic living 
conditions and legal orders, and dar al-harb, as the other territory, where Muslim life takes place 
under the given conditions of a dominating Non-Muslim society (NIEHAUS 2002; 2008: 72ff.; 
see also HASHMI 2003). 
For both Muslims at the Cape and in Natal, political activities ranging from strategic 
maneuvering to open disputes in the streets had been part of the lived reality from the very 
beginning, with religious issues increasingly becoming social ones from the nineteenth century 
onwards. A vividly documented example is the large-scale public protest of Muslims in the Cape 
Colony in 1886, who in the thousands displayed their opposition to the planned closure of a 
Muslim cemetery (SHELL 1993: 454ff.; PALOMBO 2014: 31). This historical case is important to 
note as it reflects two crucial aspects that extend beyond the historical incident itself: The first 
138 
is that resistance to the oppressive White settler-colonialist rule, and later the Afrikaner 
apartheid rule, were clearly voiced in the face of threats to the ritualistic sphere of Islamic 
normativity and to its bodily, social, and spatial modes of orders (such as burial regulations), 
effectively preventing the unsanctioned practice of Islam. Second, the confrontation with the 
White, or better, Non-Muslim other brought about exclusive moments of mass unity and the 
discourse of a homogenized South African sphere of Muslimness, despite the group being highly 
differentiated along diverse religious streams. Muslim communities and individuals in the Cape 
Colony started off being perceived as a cultural realm among the population of slaves and 
servants. In the view of the Dutch settler colonialists, dealing with Muslims meant governing 
the religious sphere of the colony; conflicts and contestations arose where aspects of Islamic 
ritual and regularities were not in line with the overall modes of order. With the arrival of the 
British colonizers, the hegemonic attitude towards Muslims changed, shifting them from a 
religious reality to a piece within the socio-spatially segregated structure of colonial life. 
Acts of political representation always unfold against the backdrop of the specific socio-historical 
and spatial path dependencies. Hence, the situation in Natal differed, reflecting aspects of 
religious life and identity to a lesser degree within the Muslim contestations to the colonial and 
apartheid modes of ordering. Instead, the scene was dominated by issues concerning the social 
and economic sphere, the realm of political representation, and territorial aspects regarding the 
lived-in places within the increasingly segregated colonial urban space. In the context of colonial 
Natal, Islam and the life-world of Muslims had been directly linked to the global colonial 
dynamics and developments and was therefore inevitably embedded in the discourses and 
practices of political resistance to the colonial logics of social and spatial ordering as they were 
put in place by the British Empire. While the presence of indentured laborers in Natal fit into 
the system of White hegemony, the attitude towards the wealthier passenger Indians and their 
economic activities was a different one. As their numbers grew, they were seen as competitors 
in economic, political, and territorial terms (SICARD 1989: 212).  
“Whites perceived the Africans as a passive threat and affected a paternal regard for 
their allegedly natural subordination, but eventually they saw in the Indians a 
sophisticated and active menace to their own position in colonial society, competing for 
space, place, trade, and political influence with the imperial authority.” (SWANSON 1983)  
In contrast to the situation of Muslims in the Cape Colony, this led in Natal to early and 
continuous social and political confrontations with and resistance to the colonial regime and a 
merging of religious and socio-political realities when it came to the representation of 
Muslimness in the confrontational environment of the colony. The relationality between 
oppressive orders and their contestations continuously evolved with the growing number of 
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Indians arriving. Hence, in the 1870s and 1880s, Indians were confronted with modes of 
ordering involving residential segregation and political exclusion, followed by economic 
sanctions after the arrival of wealthier passenger Indians. The strategies adopted by the White 
administration of Durban, namely the demarcation of residential locations for Indians and the 
clustering of their commercial zones, thus represented the first planned attempt at creating 
group areas in a major South African town, making it a precursor to apartheid legislation (cf. 
SWANSON 1983: 405). While segregation targeted Indians of all religions, the economic 
sanctions and growing restrictions on migration in the late nineteenth century specifically 
affected Muslims, as the majority of passenger Indians and traders belonged to Islam. This does 
not, however, mean that there was a uniquely Islamic quality to the contestations of White 
domination and oppression in colonial Natal. Certainly, many of the personalities engaged in 
the institutionalization of counter-hegemonic efforts were Muslims, and the formation of 
longstanding organizations, such as the Natal Indian Congress, can be associated with their 
leadership. Still, their motives were to improve the political, social, and economic status of 
Indians in the colonial system (see SICARD 1989: 212f.). The fact that the first officially 
established Muslim organization in Natal was the Indian Committee Durban, whose agenda 
was to protect socio-economic and political rights, supports this perspective (cf. DANGOR 2009: 
111). 
With apartheid, the conditions for contesting the hegemonic system and negotiating the 
exclusive position of Muslims changed. Through classification and spatial manifestation, Islam 
became associated with the Coloured or Asian (i.e. Indian) population group, and Muslims 
subsequently found themselves homogenized under the racial conditions of the White/Non-
White dialectic. Through the contributions of charismatic Muslim personalities—most 
prominently the religious and socio-political activist Imam Abdullah Haron, who died in 
detention shortly after his arrest in 1969 (GÜNTHER 2002; SICARD 1989: 208f.)—Islam 
unavoidably gained a reputation within the South African society for having an adversary stance 
to oppression and injustice. The political discourse emerging from the Islamic sphere was not 
only linked to particular personalities but was driven in large part by the formation of Islamic 
organizations whose missions pointed directly at resisting the White oppressors, while 
simultaneously offering visions for social transformation under Islamic conditions. Three of the 
organizations with socio-political agendas that gained prominence in the South African context 
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(ESACK 1988)32 include 1) Qibla Mass Movement, which was strongly inspired by the 1979 
Iranian Revolution as a blue-print for establishing an Islamic state alternative to an oppressive 
regime, 2) the Call of Islam, which had a distinct affiliation to the broad-based resistance against 
apartheid under the umbrella organization of the United Democratic Front, and 3) the Muslim 
Youth Movement (MYM), which was founded in Durban in 1970 and oriented towards the 
empowerment of Muslim communities. While this is certainly no comprehensive list of all actors 
of institutionalized resistance to apartheid,33 Qibla, the Call of Islam, and the MYM essentially 
stand for the three major traditions of institutionalized Islamic resistance to apartheid. Qibla 
represents a Pan-Africanist perspective, oppositional to the idea of a transformed and 
democratically reformed South Africa and oriented instead to a global perspective of Islamic 
governance. In contrast, the Call of Islam and similar organizations reflect a liberal-intellectual 
position, contributing to the nationalist project of a post-apartheid South Africa from an Islamic 
standpoint. Finally, the Muslim Youth Movement stands for those organizations motivated to 
propagate Islamic thought and ideology as means to change the conditions in the lived-in places 
and bring about social transformation without becoming involved in the Non-Muslim, or kāfir, 
politics of apartheid and the resistance to it. The MYM is of specific importance to this study 
and will be revisited and discussed at different points further below.  
Throughout colonialism and apartheid, Muslims in South Africa who intended to resist the 
oppressive modes of social and spatial ordering eventually found themselves in the conflicting 
situation of justifying their involvement from an Islamic standpoint. It was not exclusively the 
Muslim Youth Movement arguing that transformation through a “complete and 
comprehensive” (DANGOR 2009: 119) Islamic way of life had to happen without getting involved 
in Non-Muslim politics, as active political participation would only obstruct such a 
transformational process. While the MYM position was still a politicized one, other more 
conservative streams and scholars argued that any political contestations and involvement by 
 
32Esack describes them as “three Islamic strands” in his often cited 1988 article in the Third World Quarterly, a 
dichotomization which has strongly influenced the academic debate. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Esack himself 
is the founder of one of these so-called strands, that is the Call of Islam, and had previously been affiliated with the 
MYM. Therefore, his academic publication should be critically evaluated in the light of the political positioning of his 
own organization within it. Notably, many academic authors researching and writing on Islam and South Africa are 
themselves prominent religious scholars in their own field, including Yusuf da Costa (Naqshbandi Regional Head in 
the Cape region), Goolam Vahed (publishes for IPCI), Tahir Sitoto (former MYM President), Abdulkader Tayob (once 
presided over the As-Salaam Islamic Educational Center), Salman Nadvi (MYM), and Ebrahim Moosa (former 
Western Cape Coordinator of the MYM), to name a few. 
33Presenting all the organizations involved in that struggle at this point would move far beyond the scope of this study. 
The contributions of TAYOB (1995, 1990), JEPPIE (1991), SICARD (1989), and ESACK (1988, 1997), among others, should 
be consulted on this matter instead. 
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Muslims, especially where practices of resistance are shared with Non-Muslims, were not at all 
sanctioned, or even forbidden, by Islam(see MOOSA 1989). Pro-Nationalist Afrikaner 
newspapers gladly made reference to such statements, underpinning their paternalistic 
relationship to the obedient Muslims of South Africa (cf. PALOMBO 2014: 43). Nevertheless, the 
sphere of Islamic discourse and practices came to be integrated into the resistance to apartheid. 
Furthermore, local contestations from Islamic standpoints were very much linked to global 
discourses of Islam as a resurgent realm of challenging oppressive regimes. With a certain delay, 
Afrikaner politics realized and recognized the contingent threat that Islamic ideology posed, 
with the Dutch Reformed Church going so far as to declare Islam as a false religion and “a 
great danger for Christianity in South Africa” in 1986 (HARON 2006: 450; cf. JEPPIE 1991: 15). 
By that time, the bridging of the gap between anti-apartheid politics and practices and Islamic 
ideologies had already taken place in different lived-in places, such as those in the focus of this 
study. Especially among younger township dwellers, Islamic thought became an attractive 
alternative to Marxism as an ideological foundation for social and spatial resistance and 
revolutionary thinking. Moreover, as a religious sphere that challenged the faith of the 
oppressor, Islam even became a revolution in itself. For Natal, the epicenters and intellectual 
milieus for Muslim resistance were located among the segregated Indian population and came 
to thrive at the University of Durban-Westville from the 1970s onwards. The racial order of 
apartheid made the travel of these developments into Non-Muslim, i.e. Non-Indian, segments 
of the society difficult—but not impossible, as this study elucidates. Still, it was not only within 
the local realm that Islam as resistance to apartheid served to translate Islamic ideologies 
contesting oppression to a wider group of people. Before presenting an example of such contact 
zones, the classificatory representations of Muslims in South Africa requires critical 
consideration. 
Islam and Classification: The Questionable 
Representation of Census Data in South Africa 
In a society culturally ordered by the division of the population according to classification 
systems and their spatial manifestations, the question of census-related data is immanent. In 
fact, for the apartheid administration, enumerating the people living on the South African 
territory became an important tool for translating these abstract categories into social 
ontologies. Moreover, as increasing spatial segregation was put into practice, classification 
techniques developed further. For example, subsequent to the demarcation of the homelands 
and their connection to language groups, the 1970 census included tables on language and 
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offered ten different Bantu Nation Units (plus Others) as census categories (CHRISTOPHER 
2002: 405f.). Censuses and statistical population data were important political instruments for 
the operationalization of territorialized oppression and a system of continuous population 
control during colonialism and apartheid: 
“The creation, and amalgamation, of groups, which were assigned legal and 
constitutional status, indicated the reciprocal relationship between the census authorities 
and other organs of government. The colonial, Union and apartheid eras represented 
the tightening of control, which resulted in ever greater rigidity in the system of 
population classification.” (CHRISTOPHER 2002: 406) 
Differentiation by means of enumeration served in this regard the needs of the dominating 
minority. While the actual act of counting the population was an essentially political one, the 
same could be said of the response to census questions, as well as any attempt to gauge the 
(im)possibilities of taking the census on a representational scale within the highly socially and 
spatially segregated and therefore diversely accessible country. Especially in the 1980s and early 
1990s, accessing the population in order to gather the necessary data was made impossible by 
conflict and open violence in parts of the country, especially the Black African townships. As for 
the census-related representations of power, in their account on spatial patterns of religion in 
Cape Town, FLÖEL & HAFERBURG (2002: 209f.) point to the fact that statistical publications 
during apartheid facilitated the hegemonic ordering logics, here in terms of religion. Thus, 
comparing data before and after the official end of apartheid is a difficult, if not useless, scientific 
task. Extending the analysis and critical discussion of diverse socio-economic factors in South 
Africa presented by HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH (2017), we can conclude that census data in 
post-apartheid South Africa projects the persisting, embodied, and spatially inscribed modes of 
order, whereas their political interpretations represent projections of anticipated 
transformations. One way or the other, the political contingency cannot be cast aside by any 
means of statistical correlation or signification.  
Looking critically at the respective enumeration of religious affiliations during apartheid not 
only serves the objectives of this study; it also illustrates the most questionable representations 
of South African census data, as well as the socio-political and spatial effects that enumeration 
could entail. As described above, the logics of classification under White Afrikaner rule involved 
the ascription of aspects of cultural identity, such as religious affiliation, to specific race groups 
(i.e. Christianity to Whites and Natives/Blacks, Islam to Coloureds and Asians/Indians). This 
had diverse and grotesque effects, both intentional and unintentional. For example, EBR.-
VALLY (2001: 53) mentions the case of a Scottish-born, originally White-classified South 
African, who was reclassified as Coloured because of conversion to Islam. In a similar vein, 
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POSEL (2001b) points to the case of a White-classified woman who was deprived of her Whiteness 
by the judgement of a magistrate carrying out the classification by social acceptance. In her case 
as well, conversion to Islam turned her into a Coloured-classified person. These are only a few 
of the absurdities of the interrelations between population data and classification, on the one 
hand, and the enacting of segregative and racialized ordering, on the other. They also point to 
an awareness of the social implications linked to the presentation of the cultural self to the 
classification machinery of the oppressive regime. Such factors constrict the applicability and 
comparability of census data, at least when it comes to religion. As (HAFERBURG & 
OSMANOVICH 2017) argue, the effects of the inequalities resulting from being classified far 
outlived apartheid, as did the powerful position of being able to classify. An anecdotical example 
can be seen in the leader of a right-wing Afrikaner political party that succeeded the National 
Party arguing in parliament that as an Afrikaner, he is not a European but an African and 
therefore classifies himself as such on official forms (VERWEY & QUAYLE 2012: 556). Again, 
Nash’s (2003: 186) equation of Whiteness existing in the realm of ethnic fluidity, while Blackness is 
manifested by race is of importance when it comes to self-classification along those categories 
that outlived apartheid. This applies to census enumeration or official documents, as well as to 
the realm of everyday life.  
COMAROFF & COMAROFF (2006: 209f.) bring it to the point: 
“[T]he statistic is a medium of communication and a species of commodified knowledge, 
one whose value and veracity accumulates as it circulates. Part fetish, it has also become 
a term in the ordinary language of being.”  
Thus, having the right numbers on your side is a representation of power, and the self-
determined act of counting, and therefore owning the statistical data, entails a decisive power 
of representation. This is evident when looking at the different programs of the Muslim Youth 
Movement in their community-oriented work in Non-White areas, as one of their main tasks 
was taking a census of Muslims in the respective areas (TAYOB 1995: 111). Still, judging the 
number of Muslims in a specific area of South Africa is a rather difficult undertaking. Besides 
the previously mentioned problems with the acts of enumeration and their political implications, 
the numbers of religious followers tend to change in rather extreme terms. Exemplary for this 
development is the information provided by Shaykh Kasim, born in Malawi, who has lived in 
a Black/African township on the fringes of the Durban Metropolitan Area since the 1980s. He 
is an Islamic scholar on da’wah, working among the indigenous population. In several 
interviews, he mentioned that when he has linked his religious activities to social events, such as 
feeding schemes, public gatherings, or even the creation of football teams for the youth, so that 
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he can approach the local population in a broad-based way, the people “came in the thousands” 
and became followers in Islam. Although this may be a bit of an overstatement, the number of 
initial followers gained through social programs was most definitely high. Nevertheless, such 
masses tend to come and go with the social activities and their offerings, as well as with the 
presence of charismatic personalities such as the Shaykh. In the interviews, Kasim stated that 
people tended to leave the way of Islam as soon as he was no longer permanently present. He 
reflected on these failures of his initial work, stating that most of the people were “empty shells” 
who may have taken the shahada, the Islamic declaration of faith, but later returned to a Non-
Muslim life as members of the Shembe or Zionist churches. In this case, the numeric 
representation is not a supposedly objective reality, or even a validation of the statements 
provided by the interviewed person, but first and foremost the expression of meaningful 
experiences in the lived-in places. When it comes to publications on Muslims in South Africa, 
many authors seem to feel compelled to cite census data and the numerical differences and 
supposedly deduced growth rates among the different population groups, although only few of 
such publications are characterized by quantitative epistemology. Claims of a “rapid increase” 
in African Muslims with a growth of approximately 600% between the 1980 and the 2001 
censuses (PALOMBO 2014: 32) and chains of socio-religious correlations using census data to 
argue for an emerging African Islam in South Africa (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005) are based on shaky 
grounds, to say the least. The results of such studies can be very closely linked to the issues 
mentioned above. Moreover, comparing the census data from 1996 for Muslims in South Africa 
to that from 2001 reveals that the highest growth rate is to be found among the White 
population group. This statistical phenomenon can also be traced by looking at the historical 
census data presented by VAWDA (1994: 535), in which the number of Muslims among the 
White group is almost four times higher in 1970 compared to 1960, and had almost double 
again by 1980. This then could hypothetically indicate impressive conversion activities, an 
emerging White Islam in South Africa so to speak, or point to shifting ascriptions across the 
entire enumerated spectrum. One way or the other, only further inquiries into both realms can 
shed light on this case. Basing deductions on such accounts should be undertaken with care. 
When it comes to Muslims in South Africa, DANGOR (2003: 203) is the most valid source to be 
cited: “There are no reliable statistics on the number of Muslims in South Africa.”  
Both the practice of census enumeration and especially the actual experience of being 
enumerated are rooted in racial and segregative politics and representations. While the validity 
of census data is an issue of contestation and doubt in many places worldwide, in light of the 
South African particularities of the local setting discussed here—i.e. the social and spatial 
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repercussions of enumeration and classification under colonial and apartheid order, census data 
has to be seen as a cultural-political construct produced under undeniably oppressive and unjust 
power-relations. It most definitely does not represent any sort of objective social and spatial 
realities. With the recent 2011 census, the post-apartheid government skipped the questions on 
religious affiliation, a decision argued on the basis of the self-understanding of South Africa as 
a secular nation. Another reason for dropping the dimension of religion from the census process 
could be the fact that a significant part of the enumerated population had previously responded 
to the question with “No Religion,” which renders the outcome meaningless in many ways. 
Nevertheless, population groups are still the primary focus of the enumeration process, thus 
perpetuating the racialized differentiation of South African society. Given its self-understanding 
as a de-racialized nation, it could be helpful for the transformation of South African society if a 
similar conclusion were to be drawn regarding this census aspect as in the case of the religious 
categories (see also HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017: 58). It would be an interesting 
undertaking to add “No Race” to the coming censuses. 
Contact Zones: Africanization of the African Self through 
Islam 
The racial classification and spatial manifestation of apartheid’s modes of ordering had decisive 
effects on the mobility of culture and therefore the uniting of different practices and 
significations, as well as their mixing, hybridization, creative adaptation, and the creation of 
new cultural orders. Ontological meta-categories such as class, race, gender, religion, or 
ethnicity always tend to unfold a structuring effect onto positions within social space, thus 
predefining the possibility and probability of creative encounters. Within societies that are 
structured by the dimension of race, the segregative tendencies are even more evolved and most 
often inscribed into the spatial setting of the habitat. Yet, in the South African case of decades 
of radical segregation along racist categories on all scales of society and space, the possibility for 
cultural contact zones was restricted to the utmost extent. Everyday life, whether work, 
education, recreation, or even just buying groceries, took place in segregated spaces that were 
demarcated into an orderly, hierarchical landscape. Moreover, groups were physically kept 
away from each other by spatial barriers such as railways, streets, and industrial areas, which 
were situated in between the group areas. The definition of intermediary groups further 
decreased contact between the White minority and the majority African indigenous population. 
Although there was a higher probability of social or economic encounter and group area 
permeability between the Coloured-, Indian-, and Native-classified populations, this did not 
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imply a uniting of the respective realms of lived-in realities. Those very same segregating powers 
were used to divide and rule the indigenous majority of the inhabitants of the South African 
territory, who were divide along the lines of language and constrained to the respective 
homelands of their thus homogenized sub-groups. The restrictive politics and practices of the 
social and spatial orders and orderings under apartheid truly did fulfill the inherent meaning of 
the word: They kept people apart. Religion, in general, and everyday aspects of Islamic cultural 
and religion in particular, were subject to those very same realities. Engaging with conversion 
to Islam among people classified as Black African is therefore a search for those contact zones 
that enabled the mobility and translation of religious ideology and ritual, of discourse and 
practice, from one oppressed group of people to another.  
Regarding the academic literature, only few contemporary empirical works deal with the issue 
of conversion among the indigenous African population, most of which are ethnographic 
accounts with conversion biographies in their focus. Working with qualitative data from the 
Greater Durban Area, VAWDA (1994) identifies an increasingly autonomous Muslim 
community formation emerging within selected African townships, pointing to an increasing 
level of organization among the few converts to Islam. He links the aim of developing an 
independent African Muslim sector, i.e. one that is not linked to established Muslim 
organizations tied to the Indian population group, to a mixture of existing proselytizing work 
exactly from the institutions of this field, the history of apartheid, and the presence of 
charismatic African Muslims who have migrated to the townships from other African countries. 
In her two articles, (LEE 2001); LEE (2007) engages with conversion to Islam among isiXhosa-
speaking African women in the townships of Cape Town, shifting the conversion perspective to 
a setting of gender, religion, and social justice. She recognizes the influence of material related 
to Malcolm X on the shifting perspective of the self within the field of the social ordering in the 
lived-in area. For her respondents, Islam became an arena to reinterpret, re-appropriate, and 
empower their self-understanding as African women. BANGSTAD (2007) explores a similar vein 
and regional focus, offering a typology of African converts to Islam among isiXhosa-speaking 
Africans, thereby differentiating between conversion as social uplifting and conversion as 
political activism. Others review and discuss the issue of an emerging or African Islam in light of 
post-apartheid identity formations (OMAR 2002, 2004; RAFUDEEN 2002) or the comparison of 
a possibly new category of South African Muslims versus the established communities and the 
resulting contestations and conflicts in the transformation society of post-apartheid South Africa 
(SITOTO 2002, 2003; VAHED & JEPPIE 2005). Undeterred by the small number of empirical 
accounts, such reviews tend to draw socio-political conclusions with macro-scalar reach, partly 
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by making use of problematic quantitative comparisons to argue for a questionable intensity 
behind the phenomenon of an emerging African Islam (see for example VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 
262f., 280f.). In contrast, as part of her PhD thesis, HASSAN (2011) carefully discusses an African 
Muslimness emerging from Black African townships as a factor of ethnicity based on religion 
and social positionality, while also providing a helpful overview of African Muslim organizations 
in KwaZulu-Natal. She points to factors such as a general lack of representation of African 
Muslims within the field of institutionalized Islam in South Africa and to the difficulty African 
Muslims have in gaining political and religious respect, being often regarded a charity case (with 
reference to SITOTO 2002). 
Furthermore, HASSAN (2011: 146ff.) correctly questions the categorizations of Indian and 
African Islam, while also—in correspondence with the other existing literature—acknowledging 
the social reality of this division as a result of colonialism and racist segregation during 
apartheid. What she fails to take into account is the decisive role of spatial manifestations of 
religion in the doxic landscape of South Africa and the role of religious ascription to the 
constitution of an orderly indigeneity for the cause of White supremacy. On one side of the 
spatialized racial border, young, politicized Africans came in contact with Black Islamic thought 
from outside of South Africa, viewing it as a means of challenging order by resisting the modes 
of social and cultural ordering in their lived-in places. Coming in contact with Islam as an-other 
order opened for them a window of opportunity for re-configuring existing modes of order, 
making possible the transgression of the African self in the form of the orderly indigeneity of 
African other as defined and governed by White South Africa. While a contact zone is the space 
for unfolding the creative and transformative energy of cultural transmutation (cf. PRATT 2008), 
it is the acts of transgression, understood as boundary crossings and as meaningful acts, that 
brings such contact zones to the heterotopic realm—as the idea and space—of an-other order. 
On the other side of the racial segregationist boundary, where specific actors and organization 
from within the institutionalized Islamic field facilitated the transmutation of Islamic ideology 
into the realm of Black African resistance to oppressive modes of ordering, the heterotopic idea 
was institutionalized and advanced intersubjectively, providing religious meaning to the 
circulating political ideas. In this context of politicized proselytism, or da’wah, two organizations 
were of crucial importance to the process which brought about an Africanization of Islam in 
South Africa. The first of those organizations is the Muslim Youth Movement, mentioned above 
in the light of translating Islamic thought into a message of counter-hegemonic resistance and 
social change. HASSAN (2011: 155) labels it the only organization with significant African 
representation in terms of membership and structure. Founded in 1970, the origins of the MYM 
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can be traced back to the activities of the Arabic Study Circle of Durban (JEPPIE 2007). Its 
founding members consisted of intellectuals and professionals with no connection to Islamic 
scholars. Their intent was to make Islam and the Qur’an accessible to every Muslim, promoting 
a people’s Islam instead of an elitist one (VAHED 2000: 47). The MYM evolved from the 1960s 
onward out of the aforementioned movements in the Natal seeking to connect the secular and 
the religious spheres, and it was strongly influenced by the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s. The 
aim of the organization was to “make Islam meaningful in the day-to-day lives of Muslims” 
(VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 261) and proved particularly attractive to younger Muslims. When 
Salman Nadvi, a professor at University of Durban-Westville, became president of the MYM 
in 1974, the organization started to put specific emphasis on approaching the indigenous 
African population (TAYOB 1995: 109). From those da’wah activities originated the 
differentiation between the established and emerging or unorganized Muslim sector, i.e. the 
Islam linked to descendants of migrants from the Indian subcontinent, on the one hand, and 
that of the converts among the indigenous African population, on the other (SITOTO 2002: 5ff.; 
MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA (MYMSA) 2017: 60). In order to theologically 
educate and empower converts to Islam, the MYM’s regional branch for Natal began offering 
a Sunday Islamic School program in African border townships such as KwaMashu and Inanda 
(see map 12 above) (MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA (MYMSA) 2017: 22). 
This was at the same time an effort to combat the marginal status of the African converts(cf. 
TAYOB 1995: 111). In KwaMashu, the MYM operated in the 1970s and 1980s from the local 
YMCA office (see picture 5).34 The organization’s da’wah activities were built strongly on the 
strategy to sway politicized Africans from Marxism to Islamic thought as the ideological 
foundation for counter-hegemonic activities and resistance.35 Nadvi argued in 1983 that any 
involvement of the MYM in anti-apartheid politics would destroy the organization (ESACK 
1987: 11). Instead, Islamic ideology should offer an alternative order to the White/Non-White 
dialectic. In the 1970s, the Muslim Youth Movement established the Al-Qalam newspaper and 
launched a book and tape service. Their extensive da’wah activities and annual MYM camps 
centered around charismatic leader personalities among the Black African population, with the 
aim of creating an autonomous hierarchy among the Muslim communities (JADWAT 2012: 181).  
 
34Interview with Amin Ngubane (2013). 
35Interview with Moosa (2015); Interview with Solomon Phewa (2015); Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015). 
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Picture 3: MYM affiliate Dr. Dada (center right) talking to Ike al-Idris Nxedlana in front of the YMCA office in KwaMashu. Nxedlana later 
became a central leading figure in professionalizing the organizational character of Muslim groups in the Black African townships around Durban. 
The picture was taken in the late 1970s by Amin Ngubane. 
During apartheid, the MYM in Natal strongly influenced individuals on an intersubjective and 
communal scale through an outreach that was more socio-political than theological in nature, 
yet it was constantly denunciated by other established Islamic scholars from the field of Indian 
Islam, especially by Deobandi groups (TAYOB 1995: 154). For orthodox scholars, the MYM’s 
propagation of an Islamic way of life lacked the necessary theological commitment to Islamic 
matters. At the same time, however, the organization’s aims strongly reverberated with the 
cause of Black resistance to White South Africa, making it a Muslim version of Black 
Consciousness (TAYOB 1995: xiii), which displayed ideological similarities to issues of African 
150 
authenticity on the Pan-Africanist scale, to Black pride as a renewed sense of integrity among 
Black people, and to the indigenization of everyday politics in the lived-in places.  
The other organization which became an important institutionalized contact zone for converts 
to Islam was the Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI), based in Durban. Established 
by Ahmad Deedat and Gulam Vanker in 1957 in response to the missionary work of the 
Anglican diocese and the Dutch Reformed Church among Muslims (HARON 2006: 278f.), it 
bases its theological and proselytism outreach on comparing Christianity and Islam, arguing for 
the latter by specifically criticizing the Bible. While the MYM aimed at those politicized by 
Marxism, the IPCI became especially attractive to those interested in Islam as an-other order 
who had a Christian background and firm belief and spirituality. During apartheid and 
especially during the time of the upheavals, it became a port of call for people from Black 
African townships in their process of embracing Islam. The partial translation of the Qur’an 
into isiZulu by Umar Moleleki played an important part in this (cf. GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE 
ARAÚJO 2016: 25). Furthermore, Ahmad Deedat became a charismatic figure whose speeches 
were circulated with the help of video tapes and audio cassettes. The political effect of his work 
among the dwellers of Black African townships was based on deconstructing the theological 
foundations of Christianity, thus questioning the religiously grounded rituals and routines of the 
self and the positionality of the individual. Deedat’s message had a polemic character and aimed 
at de-legitimizing the religion that supported and justified apartheid, i.e. Christianity (cf. TAYOB 
1999a: 96). The IPCI material, mainly produced by Deedat himself, not only deconstructed 
Christianity but offered a reality where Islam can be found everywhere, e.g. by analogizing the 
Zulu understanding and isiZulu words for a monotheistic god with Islamic belief. Even though 
the general message of the IPCI was more accessible to the politicized youth of the Black African 
townships, with Deedat's speeches on tapes and cassettes gaining almost the same prominence 
as those by Malcolm X, the center had a structural problem: Its main office was located in 
Durban within the area of the Grey Street mosque. Thus, although IPCI affiliates worked for a 
time from the MYM offices in the townships, their proselytizing outreach was comparatively 
limited. Interviewed converts who embraced Islam at the IPCI criticized the role of the center 
during the interview sessions, questioning if the organization actually wanted to see Black 
Muslims being independent.36 Nevertheless, Deedat's work and the outreach of the IPCI 
complemented the image of Islam as a counter-hegemonic ideology reflected in material from 
 
36Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015); Interview with Solomon Phewa (2015). 
151 
Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam. As a South African organization with international ties, 
the IPCI offered a localized version of South African solutions for South African issues. 
The IPCI and MYM are far from the only Islamic institutions that pursued a path of proselytism 
in Black African areas during apartheid and continue to do so up until today, but both 
organizations had and still have the strongest influence on a trans-regional scale and outreach 
into the international realm of a political Islam that claims to challenge oppressive, colonial, 
White hegemony. The IPCI and MYM could both base their work among the indigenous 
African population on an organizational degree which allowed them to frequently host 
international guests for an audience of South African Muslims which broke, or attempted to 
break, the existing limitations of racist segregation and limitations of movement. In terms of 
spatial efforts, the MYM invested more in establishing a decentralized network of local offices 
and regular group meetings, while the IPCI concentrated their work during apartheid on 
producing and spreading their own religious material, which could in turn be obtained at the 
MYM offices. Both organizations managed to mobilize South African Muslims from various 
group areas to attend large events and created relatively sophisticated book networks to circulate 
Islamic literature, in both instances making use of the small gaps within the tight-meshed system 
of social and spatial modes of ordering during apartheid. This reflects the extraordinary degree 
of organizational effort invested in their outreach to a growing number of converts to Islam 
among the indigenous African population. This was not necessarily tied to a wish to serve all 
Muslims in challenge to the group areas segregation, but rather to the desire to set the agenda 
for a new and strongly politicized group of Muslims-to-be. At the same time, both organizations 
avoided pro-actively participating in or advocate for the anti-apartheid struggle, offering Islamic 
ideology and theology as an alternative, an-other order for everyday lives in the lived-in places, 
as well as the discourses for a post-oppressive state of social, religious, cultural, and spatial order. 
This move reflects the aforementioned stance of Islamic groups in South Africa towards the 
question of getting involved in earthly politics versus concentrating on a solely Islamic path 
instead. In this regard, the IPCI and MYM became attractive to different individuals, as the 
former concentrated on theological issues with a political contingency, while the latter based its 
work on a political idea of social transformation with an Islamic contingency. Nevertheless, their 
work was less an effort at “Africanizing” Islam than at providing a theological and ideological 
foundation for the contact zone, a heterotopic order for those desiring to transgress the existing 
modes of social and spatial ordering on religious-political grounds.  
On the other side of the boundary, converts to Islam among those classified as Black African 
began creating their own Africanization of Islamic ideology by creatively translating and 
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hybridizing social and cultural elements from the Islamic sphere into a concept of an authentic, 
liberated, and pre-colonial African self, which stood proudly in contrast to the colonized and 
Christianized African other. Converts quickly began to reinterpret historical artifacts, cultural 
traditions, and the social rituals of historical African belonging through the lens of Islam, 
thereby perceiving the new religion as more authentic than Christianity.  
“We African people are coming from Islam; our religion was Islam. And to bring 
Christianity, King James said, you cannot break the Muslim if you don’t break him on 
the religious side of it. For them to colonize Africa, they must have a religion that is going 
to float along and that will be used to infiltrate the African people because they respect 
religion. And then from there… they will lose everything. As Desmond Tutu said: ‘We 
had the land, you had the bible, father. How come you have the land and we have the 
bible now?’”37 
This authenticity is linked to a firm belief shared among the converts that pre-colonial African 
indigeneity had its foundation in Islam. Regarding the re-ordering of the self and the idea of 
African indigeneity, repeating similarities can be found in the converts’ self-reflection of their 
processes of re-formulating their own socio-cultural and socio-political background. Besides 
clearly religious analogies such as the oneness of God, other examples reposition a ritualistic 
Africanness anew: The red mud used by an Isanusa (diviner) to cover the skin is understood as 
similar to Islamic rituals of cleansing before approaching God through prayer in the absence of 
water, or the wearing of the Iscoco, the black headband worn by married Zulu men which the 
Mariannhill missionaries forbade (see section “Divine Modernization: Settler Colonialism and 
the Ordering of African Indigeneity”), is seen in its form and representational use as an Islamic 
artifact. Other examples given to signify the re-emergence of an authentic Africanness through 
conversion include burial practices, ritualistic slaughters, and the process of negotiating a 
marriage. Such articulations show that conversion to Islam denotes not only a history of 
resistance, especially in the case of conversions during apartheid, but also a move towards a re-
ordered African self. Thus, with the re-interpretation of the cultural practices of the ancestors, 
the act of conversion becomes an act of reclaiming one’s own history, a mode of reversion to an 
African self that could have been were it not for the colonial intervention. This indigeneity 
achieved (SHELLER 2003) through conversion is therefore perceived by the converts as a more 
powerful and meaningful mode of resistance to the oppressive environment than comparable 
 
37Solomon Phewa (2013). 
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ideologies like the Black Consciousness Movement, as these were embedded within a 
Christianized African background.  
Without a doubt, the process of reviving an ideal, pre-colonial African indigeneity in the 
contemporary world by re-contextualizing and translating it into an Islamic identity of 
indigeneity had been stimulated, at least in part, by the comparative writings of the IPCI, such 
as those relating the Islamic understanding of Allah with respective references to the Qur’an 
and the Zulu concept of a monotheistic creator god in order to argue for an Islamic root of the 
Zulu concept (DEEDAT 1981). The outstanding aspect in such cultural transmutations rests in 
the extraordinary personal and intersubjective contribution to the process of transgressing 
existing modes of social and cultural orderings by translating the self into an Islamic realm, not 
to adopt to the Islamic modes of orderings but rather to re-order one’s own indigeneity and to 
reinstate the—often idealized—rituals and routines of the forefathers, thus creating an authentic 
and liberated African self. A reality of African roots in Islam is spatially signified with reference 
to the history of early Muslims sent by the prophet Muhammad to the Negus of Ethiopia, and 
above all, the spatial signification of Timbuktu as the religious and intellectual epicenter of Pan-
African Islamic identity. As IVAKHIV (2006: 172) points out, religious communities tend to 
interact with spaces and territories within historical variables, therefore signifying the 
authenticity of the religious identity marker along a spatial path dependency. For African 
converts to Islam in South Africa, the spatial-historical link to Timbuktu enables them to signify 
their conversion within a larger framework of meaning beyond the lived-in locality or the realm 
of national politics. Conversion to Islam thus becomes a reversion to an Africanness that was lost 
through colonialism and apartheid. 
The meaningful act of boundary-crossing (see section “Conceptualizing the Challenging of Order” 
above) transmutes the idea of the other order into the social, cultural, and spatial realm of those 
who transgress. Thus, the idea of an-other order is creatively constituting by those subjects 
translating the new ideas and ideologies—in this case a politicized Islam, or an Islamic 
politicization—into the realm of their respective lived-in places and place-bound identity 
formations, thereby re-ordering the rituals and routines of the self within everyday life. Such re-
orderings occur among the converts to Islam, but they are more than often challenged by 
established Islamic organizations. The best understanding of the creative forces re-ordering 
indigeneity as Black and Muslim can be gained at precisely that point at which the translation 
of alternative ideas of order within the contact zones meets the contestations happening as these 
orders are transmuted into the socio-cultural realm of the convert. In contrast, setting 
conversion biographies as the sole focus of the analysis only reproduces an idealized narrative 
154 
of the effects and impacts of the act of conversion. Viewing conversion as the transgression of 
modes of orderings, on the other hand, seeks to identify the persistence of the lived-out practices 
of Muslimness in the lived-in places of orderly indigeneity. Transgression is an act of resistance, 
not to be understood as a singular act but rather as the continuation and repetition of practices 
reflecting the persistence of resistance, which re-order the very maps of cultural orderings within 
which the self is located. What is offered by the actors in the contact zones through their 
proselytizing activities is nothing more than another pre-defined set of orders, which the convert 
can adopt, if willing. Yet for the converts, especially those who embraced Islam in the late days 
of apartheid and were therefore spatially isolated at home from the sphere of activities offered by 
existing Islamic actors, the new maps of cultural orderings pursuant to conversion offered first 
and foremost a window of opportunity, or a state of exception in which to question and extract 
the African self, via the matrix of the new set of orders, from the existing modes of the self 
oppressively ordered as the orderly African other. In a grassroots effort, the converts overlaid the 
Islamic ideology with meaning by translating it into their own realm of idealized, pre-colonial 
African indigeneity, explaining and constituting Blackness through the new set of theological 
and cultural artifacts. In the same way as Islam was cast in an Africanized perspective, the African 
self became linked to and re-positioned within the global network of Islam, self-identifying not 
as an African Muslim but rather as being Black and Muslim. Those creative appropriations that 
produced a sense of Blackness by translating the African self into the Islamic ideology and the 
resulting mestizaje (cf. MITCHELL 2005; FORTIER 2005) of religious and socio-cultural forms 
show striking similarities to the ritualistic difference of the Islam preached and practiced by the 
Nation of Islam in the Afro-American context of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet whereas the idea of 
Muslim Blackness evolved in the United States in spatial isolation from the field of Islamic 
institutions (cf. DANNIN 2002; GOMEZ 2005), the African Muslim converts in South Africa were 
in sufficient proximity to a highly organized and orthodox realm of Islam that their grassroots 
efforts and cultural hybridizations quickly became contested, setting the process of re-ordering 
the African self on disputed grounds. 
Contestations: Re-Ordering the African Self on Disputed 
Grounds 
The desire for a liberated and re-ordered Black African indigeneity touches on issues of 
authenticity and kinship. Whereas the question of authenticity refers to a dialectic of liberation 
embracing Blackness with the contingency of a radical negation of elements that are seen in the 
light of White supremacy, kinship calls for the constitution of a new, or renewed, brotherhood 
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of Africans as Black and Muslim (cf. GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016). As described 
above, discourses of cultural transmutation and creative adoption are one aspect of the 
transformative powers of conversion; another is the aim of establishing an independent set of 
Islamic institutions and organizations. With relatively few resources, continuous attempts are 
being made to cultivate a variety of organizational structures and institutions for Muslims 
among the indigenous African population, ranging from burial foundations, such as the 
Durban-based Imbumba Muslim Foundation, to autonomously founded Islamic centers 
situated within the former Black African townships, such as the Intake center of the Sizanani 
Charity Dawah Foundation, located close to the former homeland border of KwaZulu.38 Other 
examples include self-organized Sunday classes at various homes in the townships, a clear 
continuation of the original da’wah agenda of the MYM, as well as Islamic schools for children. 
Although most converts attended Islamic courses in educational facilities like the Darul Uloom 
Islamic College in Newcastle (cf. DANGOR 2009: 110) or the Al-Salaam Center in Braemar after 
their conversion, the teaching in Sunday classes and Islamic schools within the townships is 
provided in most cases by Muslim scholars from other African countries, such as Malawi or 
Somalia, who themselves use to live in the townships.39 One of these scholars, Shaykh Ishaq 
Kasim, a born Muslim from Malawi who studied public administration in Mecca and assists 
several facilities in the African townships around Durban, sees in the lack of an independent 
group of Islamic scholars among the African Muslim converts of South Africa a core problem 
of this spatially scattered and relatively unorganized field of actors, namely a lack of local 
leadership. Since his arrival in 1986, he has seen many promising converts attend classes at the 
various religious training centers run by established Islamic institutions only to then “disappear 
into nothing.”40 Shaykh Kasim further explains that attempts have been made since the very 
beginning of group formations among Muslim converts to offer Islamic services to the 
community of Muslims in the former Black African townships, to engage in self-organized 
da’wah activities, but that most of these organizations experienced a rapid succession of 
setbacks. For him and for other respondents too, such experiences cannot be attributed merely 
 
38Interview with Moosa (2015); Interview with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015); Interview with Amin Ngubane (2013); 
Interview with Shaykh Thabani Isreal Ally Mwandla (2015). 
39Interview with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015). 
40Personal communiqué with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015). 
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to a lack of finances or organization; they must also be understood in the context of being 
constantly contested by other established Islamic organizations.  
Such contestations are not a matter of being suppressed or not tolerated by other Islamic actors. 
Nor are the grassroots efforts themselves generally seen as an organizational or even theological 
deviation from the established Islamic ways. What is happening is the reproduction of the social 
hierarchies induced by colonialism and apartheid and ascribed to the different population 
groups, with Muslim converts having to fit into the respective modes of social and spatial 
orderings. In other words, the established Islamic institutions perceive Black African Muslims 
more as a population in need of poverty alleviation and development than of empowerment 
and self-esteem. In this regard, HANSEN (2012: 258) is incorrect when she states that “hardly 
any welfare work is carried out by Muslims [from established Indian Muslim institutions and 
denominations] in the African townships.” The welfare work carried out in African townships 
by Islamic organizations either reported by the respondents or observed throughout the 
research periods is so extensive that Muslim converts perceive it as somewhat humiliating, 
instead desiring and demanding structural and especially religious recognition by such 
organizations. As one respondent commented on such welfare activities: 
“They are doing work over the African people. Indigenous people. They are uplifting 
them and so on. Obviously, they uplift us, no one doesn't uplift us, but you don't get 
uplifted. Everyone uplifts us, you see.”41 
Such stereotyping of Muslim converts from former Black African areas has been described by 
SITOTO (2002: 6) as the devaluing of African Muslims as a “charity case.” Respondents from 
the cases featured here underscore such tendencies by providing further examples, such as the 
production and use of pictures of “poor Black Muslims” for fundraising issues42 or the 
assumption that when African Muslims wearing Islamic dress enter shops run by Muslims from 
the Indian population group, they intend to beg. The latter aspect is, however, also critically 
reflected by Muslim converts, as some individuals do this, especially in the vicinity of mosques. 
Such activities can be described as opportunistic conversion, i.e. the appropriation of social and 
cultural signifiers in order to obtain social services from another group (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 97). 
Nevertheless, such contestations, set against the background of racist ascriptions and racialized 
social hierarchies, are viewed by Muslim converts among the indigenous African populations 
 
41Interview with Solomon Phewa (2013). 
42Interview with Omar (2013). 
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in the light of global colonialism and the oppression of Black people. As the respondent from 
above, continued in his comment, speaking about the welfare activities: 
“That is what Malcolm X said, you see, they speak to you as if they are speaking in front 
of a horse, or a cow. They are talking about you. You hear all that they say, but they 
regard you as if you are not there. Everybody uplifts us.”43 
African converts’ experiences of racialization and segregationist tendencies related to contact 
with established Islamic organizations stretch back to the very beginnings of their conversion 
biographies. In his account on the Muslim Youth Movement, TAYOB (1995: 150) reports similar 
issues in the 1980s. In addition, interviewed converts who went to educational facilities such as 
a Darul Uloom or to Islamic gatherings report experiencing open racism aimed at them. Saliim 
Mthimkhulu, a Muslim from Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal describes another version of such 
inscriptions of othering and foreignness to being Muslim. After he and others became Muslims 
while living in the Black African township of Osizweni, east of Newcastle, they had themselves 
dresses made that resembled an Islamic style but were made by local dressmakers out of colorful 
fabric from other African countries. Walking around in such attire, they were “looked upon by 
bystanders as being from Nigeria.” When approaching stores in town that were run by Indians, 
where they had otherwise been treated with a certain distance because of their being Black 
African, they then experienced that shopkeepers were more than willing to invite them into 
their stores, sometimes even addressing them as Shaykh. When asked if they were from Nigeria, 
they replied that they were South Africans from Osizweni, which in most cases brought the 
friendliness to a sudden stop.44 
Although these events date back to the time of apartheid, the converts are convinced that the 
reality in this regard has not changed at all. Saliim tells of his children, themselves now born 
Muslims, who still experience stigmatization and discrimination from their Non-Black 
schoolmates at their Islamic college.45 Uniting the experiences of Muslim converts in everyday 
life with the discourse of colonial oppression and social as well as spatial injustice signifies to 
what an extent the factor of race became a bodily ascription to the subject and spatial inscription 
to the lived-in locality (cf. HAFERBURG 2007). Such racialized contestations of newly 
appropriated modes of orderings are experienced not only in relation to the field of establish 
 
43Solomon Phewa (2013). 
44Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015). 
45Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015). 
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Muslims but also to the sphere of orderly Africans. Referring to a situation in Soweto, Gauteng, 
VAHED & JEPPIE (2005: 264) cite a Sotho-speaking Muslima, who embraced Islam in 1971, who 
reported that Islam is perceived by other Africans from her neighborhood as a “coolie thing,” 
linked to those who exploit South Africa’s indigenous population. This coincides with the 
experiences of African Muslims in Newcastle. There as well, the Indian-classified population 
was and still is perceived as having a dominating position. The view that African people working 
for Indians are treated and paid badly persists, kept alive by discourse and everyday life 
experiences. Islam is understood in that regard as an “Indian thing” or the “church of the 
Indians.” Suspicion towards Islam due to its perception as the import of foreigners is also 
reflected in attitudes towards people from Malawi. In that case as well, Islam is not understood 
as a major global religion but as the church of the Malawians. The situation of distrust is even 
worse when the person associated with Islam in the Black African areas is not only regarded as 
a foreigner but especially as a refugee. Bilal Kasim, the son of Ishaq Kasim, once explained that 
he avoids walking around dressed in classic Islamic attire because it causes him to be perceived 
as a Somali refugee and thus badly treated by African South Africans. According to his 
experience, traders think of him as a beggar when he dresses in a kurta while doing business.46 
Similar tensions are reported by VAHED & JEPPIE (2005) with regard to aid activities towards 
Somali refugees carried out by the African Muslim Agency (AMA) in the late 1990s, as well as 
by (TAYOB 1999a: 97), who describes the unwillingness of Muslim converts among those 
classified as Black African in the town of Brits to dress in Islamic clothing because they do not 
wanting to be called “Indians.” 
The historical path dependency of Islam in the context of colonialism, apartheid, and the 
ordering of indigeneity brings about such social and socio-spatial conflicts evolving from the 
emergence of independent fields of Black Islam in those areas once classified as Black African 
(cf. VAHED 2000; SITOTO 2003). Those contestations in the contact zones translating Islamic 
modes of orderings into the realm of ordered African indigeneity create conflicting areas, 
leading to a constant contestation of these religious-cultural and religious-political 
transmutations. On the one hand, the wish to reclaim African indigeneity by becoming Muslim 
leads to a state of alienation from the community of origin. On the other, new conflicts with 
Muslims from the established field of institutionalized Islam arise, making the attempt to express 
and practice the Muslim faith independently difficult. As a continuation of the segregationist 
 
46 Interview with Bilal (2015). 
159 
politics under apartheid and the effects of division and rule, the historically racialized, uneven 
distribution of resources and thus the related colonial structures become visible as they are 
reflected in the structural possibilities of expressing faith and acting through religious 
communities. Although these contestations persistent into the contemporary realm of Black 
Muslim everyday life, they are far from the final stroke in the narrative of conversion to Islam 
and the practice of a re-ordered African self. On the contrary, the transgression continues by 
moving the social realm of being Muslim and Black away from the sphere of contestation into 
an anticipated future for a Black Muslim society—in cultural and spatial ways. The following 
will introduce a case study of contested belongings that exemplifies this development among a 
specific group of African Muslims, who are preparing for an exodus, or a township Hijra, to 
ultimately lead the African Muslims of South Africa away from the persistent modes of social 
and spatial orderings. 
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Attempting Muslim Blackness in 
KwaMashu: The Limitations to Re-
Ordering Indigeneity within the Doxic 
Landscape 
What began as the traveling of ideas and ideologies of Muslim Blackness into the South African 
sphere, with contact zones to Islam as an-other order offered by organizations such as the IPCI 
or the MYM, brought about a slow but steady shift within the doxic landscape of the modes of 
orderly indigeneity with regard to religion. In the greater Durban area, the specific local focus 
of this study, a small number of Muslim converts can be found—together with their children, 
the first generation of native born South African Black Muslims—in each former African 
township. Mostly as a consequence and continuation of the institutionalization carried out by 
the Muslim Youth Movement, these Muslims are closely connected with each other, investing 
an outstanding degree of energy, time, and economic resources into African Muslim community 
work and the shared efforts to establish an identity of being Muslim and Black. The case featured 
in the following section is set in the township of KwaMashu, north of Durban, a place 
specifically developed by the local apartheid government to function as a border township 
between the White urban area and the homeland of KwaZulu. Here, the organizational efforts 
of converts to Islam lead to the foundation of a mosque, which can be regarded in its material 
sophistication, visibility, size, and meaning as the most important development of African 
Muslim autonomy in KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, the case also reveals the effects of 
contestations on Black Islam, as well as the impact that the conflicts with other Islamic 
organizations have had on the endeavors of those once classified as Black African to transgress 
orderly indigeneity. The case presented here represents a common sequence of events, as it is 
characterized by the dynamic cultural-political bricolage of Islamic grassroots developments 
among the Muslim converts in Black African areas, which have experienced strong 
contestations by and severe confrontations with Islamic organizations from the field of Indian 
Muslims. The broader field research related to this study documented other, similar stories and 
developments within various African areas of KwaZulu-Natal, whose comprehensive 
presentation here would exceed the scope of this study. Instead, the featured case from the 
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township of KwaMashu will serve as a representation for the contested belongings of converts 
to Islam among the indigenous African population and their attempts to continue their 
transgressions despite the persistent power of an orderly indigeneity that renders the wish for 
belonging and re-grounding a continuation of the signification as the African other. 
A Space of Not-Belonging: New Town-Ship KwaMashu 
Together with Umlazi and KwaDabeka, KwaMashu was one of the very first designated Black 
African townships near White Durban planned on the basis of British New Town principles (cf. 
MAYLAM & EDWARDS 1996: 116). Labelling the newly established townships New Towns was 
highly misleading: While the planning of New Towns was guided by the idea of creating fully 
independent habitats for living and working, the townships were still dependent on the White 
core city of Durban on a level of services and labor. Such settlements only served to cater to the 
demands of the White capitalist city, namely by housing a cheap, Non-White labor force.  
 
Table 1: Historical development of KwaMashu. Source: (MANZI 1994: 46ff.) 
Historical development of KwaMashu 
proposed in 1948 
1952: Durban City Council authorizes negotiations for land acquisition for 5,000 acres in Duﬀ 
Road area; acquisition of 2620 acres in 1954 
1956: approval by Minister of Native Aﬀairs (nine village units, two hostel units, R19,362,000 for 
land, services, facilities, etc.) 
1957: renaming Duﬀs Road scheme to Kwa-Mashu Housing scheme for approx. 123,500 people 
plus 2,500 beds in the hostels; construction takes place 
1959: KwaMashu is handed over to the Director of Bantu Administration (accommodation for 
10,000 people available) 
1963: KwaMashu scheme completed as planned 
1966: Spatial extension of KwaMashu 
1970: Recreation facilities become available (soccer fields and stadiums, tennis courts, 
swimming pools, community halls, childcare centers) 
1971: 15,404 houses for 107,000 people, plus hostel units for 16,880 people 
1973: establishment of Port Natal Bantu Aﬀairs Administration Board (commencing the work of 
the Bantu Administration Committee of the Durban City Council) 
1974: Self-governing status for KwaZulu 
1977: Jurisdiction transferred to the KwaZulu ‘Homeland-Government’ 
 
The built-up habitat of KwaMashu consisted of two forms of housing, high-density male hostels 
and family residential houses with two or four rooms, which could be rented or purchased. Only 
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one house could be owned or rented; sub-leasing or trading was not permitted at all. After the 
neighboring homeland of KwaZulu gained its self-governing status in 1974, the Durban 
townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi fell to the homeland-administration (LODGE, NASSON, 
MUFSON et al. 1991: 155). The removal of almost all Black African residents from the Greater 
Durban area to the newly created townships on the outskirts was completed, and the population 
deemed unwanted by apartheid legislation was removed from White Durban: 
“The largest towns with Zulu inhabitants are on the outskirts of Durban. Kwa Mashu is 
administered by the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board, but the official 
intention is that it should be incorporated in KwaZulu.” (HORRELL, HORNER & 
HUDSON 1975: 195) 
Even though Black African-classified people were regarded as temporary sojourners in the city 
space from that time on, the territories on both sides of the racialized border were intrinsically 
linked with each other. This is illustrated by SMITH (1990: 47) in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Segregating a Black workforce: migrant labor, frontier commuters, and permanent residents. Source: (SMITH 1990: 47). 
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The author notes: 
“[T]he KwaZulu townships are effectively part of metropolitan Durban and many of 
their residents commute into the city daily […], yet officially they belong to a separate 
self-governing territory which could ultimately become independent of the RSA.” 
(SMITH 1990: 5)  
The exclusion of KwaMashu from the territory of White Durban and the subsequent transfer 
of jurisdiction to the pseudo-independent but relatively powerless government of KwaZulu 
rendered the inhabitants of the incorporated townships foreigners in Durban, frontier 
commuters (as explained above in the section “The Spatial Ordering of Indigeneity,” see also 
maps 4 and 12), living on the supposedly international boundary between the White-inclusive 
urban and industrial core and the excluded Black African homeland-to-be KwaZulu (SMITH 
1990: 47). MANZI (1994) presents an intriguing socio-economic analysis of KwaMashu and its 
residents, exposing a cruel sense of place based on a constant feeling and knowledge of not-
belonging. The majority of the people interviewed in his study stated that—despite having been 
forcefully evicted—they initially perceived the relocation from their former slum homes to the 
housing scheme to be an improvement in housing quality at least; however, the hopes they 
projected onto KwaMashu were not fulfilled. Instead, insecurity, in terms of both social ties and 
safety, became their reality. While the costs for the newly erected public housing homes were 
relatively low, the uniformity of the poorly built, box-shaped houses together with the lack of 
maintenance and the lack of proper service facilities and communal places resulted in socio-
economic degradation, which left the inhabitants of KwaMashu with a severely low standard 
of living (MANZI 1994: 62). All the so-called improvements the White administration of the city 
of Durban promised the new housing scheme would bring to the Black African population could 
not cover the actual lack of choice and opportunity it brought, nor make up for the frustration 
that was and is experienced by the younger inhabitants, who have constantly found themselves 
“facing barriers when trying to improve their life chances” (ibid.: 63) (whereas the older 
generation has tended to find itself in apathy). The whole area quickly devolved into a state of 
social and spatial decay, brought about by a combination of violence, crime, delinquency, and 
alcoholism. All these conditions are of crucial relevance for the unsettledness inscribed upon the 
inhabitants in bodily terms, as well as for their contested longing for belonging and their struggle 
for control over the very modes of social and spatial ordering while living in the dis-orderly 
dystopia of everyday life. As MANZI (1994: 64) summarizes it:  
“The problems encountered are directly responsible for the generation of either 
demoralization or personal rebellion. […] The salient characteristics of the culture of 
‘NOT BELONGING’ include a high incidence of social ‘pathologies,’ family 
disorganization and breakdown; mother dominance and male marginality in the family; 
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the weakness or absence of male models in child socialization; self-control bringing no 
rewards, leading to wasteful hedonistic lifestyles; a belief that life is ruled by luck or 
supernatural forces.” 
Despite their self-developed sense of belongings, the places of origin of the new denizens of 
KwaMashu had been declared dis-orderly by the logics of social and spatial orderings of 
apartheid legislation. The new township was meant to be a space for the African other, ordering 
the population group into the larger scheme of apartheid segregation. In contrast, the lived-in 
reality of the relocated people quickly inscribed a sense of continuous unsettledness within the 
boundaries of the orderly planned New Town-Ship of KwaMashu, a dystopia of dis-orderly 
indigeneity. 
From the mid-1970s onwards, KwaMashu and the two neighboring townships of Inanda, which 
developed out of a mission station (cf. HUGHES 1996), and Ntuzuma became major centers for 
the work of the Muslim Youth Movement and the organization’s Africanization strategy. The 
Sunday Islamic School Program (cf. MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
(MYMSA) 2017: 22) and events meant to serve the African community of KwaMashu took 
place on a regular basis. The result was a relatively high degree of organization among the 
African Muslim congregation and a pull factor for Muslim converts from other Black African 
townships around Durban. KwaMashu, and especially the area of Section J, became an 
epicenter for Muslims among the indigenous African population. The work of the MYM in that 
area and its subsequent impact were multiplied to a great degree by the presence of the 
Malawian Islamic scholar Shaykh Abbas Phiri in KwaMashu (VAWDA 2004, 1994). Phiri, a 
charismatic personality, entered South Africa in the 1940s and settled in Ntuzuma in the 1970s, 
turning his home into a jamāt khane, a madrassa, and a meeting place for Muslims in the area. 
From the beginning, the MYM and Phiri joined forces in their efforts to bring Black African-
classified people in contact with the ordering sphere of Islam.47 His proselytizing strategies 
among the indigenous African population were built on welfare work together with the lobbying 
of Islamic activities among the traditional, local authorities (VAWDA 1994: 539). His mandate 
to speak for the African self and to be heard by authorities of the indigenous population must be 
seen in relation to his origin as a Muslim of African nativity. This is of crucial importance for 
understanding how nascent Black and Muslim indigeneity could only gain momentum when 
translated by personalities that the converts themselves regarded as indigenous. While the 
 
47Interview with Bongani (23.3.2015). 
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MYM's da’wah activities were extended into the sphere of Black South Africa, making use of 
globalized narratives of Muslim Blackness as a facilitator to transport the ideology of Islamic 
resurgence as an-other order through the contact zones and the racialized socio-spatial 
boundaries, they were still perceived as deriving from the field of Indian Muslims. The fact that 
only a person of African descent could be accepted as a leader and transmitting intermediary 
for the converts to Islam underscores the degree of racial segregation and racialized modes of 
orderings resulting from three centuries of White domination. Another personality ascribed the 
quality of an indigenous leader is Imam Issa al-Seppe, a convert from the Black African 
townships who became a chairman of the Muslim Youth Movement (SITOTO 2002, 2003; cf. 
LE ROUX & NEL 1998). His death in 2002 is described by Black African Muslims still today as 
a tragedy and the heavy loss of a leader.48 Presently, the aforementioned Malawian-born Islamic 
scholar Ishaq Kasim is widely regarded by Muslims from former Black African areas of Durban 
as the successor to indigenous Islamic leaders such as al-Seppe or Abbas Phiri: 
“When Essa Al-Seppe passed away, ay, every African Muslim said, now we are in 
trouble. He was a leader; he was a great leader. The quality of leadership. He had 
everything. Now we got another Shaykh, we call him a shaykh, Kasim Ishaq. He is 
another great scholar. He is the only one that we have, an indigenous Muslim.”49  
The persistence of the modes ordering indigeneity up until today presupposes a racialized 
ascription to the question of who is mandated to represent the African Muslim community. The 
early converts to Islam from KwaMashu formed a committee with the purpose of erecting a 
mosque in KwaMashu. Phiri facilitated the process and the necessary fundraising and later 
became head of the mosque. Before it was established as a solid building, the mosque started in 
a provisional tent (see picture 4). In the 1980s, the mosque became more than a religious place: 
It hosted a variety of welfare initiatives and social programs, ranging from educational courses, 
to feeding schemes and sports programming, such as Karate classes and its own football team, 
the Mosquitos.50  
 
48Interview with Shaykh Dawud Cele and Shaykh Thabani Isreal Ally Mwandla (2015). 
49Shaykh Dawud Cele (2015). 
50Interview with Shayk Ishaq Kasim (2015); Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015). 
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Picture 4: Provisional KwaMashu mosque, probably in the late 1970s. Picture: Amin Ngubane. 
At the same time, a number of the converts to Islam from different Black African group areas 
who were active in the foundation and construction of the mosque decided to move into the 
vicinity of the building in order to materialize the creation of a Black Muslim community and 
to make Islam more visible in the African township: 
“I felt that all the group who were Muslim in that town must all go and buy houses next 
to the masjid so that we can support the masjid and that people can easily know that this 
is a Muslim. And fortunately, most of the guys who were part of us at that time all had 
their houses here at J Section. I am counting who is late, Abdumalik is also late, Cassiem 
was at P Section, though others have moved out from the township, we were all 
concentrated in this area. With the hope that, because our intention was to try first 
Islamize J Section. Let people in J Section become Muslim so that we can be able to 
spread Islam throughout the township. Even our letterheads were KwaMashu-Ntuzuma 
Muslim Association because we originated from Ntuzuma. So, we expand to 
KwaMashu. So, we grew up, I bought this house in 1983, and Idris [see picture 5 above] 
also bought another one, also in 1983. We all stayed within this area since then, in the J 
Section. After 1985, I resigned my job. I started with, both of us Idris and I, we start 
business here in the center because we wanted to be seen doing our prayers as it has 
been stated by the Quran.”51 
 
51Amin Ngubane (2015). 
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The founding of the mosque created momentum for community building and intensified the 
grassroots approach to Islamic education and the religious appropriation of Islam among 
Muslim converts. The vision for a re-ordered lived-in place was based on the image of the ideal 
Muslim community of the prophet Muhammad and the first congregation of Muslims, forming 
a spatial nucleus around the mosque. Guided by scholars such as Abbas Phiri and Ishaq Kasim, 
who mainly organized the social activities in the 1980s, the converts read and discussed the 
Qur’an and other Islamic sources, learned about the Hadith (the verified expressions of the 
prophet and the second most important scriptural source after the Qur’an), and educated 
themselves in the history of Islam, especially from a Pan-Africanist perspective. As a result of 
the Black Muslim ideologies from the Afro-American realm circulating among the converts and 
serving as a foil to the re-ordering of indigeneity as Black and Muslim, the new theological sphere 
was imbued with a strong connotation of social justice. These discursive processes were most 
definitely influenced by the work of the MYM that brought the religious dimensions of Islam 
together with the desire to have an impact on everyday life, and they offered the converts a way 
to contextualize their existence as the African other and locate it in a larger framework of 
oppressive Western and Christian regimes. At the same time, aside from such religious-political 
implications, the shifting of the routines of everyday life through the newly adopted rituals, such 
as keeping strict prayer times and the associated washing rituals, or the visible wearing of dress 
inspired by the new Islamic perspective, led to a constant re-ordering on the level of the bodily 
subject. Creating visibility was important for connecting the social impact and change with the 
new normality of Islam as everyday life practice. 
Each step the grassroots development of Muslims in Black African townships took in 
transgressing the modes of ordering indigeneity was answered by contestation from other 
Islamic organizations from the field of so-called Indian Muslims. The institutionalization of a 
growing number of African Muslims did not happen independently but was supported from the 
very beginning by funds from other Muslim organizations or families. In the view of the 
interviewed converts, such help and funding were not per se problematic; however, a growing 
number of Muslims among the newly founded congregations viewed it in light of the hegemonic 
relations and segregationist hierarchy among the different population groups during apartheid 
and began to perceive the influence as oppressive: “Indians enslaved the whole system, telling 
you what to say and to do.”52 Based on the Islamic principle of zakat, the welfare-related 
 
52Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2013). 
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fundraising and religious obligation to share one’s wealth, the Islamic financial landscape and 
the structure for collecting funds for Islamic developments saw a certain professionalization 
during the second half of the twentieth century. The Muslim Youth Movement founded its own 
Zakah fund, which later became the South African National Zakah Fund. Furthermore, the 
Youth Movement created the financial investment company Jaame. In addition, two Islamic 
banks, the Al-Barakah bank linked to a wealthy family from Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Bank 
of South Africa, grew in importance to the structural development of Islam in South Africa (cf. 
TAYOB 1995: 182). The construction and development of the mosque in KwaMashu was 
mainly funded by these banks.53 Parallel to receiving funds from such organizations, the new 
converts began to create their own institutional structure. The aforementioned KwaMashu-
Ntuzuma Muslim Association became the first attempt to do so, with an organizational structure 
consisting only of Muslims from Black African areas. To finance welfare activities and social 
events, each Muslim belonging to the congregation had to make a weekly donation. As the 
number of converts grew, so did the funds. At the same time, a discourse of making the mosque 
financially independent from other Islamic institutions evolved among the Muslim converts. 
However, not all of them supported such a move, criticizing that this would only run along the 
lines of those racist modes of orderings they had hoped to overcome by joining a brotherhood 
of Muslims with an ordering logic beyond the sphere of apartheid.54 Nevertheless, while the 
structural support from Indian Muslim organizations was seen as a help in terms of funds, it 
was also perceived as an attempt to control the Islam preached and discussed in KwaMashu.55 
These tensions led to a split in the group after the circulation of an article from a Saudi-Arabian 
newspaper in the 1990s that mentioned an additional donation given to the mosque of the 
indigenous African converts. Some of the converts demanded to see the money, and an open 
conflict about the legitimacy of the mosque leadership broke out. The dispute led to a certain 
disillusionment among the congregation, a subsequent discrediting of the group, and a loss of 
religious followers. Respondents who were active during that time pointed out that many of 
those from the townships who had been attending prayer times and social functions could be 
found at the Shembe church after the conflict broke out. The remaining Muslim converts had 
to realize that the Shembe, or Nazareth Baptist Church, was a direct competitor of the Islamic 
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54Interview with Bilal Zizi (2015). 
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ideology when it came to acquiring followers in the Black African townships, who sought a 
religious authenticity and native religiosity. 
“Shembe? Those people, they are supposed to be Muslims. But I cannot see where it 
went wrong. And Shembe is a very big church because it comes from an indigenous 
African. If Islam from that time it came from a Black person, it would be all over. Many 
Muslims, Black Muslims, who left Islam they went to Shembe.”56 
Within the religious sphere of transgressing the African other resulting from the modes of ordering 
indigeneity, Shembe had a decisive advantage over Islam among those once classified as Black 
African, as it builds on a reputation of originating from an indigenous African leader, not only 
in terms of organization but also of theology and religious rituals. As an African-initiated 
church, the Shembe belief system builds strongly on merging Christian elements with rituals 
deriving from pre-Christianized African religions. Especially among the Zulu, Shembe enjoys 
a good reputation and is endorsed by the existing traditional leadership structures (cf. RIEDKE 
2016: 53).  
In reaction to the conflict over the donations from Saudi Arabia and the influence of Non-
African Muslims on the KwaMashu mosque, the splinter group founded the Organization of 
African Muslim Unity in 1997 (cf. SITOTO 2003, 2002), named with obvious reference to the 
Organization of Muslim Unity founded by Malcolm X after his parting ways with the Nation 
of Islam. They built their own jamāt khane, a house for prayers and religious functions, two 
blocks away from the KwaMashu mosque. The impact and outreach of the organization has 
remained limited up until today, although theie jamāt khane has become a vibrant space for 
African Muslim activities. With the modes ordering indigeneity consisting of spatial and bodily 
inscriptions, the conflicts and contestations between the field of Indian Muslims and those 
converts to Islam seeking African indigeneity as Black and Muslim became more than just 
religious-political disputes over institutionalized power relations. The transmutation and re-
ordering of the African self is a transgression of the very body of the African other as deliniated by 
the social and spatial modes of order that defined indigeneity—for the African subject as well 
as for people of other classifications, e.g. Muslims once classified as Indian, who had come to 
look at the indigenous population as the other. The developments around the KwaMashu 
community reveal that the contestations around the contact zones run deeper than merely the 
question of who is organizing the mosque. Transgressing orderly indigeneity by means of Islam 
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touches the spheres of social disputes and territorial struggles, as well as the scale of the body as 
the realm where resisting and transgressing the permanence of inscribed modes of orders 
becomes a highly contested and difficult task. The following section will present a case from the 
township of KwaMashu which highlights these bodily dimensions of the politics of 
indigenization in the context of Islamic ideology.  
KwaMashu Cemetery: Death, Deathscapes and Politics of 
the Corpse 
In September 2015, news circulated about a Muslim cemetery being reopened in the former 
Black African township of KwaMashu. Its origins can be dated back to 1908, with five Muslim 
graves from the Dhooma and Bassa families still on site. The cemetery is situated close to 
Inanda, the neighboring area of KwaMashu and the assumed place of residence of the buried 
families (SUDER 2015a). The head of the Islamic Burial Society, Ahmed Paruk, is cited in the 
Al-Qalam online newspaper saying that more cemetery space is needed due to an increasing 
influx of Muslims from the Indian sub-continent and African countries, especially over the last 
ten years (SUDER 2015a). No reference is made to African Muslims from the KwaMashu area 
or any other Muslim community from neighboring townships. This is even more curious, as the 
KwaMashu mosque, which had been established under the auspices of converts from the Black 
African-classified population in the 1970s and 1980s, is included in the preliminary planning 
for the reopening of the graveyard. These plans include extending their building with a ghusl 
khane, where the ritual washing of the body of the deceased is performed. At the same time, a 
small graveyard next to the mosque, established by Muslim converts from KwaMashu 
themselves, is poorly maintained. The aforementioned Imbumba Muslim Foundation, a burial 
foundation established in 2011 by Muslims from former Black African areas of KwaZulu-Natal, 
is linked to these efforts to finance and organize Islamic burials for African Muslims, and the 
setbacks they have experienced reflect the struggle for independent facilities for that group. The 
reopening of the cemetery and the associated connotations of superiority and inferiority along 
the lines of racial and colonial population groups can be approached by understanding the 
specific configuration as a deathscape (KONG 1999, 2001a, 2004; MADDRELL & SIDAWAY 2010), 
i.e. as meanings invested in space through place-making processes anchored in matters of death, 
dying, mourning, and remembrance (cf. forward by Lily Kong in MADDRELL & SIDAWAY 
2010). A space of mourning reflects not only the sensual, emotional, bodily-inscribed, and 
ascriptive qualities of the scape but also the power relations within and between social groups. 
Thus, it is considered an expression of power politics with the potential to express and manifest 
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and hence secure hegemonic positions over time. Following MADDRELL & SIDAWAY (2010: 4f.), 
deathscapes, are thus a way of understanding contemporary social processes and the intersection 
of society, space, and power. The extent of such thinking and the spatial scale of the scape can 
range from artifacts such as roadside memorials (HARTIG & DUNN 1998), to burial and 
memorial sites like cemeteries or columbaria (TEATHER 1998; KONG 1999), or even complete 
sections of an urban space, appropriated in its meaningful significations by death, memory, and 
power. (KONG 1999: 3, 6f.) provides the example of the Tel Aviv city square in reference to the 
assassination of the former prime minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin.  
Deathscapes “illustrate the constructions of nations and the politics of internation [sic!] 
relations. […] [M]eanings are invested in deathscapes which speak about the power relations 
between nations” (KONG 2001a: 217). In this regard, the fact that the KwaMashu cemetery was 
reopened by a group of Muslims described by the interviewed converts as Indians represents 
the perceived superior positioning of the one population group (Indian) over the other (Black 
African). Against the backdrop of the segregative politics of colonial South Africa as well as the 
social, economic, and spatial interventions of apartheid, this conflict resembles the scale of the 
previously mentioned relations between nations (cf. ibid.) and represents the persistent divisions 
stemming from centuries of division and rule. CHRISTOPHER (1995) provides us with an 
intriguing analysis of the cemeteries in the city of Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape of South 
Africa. He reveals that a racial segregation within the burial sites ultimately gave way to a 
segregation of the cemeteries themselves along the lines of racialized segmentation of space after 
1948, the year when the National Party gained power over South Africa and began instituting 
apartheid. Such patterns have been replicated throughout South Africa, with the effect that the 
radical segregation of space and society in terms of religion and race (ibid.: 45) is again 
reproduced in the example of the Muslim graveyard in KwaMashu. This cemetery reopening 
fails to include all Muslims, thereby revealing territorial tensions among the population groups 
brought into social and spatial existence by apartheid. 
Contestations through space for death can, as KONG (1999: 3) identifies, evolve around three 
major fields, i.e. the sacred vs. the secular, within and between constructs of sacredness, and as 
power relations along the lines of gender, class, and race. Those aspects apply too in the featured 
case. First, Muslims from the KwaMashu township avoid entering the old cemetery as it is 
located in proximity to the former workers’ hostels and therefore sits in a socially problematic 
area: 
“We [Muslims from KwaMashu] do not go there because of the area as we could be 
seen there and then could get into problem with gangsterism at the location. […] It is 
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easy for the Indians to go there because they could just come and fffft [blows air through 
his teeth], in and out.”57 
Here, not only do the racialized aspects of the deathscape come to the fore but also the different 
secularized positions of the actors in relation to the locale of the cemetery. While both actor 
groups may share the inherent sacredness of a Muslim graveyard, they decode the socio-spatial 
implication of the secular space of the hostels on various levels with different implications for 
the everyday lives of the actors that want to access the cemetery.  
Those workers’ hostels or compounds can be found around all major industrial cities of South 
Africa. They date back to a system established at the beginning of the twentieth century that 
was set up to facilitate accommodation to an all-male workforce from the indigenous population 
working in the industrial sector or the mines. Those men were initially hosted on a private basis, 
mostly in so called backyard quarters (DAVIES 1991: 76). The municipal administration 
perceived them as a migratory workforce and thus as temporary sojourners. The social reality 
of the workforce-related influx developed differently than the cities and their administrators had 
anticipated, threatening the idea of an orderly, exclusively White urban space in colonial South 
Africa. 
Durban followed the same path as the other major metropoles of twentieth century South 
Africa, experiencing an intense influx of people classified as non-White or non-European into 
the vicinity of the industrial growth areas surrounding the harbor city. The majority settled 
outside of the city limits which created unplanned, informal settlements. Most prominently 
among these was Cato Manor, an area that persisted throughout the whole period of apartheid 
despite its complete demolition and thus became a symbol of territorial resistance to the spatial 
racism of the system (see amongst others MAHARAJ 1994; POPKE 2001).  
With the expansion of the borough of Durban in 1932 and the beginning of racial demarcation 
in the 1950s, most of the workers were relocated to hostels in the newly built Black African 
townships, such as Umlazi or KwaMashu. The living conditions in the overcrowded and under-
facilitated compounds were bleak, best represented by the example of the sanitary conditions 
provided by the so-called shit-bucket system, run by shit workers who collected the buckets from 
each compartment (cf. HEMSON 1996: 166).58 Nevertheless, the hostels were run by the city for 
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as long as there was a need for cheap workforce and the South African city space attracted 
workers from the rural areas (SMITH 1990; MAHARAJ 2002a, b). No longer facilitated by the 
municipality as worker’s hostels for the male, migratory workforce, today, most of these old and 
often deteriorated housing areas in the African townships of eThekwini, the post-apartheid 
metropolitan municipality that includes the city of Durban, are either afflicted by severe social 
problems and crime or at least perceived as such by the neighboring population. This not only 
implies a socio-spatial efficacy for the specific location of the former worker’s hostels but also an 
ascription of ordering towards the subjects that enter such spaces, especially on a regular basis. 
For a person who is not an inhabitant of the KwaMashu township, such as Muslims from other 
areas, and those who have not been classified as Black African, the ordering scheme and the 
place-to-subject ascriptions only act upon them for a limited time. In contrast, a Muslim who 
lives in KwaMashu may not be able to avoid a longer tie to the socio-spatial implications related 
to that space, because they remain within its social sphere, leading them to naturally fear getting 
involved in issues that stem from that area or raising the suspicion of being so among other 
people in KwaMashu. The negative ascriptions evolving from the hostels are also linked to the 
history of in-fights among the population of the former Black African areas in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, as the hostels’ inhabitants represented a different fraction from the majority of 
those living elsewhere in KwaMashu.59 
Such differences in the ascription of secular or sacred significations to certain places reveal the 
contestations which are—against the backdrop of a history of territorial segregation and social 
stratification along the lines of race and class—profoundly in place, thus making the reopening 
of an old graveyard more than just an issue of reviving the function of a religious place. As part 
of the micro- to meso-scale of Durban’s doxic landscape of social and spatial modes of orderings, 
the place of the graveyard and the differences in its accessibility represent a deathscape, a place 
of contestations between the sacred and the secular, constantly reflecting the stratifications of 
socio-spatial power relations along the lines of racial inscriptions. 
A second aspect further reveals the reopened graveyard as a space contested according to 
different constructions of sacredness (KONG 1999: 3). Several interviewed converts mentioned 
their skepticism about being able to be buried at the reopened cemetery at all because they are 
not accepted by the established Muslim groups: “We were not even invited [to the reopening]. 
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I read about it in the news. The usual people were there, yes, also some of the long-standing 
African Muslims. But they do not represent us.”60. 
Sacred space is inherently contested space: It is neither elusive nor constituted but taken, 
negotiated, defended, and re-appropriated. It reflects the overall power structure of a society 
(cf. CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995: 15f.). Conceptualizing the graveyard as a deathscape helps 
to understand the perceived and enacted control over territory by a single group. Death, burial, 
and mourning become matters of control over access, exclusion, and inclusion. Spatial and 
practical connections to and interactions with the graveyard thus depends on the “interpretive 
potential of the site” (CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995: 3) and the sacred place becomes a 
reflection of the persisting tensions among a society divided by apartheid. The powerless actors 
become spaceless and are left fighting over death practices and even the bodies of the 
deceased—over the politics of the corpse. 
One specific example occurred in 2015 during one of my research periods: The story spread 
quickly among members of the Black African Muslim community and became a reference for 
identifying and aligning oneself in the power-play between indigenous converts and born Muslims. 
Allan Idris Mabaso, a convert from KwaZulu-Natal, passed away while residing near 
Heidelberg, south of Johannesburg. Being the only Muslim convert in his family, his relatives 
refused to have him buried according to Islamic regulations, instead insisting on a Christian 
burial. However, his wife Fazila Mabaso was able to stop those burial plans through a court 
injunction, and Mabaso’s body was handed over to Muslims who traveled to Heidelberg to 
retrieve the corpse. Nevertheless, a vocal Moulana from the mosque allegedly demanded 
verification that the deceased was indeed a Muslim. While the Imam Moulana Cassim Jada, 
who dealt with the case, say that claim is utterly and entirely untrue and that the mosque works 
closely with the African communities, catering to disadvantaged African Muslims (SUDER 
2015b), the current President of the Muslim Youth Movement Thandile Kona stated that  
“Part of the problem when it comes to burials is the ostracism and isolation faced by 
Muslims of African origin. We are in limbo, not fully part of the Muslim community and 
seen as having deserted our ‘own’ communities and families. Non-Muslims see the 
disparities in the Muslim community, and some have experienced discrimination at the 
hands of Muslims… and they can’t understand our embracing of what to them is a 
‘religion of Indians.’ Therefore, when an indigenous Muslim dies, the family and the 
non-Muslim community from which he or she comes, see an opportunity to ‘reclaim’ 
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their own who had lost his or her way. The attitude is ‘you had him/her in life, you can’t 
have him in death.’” (Thandile Kona as cited in SUDER 2015b) 
Along the divisions within one religious faith, the politics of death are not only tied to 
contradictory claims to territory and power but also extend to the body of the deceased, thus 
producing the politics of the corpse within the framework of deathscapes. In what seems to be 
a case of self-determination regarding the question of where to be buried, the divisions stemming 
from the colonial heritage of the South African society come to represent the self through the 
suffering of the group, i.e. Black African Muslims. In the case of Black African Muslims, 
therefore, death and burial involve conflicts over territory, bodies, and the practices of dying 
and mourning, while at the same time representing the overall situation of belonging neither to 
the group of origin (Black African) nor the group of redefined belonging (Muslims).  
Finally, the reaction of the Imam of the Heidelberg mosque points to the third major field of 
Kong’s contestations through spaces of death described above, i.e. the intrinsic power relations 
along the lines of race, class, gender, and ethnicity. Confronted with the conflict over verifying 
that the deceased was a Muslim, the Imam questioned mentions that Islamic institutions have 
a strong relationship to the believers in the Black African areas because they specifically cater 
to disadvantaged African Muslims. Thus he automatically associates Muslims from those parts 
of society once classified as Black African with being disadvantaged. This discursive interlinkage 
again represents the persistent inequalities that are lived out along the lines of racial divisions 
through South African society: Converts from the Black African part of society do not feel fully 
integrated into the Muslim community, because they are regarded as poor and disadvantaged 
subjects. At the same time, the established Muslim institutions that can be linked to the category 
of Indians do not understand this critique of treating Muslims unequally, because they do help 
disadvantaged African Muslims who are newcomers to the religion of Islam. The category of 
Black African is perceived as well as experience as the inferior, which represents and reenacts 
the racialized classifications in their hegemonic order as it was defined during the apartheid era, 
from White at the top to Black African at the bottom. 
Throughout the different research periods of the featured case studies, one of the initial 
questions I posed to new contacts among the Muslim converts was about forms of self-organized 
Islamic institutions. Somewhat surprisingly, in many cases the very first attempt at self-
organization had been the establishment of a burial society. It was not the formation of an 
Islamic center, a community group, or a circle for religious education, but the setting up of a 
society to care for the deceased and raise funds for the members’ burials that was the focus of 
efforts to manifest a self-determined Black African Islam. The rather strict Islamic rules 
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surround the death and the burial of a Muslim may be one reason for this. Nevertheless, the 
example of the conflicts surrounding the KwaMashu cemetery presented here reveals the 
intricate politics of the religious self-determination of subjects set within a religious landscape 
where religion was and still is a colonial tool, and where the politics of self-determination are 
strongly limited by the scope of acting them out in territorial, material, symbolic, and practical 
terms. Therefore, as the territorial and spatial aspects are largely unattainable, the material, 
symbolic, and practical aspects of self-determination become the centerpiece of power over the 
self and the group. In this regard, control over one’s own body is regarded as a quintessential 
symbol of success, while the control over a corpse equates to control over the representation of 
a new order of practices and identity. 
With reference to TUAN (1978), (CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995) highlight the importance of 
posing the simple question of the “meaning of the sacred,” thereby exploring various dimensions 
of experience, definition, wholeness, order, and power in order to understand the entanglements 
of sacredness and space beyond traditional, culture-bound images (a shrine, a temple, a bishop 
being consecrated (cf. TUAN 1978: 84)). While sacred space is nothing more or less than space 
of apartness and definition, which is separated, delineated, and cut off from the surrounding 
homogeneity experienced in profane space (cf. KONG 2009b), it is the “[s]acred phenomena 
[…] that stand out from the commonplace and interrupt routine” (TUAN 1978: 84). The case 
of the Muslim cemetery exemplifies how religious place-making is experienced as an 
interruption of routine within the lived-in places, which fails to wholly break with the social and 
spatial orderings of the persistent racialized dialectics of us and them, of those ascribed with 
more power than the other by the old regime of White minority rule. Symbolizing the post-
apartheid liberties of Indian Muslims, who are able to restore their place-boundedness in the 
former Black African segregated areas, the reopening of the Muslim cemetery in KwaMashu 
does not question but rather reifies the routines of social and spatial racialization. Spatial 
appropriation is still enabled by a hegemonic relationality between the former race groups. 
Therefore, Islam may stand as an anti-order to the spatial inscriptions of apartheid, but it is not 
an-other order, a heterotopia, or state of exception to the persistent socio-spatial ascriptions, 
restrictions, and injustices experienced by those who lead their everyday lives within the former 
Black African townships.  
Thus, the reopened cemetery becomes a space of contestation for the Muslims among the 
indigenous African population of KwaMashu, who are left without power and mandate as a 
result of persistent race relations. Given the inability to act as African Muslims in religious-
territorial terms, the politics of the corpse become a pivotal positionality within contestations of 
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the persistent order. Expressing the need to follow Islamic rituals is a political message aimed at 
delineating the self from the Christianized and therefore colonized Africanness in the Black 
African townships. Therefore, establishing self-organized burial funds and organizations is an 
intriguingly important step for converts to Islam among the indigenous African population, 
though it is a step that is often accompanied by experiences of failure. Nevertheless, while the 
self-determined institutionalization of Islamic societies from within the emerging field of Black 
Muslims in South Africa is still strongly contested by established Islamic organizations, the 
politics of the corpse seem to be an equally if not more important field for organizational energy. 
While actors from the field of established Muslim organizations claim the politics of the 
territoriality of Islamic burials as one of their fields of influence, the African Muslims interact 
and engage with the politics of the Black and Muslim corpse, rendering Muslim Blackness—
even in death—a transgression of existing modes of social and spatial orderings. 
The examples provided in this chapter concerning attempts to re-order indigeneity within the 
realm of Black Islam show that the processes of conversion in the contact zones and attempts to 
Africanize Islam in South Africa on disputed grounds are leading to a more fundamentalist 
stance in the Africanist tendencies of some of the converts. The message of African authenticity 
and the religious indigeneity of Islam is being translated into a wish for African homogenization, 
understood as a racial exclusivity. Founding independent Islamic institutions and organizations 
within the Black African areas has not only been a matter of proselytism, historically or today; 
such activities can also be aimed at creating “100% pure Black Muslim” structures.61 
Transgressing socio-cultural modes of order of the African other have become less an aspect of 
authenticity than of purification, thus resembling the racist ascriptions of colonialism and 
apartheid. The Islamic message has not been able fully transgress or transcend the racist 
tendencies between the Indian and African population groups. Although conversion to Islam 
offered and offers a measure of hope for social change (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 99), it was and is still 
perceived as an “Indian thing.”62 The orthodoxy of the established Islamic scholars from the 
field of Indian Muslim organizations has contributed to these racialized tendencies and 
prolonged their existence into the era of post-apartheid South Africa. “Truth has become 
synonymous with the Ulama and to question the Ulama means questioning the truth” (VAHED & 
JEPPIE 2005: 262). Thus, after more than thirty years of emerging Muslim Blackness, 
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transgressing orderly indigeneity is still a work in progress. The break-away group of Muslims 
in KwaMashu who founded their own jamāt khane continue with their transgressions by 
following a path of self-reformation of Islam in order to self-appropriate Africanness. In a 
common development among politicized Muslims in South Africa (ibid.), they have attached 
themselves to a Sufi Shaykh, who preaches promises of a new era of indigenous Islamic 
hegemony, as the following chapter of this study will illustrate. 
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Continuous Transgression: Departing 
Orderly Indigeneity 
When people from Black African group areas engaged with concepts of Muslim Blackness 
during apartheid, they did so in order to ground themselves in an ideology that allowed them 
to deconstruct the existing modes of social and spatial orderings in a truly transformative way. 
Islam as religion, way of life, and socio-political foundation became a window of opportunity, a 
heterotopic space which made it possible to question the oppressive orderings of indigeneity as 
the African other and therefore the routines of everyday life in their lived-in places. As an element 
of orderly African identity, Christianity came into question as well. Re-thinking their own lives 
through the theology and Non-White history of Islam led converts to reposition the Christian 
religion, shifting it into the realm of the oppressive order, while they came to understand Islam 
as the revolutionary African way. Inspired by examples of Muslim Blackness from the Afro-
American context and the re-ordered model of an Islamic nation created by the Iranian 
revolution, the Black African-classified converts to Islam found a way to embed the South 
African discourse of Black Consciousness into a framework of social and cultural 
transformation, which promised to eventually succeed. While the support provided by Islamic 
organizations in the contact zones and by born Muslims from other African countries facilitated 
the emergence of a field of indigenous African converts to Islam, the spatial segregation of the 
converts’ lived-in places not only necessitated organizational autonomy but also led to a 
grassroots moment transmuting the African self into the Islamic realm. Having a religious as well 
as political scope, these developments were often in positions contradictory to organizations 
from the established field of Muslim communities and institutions and their perspectives on an 
Africanized Islam. Such contestations began to gain momentum, especially after the end of 
apartheid and the subsequent permeability of the former segregated group areas. While the re-
ordering of African indigeneity on such disputed grounds led to disillusionment for some, others 
saw the contestations as a continuation of oppressive colonial-hegemonic race relations, thus 
viewing their evolving Muslim Blackness as a continuous transgression of persisting modes of 
orderings. The break-away group from the KwaMashu mosque is one example for such 
attempts to create new foundations for an Africanized Islam in contrast to the local field of 
Muslimness. In their search for spiritual leadership, the group became attracted to a Sufi 
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movement which offered more than a foundation for the re-ordered self in the places of 
everyday life. As will be explained in the following final case of this study, the Sufi movement in 
question also offers a vision for a new order, beyond the lived-in locale and beyond the failed 
post-apartheid promise. By uniting the message of a global emergence of Islamic liberation for 
oppressed indigenous people with the specific social and spatial modes ordering the South 
African sphere, the movement extends the new promise of what can be called indigenous 
millennialism, which—it is believed—will eventually lead the oppressed indigenous Africans out 
of those spaces that continually ascribe oppression to the African subject. This final empirical 
chapter discusses these continuous transgressions. In order to provide a concise understanding 
for the magnitude of the Murabitun ideology in the context of Blackness in South Africa, the 
following section will first discuss the teachings of the Shaykh of the Murabitun, Abdulqadir as-
Sufi. Some academic accounts on the Sufi order exist (LE ROUX & NEL 1998; HERMANSEN 
2000; HARON 2005; ARIGITA 2006; DOUBLEDAY & COLEMAN 2008; BUBANDT 2009, 2011; 
ROSÓN LORENTE 2014; PASTOR DE MARIA Y CAMPOS 2015), but none of them so far has payed 
attention to its actual ideological basis. As the writings and teachings of this movement became 
a central focus in the interviews and group discussions of the research at the heart of this study, 
this chapter will try to close this critical gap in the analysis of the Murabitun order and their 
fundamentalist influence on the identity of some Black and Muslim South Africans.63 
Indigenous Millennialism: The Religious, Social, and 
Spatial Promise of Black Muslim Indigeneity 
In the early 1980s, Abdalqadir as-Sufi, a Scottish convert to Islam and founder of the Murabitun 
Sufi order,64 began with his ideological outreach and da’wah activities (Islamic missionary work) 
in South Africa. His involvement specifically aimed at those parts of the population that were, 
under the racist logics of the apartheid state, classified as Black African. He started preaching a 
millenarian promise of Islamic revival in a global context of anti-Western and anti-capitalist 
thought. His message is contingent on the racialization of belonging with absolute and 
fundamentalist differentiations between a Muslim us and a kuffar, a non-believer them. His outreach 
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64The term “order” for Sufi groups is to a certain degree misleading, as it may imply a centrally organized hierarchy. 
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the central focal point in organizational and spiritual terms (cf. MARTIN 2004: 680f.). 
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soon attracted those searching for an alternative spiritual and political basis for transgressing 
the social and spatial modes of ordering in their lived-in places. In a social setting where 
indigeneity was defined and regulated to perfection by an oppressive White minority in order 
to support and justify the differentiation of domination and subordination along the dialectic of 
White/Non-White, the Murabitun message offered a re-ordering of the indigenous African 
identity, an Africanization of the self and belonging. While the preaching and teachings of Abdalqadir 
as-Sufi construct imaginings of belonging to a greater ideal of being Black and Muslim, imagined 
as a home and territory, the propagation of Sufi practices such as dhikr, the ritualistic praising 
of Allah, facilitate the shared experience of the coming other order. With its vision of radical 
transformation, Murabitun ideology taps into the pulse of dissatisfaction in deprived Black 
African areas, providing not only meaning for the continuing experiences of injustice but also a 
vision of an Islamic era of indigenous African liberation and supremacy and the creation of a 
new human of indigenous quality. As the discussion below will show, the translation of 
Murabitun ideology into the realm of Black politics is linked to (a) the imagining of a counter-
hegemonic and counter-colonial tradition of Islamic revivalism and (b) the framing of an 
indigenous millenarian scenario within an anti-Western set of conspiracy theories. This 
discussion will then continue with the issue of projecting Blackness as a political ideology and 
realm of resistance and transgression onto the Islamic narrative offered by the Murabitun. 
Uniting these two facets will shed light on the spiritual and political foundations upon which 
people base their self-perceptions as Black and Muslim individuals, in hopes of transforming the 
given conditions of their social ordering. In the context studied here, the Murabitun narrative 
has fallen on fruitful grounds, promising the coming of a caliphate as millenarian salvation and 
a golden era of freedom, justice, moral rule, and the reestablishment of tawhid, the unity with 
god. As BUBANDT (2009: 113) points out, the “Murabitun tawhid is a post-secular utopia.” It 
unfolds as a promise that indigenous Africans will rise in a coming earthly millennium of social 
restructuring. The cornerstones of this vision are an indigenous millennialism and an Islamic 
revivalism. This section first analyzes the development of the Murabitun order in South Africa 
and the impact of its ideology against the backdrop of the promise of an end time for the 
persisting modes of segregation and injustice. It then asks how indigeneity as Blackness is 
merged with a Sufi-oriented vision of a purified and revived Islamic community. Finally, the 
impact of indigenous ideology on the researched group of African Muslims will be discussed. 
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Millennialism: The Meaningful Narrative of Social Transformation 
Leaving aside false predictions of the dawn of various millennia and new orders and 
disappointed expectations of a coming apocalypse, millenarian ideology is one thing above all 
its diverse religious, conspiratorial, and political aspects: It is the uncompromising belief in a 
meaningful narrative of social change and transformation. This is why the end of times as 
discourse, symbolic significations, and intersubjective practices needs to be taken into account 
in conceptual thought beyond the field of religious studies. In the case of South African converts 
to Islam, both the belief in social transformation and the awaiting of a new era are of crucial 
importance, especially for those previously classified as Black African under the racist regime of 
apartheid. For them, the struggle to resist and transgress the persistent power relations deeply 
inscribed into society and space and the striving for change are today more a matter of belief 
than something to be readily expected in the form of a just and de-racialized post-apartheid 
state. The promise made to the people of South Africa in the early 1990s, and politically 
manifested in the metaphor of the rainbow nation, can itself be understood as millennialist to a 
certain degree. However, now disappointed expectations seem to overshadow the secular 
prophecy of social transformation. Instead, the radical modernism of apartheid and its multi-
scalar social and spatial segregation along the lines of racially constructed population groups 
can be understood as the fulfillment of the millenarian project of White supremacy, which began 
with the politically mythologized exodus of the Dutch Boer settlers from the Cape Colony on 
the Great Trek (cf. DIJKINK 2006: 203). Apartheid, the divinely-ordained social separation and 
spatial segregation achieved by means of cultural ordering, became a paradise for the 
dominating minority and a real-life dystopia for the subordinated majority (DODSON 2000). 
Even though the White settler colonialists were in many ways influenced by religious ideology, 
Dutch Calvinism in particular, the apartheid project is a form of secular millennialism (cf. 
BARKUN 2003: 15ff.), or as proposed by LANDES (2011: 27f.), an innovative millennialism (in 
contrast to a restorative form) aimed at bringing about a modernist utopia of orderly society, a 
world of perfection. Resistance to the racialized orderings of apartheid was influenced to a great 
degree by grand narratives of social transformation such as socialism and communism. 
Religious blueprints for new modes of ordering on a macro-scale, such as the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, also gained prominence in the struggle against apartheid (LEHMANN 2006), 
being viewed as a path to a faithful and promised land (cf. LANDES 2011: 21). These aspects 
also indicate how the differentiation between secular and religious millenarian scenarios is 
difficult to maintain in a time of globalized cultural hybridizations and political bricolage. To 
speak of a “geopoliticisation of religion” and a civil millennialism (DIJKINK 2006) seems to be 
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more appropriate, as the manifestations of opposing orders are increasingly aligned with 
geopolitical factors. Although the religious dimension is increasingly being reoriented from its 
eschatological position to a socio-political one, the basic conceptual idea of millennialism as the 
“apocalyptic” renewal in the here and now of earthly life remains in place (cf. LANDES 2011: 
21).  
In terms of a conceptual understanding of millenarian ideologies as political discourses, 
symbolic significations, and social practices, we must consider the scale of the individual in his 
or her social environment holding on to a promise of a coming new order. It is on this scale that 
the discursive construction of a social world consisting of public and hidden transcripts (cf. LANDES 
2011: 21) is intersubjectively translated into the reality of the lived-in places, thus becoming a 
layer of supposedly extended knowledge of hidden truths of an otherwise disguised reality. Thus, 
in the case of Muslim converts from Black African areas of South Africa, the millennialist 
perspective renders the embracing of Islam not only a matter of resistance to and transgression 
of persisting modes of social and spatial ordering, but also a spiritual and political promise of a 
new order to come, the hidden transcript of an unavoidable transformation. In addition, 
because colonial rule did not only bring segregation and oppression with it but also Christian 
missionary efforts, entering the sphere of Islam essentially questions religiously legitimized 
colonial ascriptions, as it offers a radical and revolutionary break with the spiritual link to the 
oppressors’ religion. For the African converts, the narrative of a divine future of social orderings 
that will overcome and overthrow the existing regime arose through interaction with the Islamic 
revivalist ideology of the Murabitun.  
Murabitun Ideology as Indigenous Millennialism 
The Murabitun under Abdalqadir as-Sufi are one of the ‘newcomers’ to the contemporary field 
of mystic Islamic orders in South Africa, though they are far from the only Sufi tariqah with an 
agenda of social development and transformation (cf. HARON 2005: 284ff.; VAHED 2001: 321f.; 
SMITH 1969). The origins of the Murabitun order, or the Shadhili-Darqawi Sufi tariqah, is 
linked to the conversion biography of the Scottish playwright and actor Ian Dallas. He claims 
to have been initiated in Morocco by Shaykh Muhammad ibn al-Habib al-Darqawi in the late 
1960s. In the mid-1970s, he started his own tariqah in Norwich, England and took up position 
as Shaykh under various changing names (al-Murabit, al-Darqawi, as-Sufi). Accounts of his 
biography can be found in the few publications that discuss the Murabitun (BUBANDT 2009, 
2011; HARON 2005; HERMANSEN 2009; LE ROUX & NEL 1998; PANKHURST 2013; PASTOR DE 
MARIA Y CAMPOS 2015; ROSÓN LORENTE 2014). While some dates vary, these accounts 
184 
reproduce a similar narrative of the order’s central personality, which seems to stem from the 
image cultivated by Abdalqadir as-Sufi and the way in which he mythologizes his own 
biography. He documented his ‘coming of age’ in the form of an autobiographical novel, the 
Book of Strangers (DALLAS 1988), which portrays his transformation to a Muslim in a narrative 
manner and presents his personal story as an inspiration for followers. Moreover, the book 
serves the religious legitimization of Ian Dallas as the charismatic leader of a Sufi tariqah. The 
construction of this mystic personality cult is further assisted by the work of one of his very early 
followers, Abd al-Haqq Bewley, who has also engaged in translating Islamic texts. Abdalqadir 
as-Sufi appropriated Sufi-oriented teachings and practices and hybridized them in light of a 
spiritualist search rooted in a growing criticism of Western culture and capitalistic ways of life, 
subsequently projecting his anti-capitalistic sentiments and an epistemology of postmodern 
deconstruction of the modern nation state onto Islamic mysticism (cf. HARON 2005: 286). For 
HERMANSEN (2009: 34), such religious-political narratives in opposition to Western modernism 
are a common trait of Sufi movements founded by Western converts. As-Sufi’s own conversion 
biography reflects the search for religious roots and ritual groundings beyond the sphere of the 
‘old’ European world, which became a trend in the 1960s and 1970s, especially among young 
intellectuals. In the introduction to their edited volume on Sufism in the West, DRESSLER, 
GEAVES & KLINKHAMMER (2009: 2) refer to this trend as a re-sacralization and an 
“Easternization” of Western spirituality, in which religious—and especially mystic—thought 
and practices from beyond the West are perceived as a higher state of being, superior to a 
“soulless materialism” of a corrupted Western environment. Among other groups and in other 
places, the Sufi tariqahs of the Maghreb, Morocco in particular, became attractive to those 
searching for spiritual answers and worldly truths, as they offered meaning to hyper-modernized 
subjects in post-World War II Europe. This reception of Sufism as a universalist spiritual 
antidote and the import of mystic practices and teachings led not only to proselytism but also 
the marketing of Eastern spiritualities and a commodification of Sufi-related cultural products 
and rituals in Europe and North America (ibid.). Ian Dallas/Abdalqadir as-Sufi and the 
Murabitun movement must also be seen in light of this political-religious trend of the twentieth 
century. The order quickly expanded to other places on the globe, such as Granada, Spain, 
where they began planning the Granada Mesquita Major in the 1980s, celebrating its 
inauguration in 2003 (for an account on the mosque worth reading, see COLEMAN 2008). 
Another example is the San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas, Mexico (see GARVIN 2005). The 
order’s success and attractiveness is linked to a millennialist message of a future order of 
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indigenous liberation and superiority that can be achieved by means of an Islamic revivalism in 
religious as well as social terms. As PANKHURST (2013: 182) sums it up: 
“Their ultimate aim is the destruction of the global capitalist banking system and the re-
establishment of the caliphate, to be achieved through the creation of Islamic trading 
communities around the world, which would undermine the existing world order and 
naturally bring about the emergence of Islamic rule.” 
Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s anti-hegemonic, anti-Western ideology had been present in South Africa 
since the late 1970s, when his political and socio-religious publications circulated among young 
Black Africans who were becoming politically active in the struggle against apartheid and racist 
oppression. Thus, before as-Sufi entered the country himself, his publications could be found 
next to those with a Black Power background emanating from the United States as well as 
conspiratorial writings such as The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, the famous forged 
revelation of an international Jewish conspiracy, and other books on supposedly hidden global 
power structures (see LANDES & KATZ 2012b). While such publications were in most cases 
censored or even forbidden by the apartheid regime, the Murabitun writings where not affected 
by those control mechanisms and evaded censorship, presumably due to their religious 
appearance.65 
Three books were of crucial importance to those seeking new spiritual and political belongings 
in Islam and thus to the travel and translation of Murabitun ideology into the South African 
situation: Jihad. A Groundplan (AS-SUFI 1978), Letter to an African Muslim (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 
1981), and Root Islamic Education (AL-MURABIT 1993). The first invited Black African-classified 
readers to link their own resistance to the White-dominated modes of social and spatial ordering 
to the greater cause of a global anti-hegemonic and anti-colonial struggle. It circulated beyond 
Muslim networks and was frequently referred to by the Murabitun followers interviewed in 
KwaZulu-Natal as a clear instruction manual on how to deal with the given situation of 
oppression under racist orderings and how to prepare for resistance. In contrast to the wide-
spread perception of Islam as the “church of the Indians and Malawians” (see section 
“Contestations: Re-Ordering the African Self on Disputed Grounds”), the book Jihad. A 
Groundplan offered the perspective of a global politicized realm of Islamic ideology and a new 
spectrum of politics of difference beyond the White/Non-White dialectic of apartheid South 
Africa: 
 
65Interview with Umar (2015). 
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“To the kafir who enters Islam – he finds he has joined the most radical and the most 
beleaguered minority group in existence - and yet behind them stand millions of muslims 
in the chains of kafir-controlled regimes. To enter Islam is to enter struggle. But a 
worthwhile one that places a person immediately in a world community.” (AS-SUFI 1978: 
22) 
The work is a 48-page summary of the anti-Western Islamic revivalist teachings of Abdalqadir 
as-Sufi. By presenting a selective, anti-hegemonic history of Islam, the Western model of the 
nation state and the society living in it are described in anti-Semitic terms as being based on the 
usury of Jewish banking. Consequently, “masonic” democracies need to be overthrown and 
replaced with true Islamic leadership. The writing contains a fundamentalist core with repetitive 
elements of them vs. us dichotomy, with the enemy other being constructed as a hidden global 
elite of freemasons, with members of the academic world—linguists, anthropologists, and 
historians in particular—being described as an element of the oppressive system (cf. ibid.: 7). 
Together with the postmodernist deconstruction of concepts like the nation state or civilization, 
a future Islamic world order is presented as the justice-providing successor to the present state 
of the world. As-Sufi hit a nerve with indigenous Africans in apartheid South Africa when 
writing about the oppressors’ construction of tribes as a means of domination and demanding 
the rebuilding a self-declared Islamic understanding of tribalism and indigeneity that breaks 
with the cultural hegemony of White Christian rule (cf. AS-SUFI 1978: 18). Further, his writing 
includes an indigenous millennialist promise that the next age of mankind will “fall to the lot of 
the new southern ‘nomadic’ societies who will take over from the ‘settled’ (i.e. industrial) 
societies in the north” (AS-SUFI 1978: 20), which will be fulfilled in a setting under Islamic social 
rule.  
The political inclinations of this Islamic ideology and its unambiguous rejection of any non-
Islamic discourse like democracy or socialism, even those working against such oppressive 
systems as apartheid, are continued in the Letter to an African Muslim. The latter book had a similar 
format and scope and made its way to South Africa and into the segregated Black African 
townships and homelands through Muslim networks, such as the outreach programs of the 
Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa and their Muslim book service network (cf. TAYOB 
1995: 150). It is described by converts as a concise analysis of the exploitation of the African 
continent and the realities that indigenous Africans have experienced under White colonial rule. 
In continuation to Jihad. A Groundplan, it argues for rejecting forms of resistance that build on 
Western-democratic or socialist-communist ideologies as intrinsically wrong and unfitting for 
the African situation. By way of a postmodern and post-structuralist critique turned political 
message, Abdalqadir as-Sufi extends his deconstruction of the Western nation state by including 
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colonialism as well as the development paradigm, thereby making his message applicable to 
eras beyond the official end European colonialism. 
He projects his apocalyptic perspective of transformation onto the African continent by arguing 
along a combination of geopolitical and religious lines, thus claiming that the history of 
missionary and colonialist endeavors has suppressed the truly liberated existence of Africa as an 
Islamic continent, which needs to be revived. “There is no question but that the future destiny 
of Africa is Islamic” (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 43). For as-Sufi, the old colonies have been 
recast under the “new dependency” of capitalist economic exploitation, under which their 
governments depend on the wealth and welfare of the former colonizers. Without directly 
outlining the logic of the argument, he presents a hidden power which has taken control of the 
continent in the wake of development and modernization, bringing with it crime, amorality, 
concentration camps (sic!), and among other horrors, thus destroying an “indigenous nomadic 
life,” which in his words and without further explanation is said to be vital for the future of the 
human race. Subsequently, he foresees an Islamic revival, coming to put his vision of future 
power-relations into practice:  
“There is little doubt that young Muslims alive today will live to see the beginnings of 
Islamic rule again, the re-establishment of the shari’at, even to the return of permitted 
slavery, with the now ruling white colonists themselves become the slaves of the Muslims 
under halal and just control.” (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 41) 
These arguments have been singled out by interviewed followers of the Murabitun movement 
as one of the most important eye-openers. Its attractiveness and impact can be grasped by 
interpreting the text as an inversion of the politics of resistance during the late phase of apartheid 
that was targeted at overcoming racist and racialized segregation, exploitation, and 
dispossession by dismantling the White minority regime. Instead, the control of state, territory, 
and society should pass over to the majority of inhabitants of South Africa, once classified as 
Non-White. Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s line of thought runs deeper still, as it predicts a new 
colonialism in succession of the current state of oppression and presents the very means of 
resistance and striving for independence as being themselves entangled in the logics of the 
supposedly hidden power structures. Thus, only within the realm of Islam as religion and 
societal order can a true revolution happen. Murabitun ideology not only deconstructs the 
politics of resistance offered to those whose daily lived-in reality is one of segregation and racial 
marginalization; it also destabilizes the attempts to reposition the self in the field of ‘color 
politics’ by labeling that whole field a false arena, in which even the tools of resistance are pre-
defined by an omnipresent power structure. Then, a promise of a future Islamic order is made: 
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“The road to the liberation of Africa and the raising up of Africa, and to being finished 
with this tragic hundred years just gone by, is clear. liberation from exploitation and 
degradation and the horrible christian nexus of prostitution and alcoholism and the theft 
of resources. Liberation from the mythic fantasies of marxist materialism which nowhere 
liberates and everywhere enslaves, a doctrine created by jewish intellectuals (Marx, 
Lenin and Trotsky were all rabbinically educated) to destroy her enemies, and that 
includes Islam. A new Islamic century is beginning.” (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 47f.) 
What is already sketched out in the Letter to an African Muslim as the millenarian blueprint, an 
Islamic revivalism on the basis of the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence and the adherence 
of Al-Malik’s major work, the Al-Muwatta‘, is then further developed in the book Root Islamic 
Education. In most cases, that publication is distributed directly by the Murabitun to new 
followers and serves as an instruction manual for the re-ordering of the self and social 
surroundings. It argues for a purification of the (indigenous) self by following a purified Islamic 
ideology, which draws on a scripturalist approach to Islamic thought emphasizing adherence to 
the Qur’an and hadith, the authenticated expressions of the prophet Muhammad. This purified 
Islamic ideology leads to a mode of governance that is intriguingly spatial. It idealizes Medina 
as the city of the Prophet and the life of the first community of Muslims as the perfect form of 
Islamic ordering to which Muslims need to return to: “The Islam of the Messenger of Allah […] 
was achieved, was laid down, did happen, did last, did endure, and then was swept away” (AL-
MURABIT 1993: 15). In contrast to other religious millennialist ideologies, which project the 
coming new order onto something that is for now in illo tempore and an illo loco (cf. discussion 
above with reference to ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 263), Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s vision for a future 
community and Islamic order includes connotations of spatial order tied specifically to the place 
of Medina, as it would be today had it not been subject to historical developments. The 
imagining of the Salaf, the first generations of followers of the prophet Muhammad, is precisely 
projected onto that city, rendering it a promised land lost. This leaves the different Murabitun 
communities with the obligation to rebuild the imagined city and community in their own living 
places, according to the principles of tasawwuf, the Sufi ways. By bringing Salafi Islamic 
revivalism together with the strict adherence to the Islamic jurisprudence of the Maliki school, 
Abdalqadir as-Sufi sketches out an instruction manual for how to govern this future socio-
religious Islamic landscape, offering a pure scholarship for a purified territory. In the same way 
that his promise projects the lost city of Medina as the ideal place, it casts the last Ottoman 
Empire—in his regard lost as well to the developments of modernism in the twentieth century—
and its governmental system of the caliphate as a role model for governing Islamic society in a 
post-capitalistic and postmodern way. This millennialist space as the purified place for a revived 
Islamic order is a powerful narrative, as it allows as-Sufi to create an ideological blueprint 
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landscape through Murabitun teachings and communal practices. This ideological landscape is 
layered on top of the reality of the followers’ lived-in places, thus always reinforcing the promise 
of the better place to come and enabling followers to experience an emotional connection to 
that coming order today. 
For Abdalqadir as-Sufi, all forms of Islamic governance after the first community represent a 
corruption of the social, spatial, and communal ideals of the Islam of the first ‘Salafi’ generations 
of Muslims (AL-MURABIT 1993: 172). Political change is not to be brought about by religious 
practice alone, as it is seen to be rooted in political action, a claim of social and territorial 
hegemony, and a framework of politics of differentiation and difference, of us and them. This 
activist and interventionist re-positioning of the otherwise spiritual sphere of Sufi practices and 
thought entails an absolute rejection of orthodox Islamic scholarship, criticizing it as being 
detached from social realities, as well as its theological message, which fails to induce change in 
the lived-in situation (cf. AL-MURABIT 1993: 13). Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s stance towards what he 
sees as the body of Islamic scholars is based on a critique of the social distance of theological 
Islamic knowledge. In contrast, he argues for taking religious practices out of the sacred places 
and into the public, linking it with da’wah activities, while at the same time moving Islamic 
obligations such as the zakat into the realm of political action. In the early days of Murabitun 
activity in the Black African areas, this aspect led to a series of incidents that damaged the public 
image of the order, from which it still suffers today. The claim that “Africans should retake their 
natural possessions in Africa, with force if necessary” (LE ROUX & NEL 1998: 11) was put into 
action under the first Murabitun Amir, Abdurahman Zwane, by forcing members of the African 
Muslim Agency and the Islamic Missionary Society to hand over money as zakat. Although 
justifications for such actions can be found in Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s writings (cf AS-SUFI 1996: 
92f.; PANKHURST 2013: 185f.), the incidents were condemned, and Zwane was eventually 
replaced. Still, the basic attitude of how to put the ideology into practice continued, as a regional 
Amir explained:  
“People actually were scared of Murabitun because we were just straight forward. When 
things were wrong, we just mentioned that, and we did whip some people for doing 
wrong things. We whipped them. That’s it. And we even promised the Indians a 
whipping also.”66 
 
66Umar (2015). 
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In socio-economic terms, religious and social orderings are to be purified in the name of 
revivalism by establishing a post-capitalistic communal life based on economic activities of trade 
“hand to hand” (AS-SUFI 2014), as it is projected onto the imagined original Islamic community. 
Breaking away from the “usury system” of banking and paper money is a core argument in 
Murabitun thought and practice and has been taken so far as to propose minting gold dinars 
and silver dirhams as a future Islamic currency (BUBANDT 2009, 2011). Until recently, this 
minting program was a central piece of the political outreach of the Sufi order, with Umar 
Vadillo serving as the intellectual frontrunner of the project. Now however, interviewed 
followers explained that as-Sufi has stopped emphasizing the issue (cf. AS-SUFI 2014). Still, the 
post-capitalistic narrative proves to be outstandingly powerful among Murabitun followers in 
the Black African townships of KwaZulu-Natal. The instruction to circumvent capitalism and 
the experienced injustices of economic relations by changing the very practices of economy on 
a personal and communal level resonates with their constant longing for changes in the modes 
of social and spatial order, as well as their struggle to belong in a society which is still 
characterized by racialized stratifications. Interviewed Murabitun followers are strongly 
convinced that escaping capitalism by changing the practices of economic exchange is a political 
necessity pursuant to their embracing Sufi-oriented Islam, as well as a foundation for the 
bringing about a new order. 
The utopian perfection of an imagined first community transforms the Islamic revivalist 
narrative into a revivalist millenarian project for a future Islamic world order. Between Islamic 
revivalism and indigenous millennialism, Murabitun ideology has had a decisive influence on 
converts to Islam from those Black African townships and homelands who have come in contact 
with it. Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s writings and teachings promise a world to come, in which the 
expression of the African self will be possible, unbounded from the religious as well as social 
orderings of a society that has been culturally influenced by the work of Christian missionaries 
and politically dispossessed by White Christian colonial regimes. The dimension of Blackness 
stemming from the indigenous perspective on Islamic practices and spirituality is expressed in 
the imagined incompatibility of the emerging Black Islam with the established Indian-related 
Islam. The preached rejection of orthodox Islamic scholarship plays an important part in this. 
However, what broadens this dimension is the positionality of Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s millennialist 
message between prophecy and conspiracy, and the subsequent radical othering. These aspects 
will be discussed in the following section before moving further into the realm of the translation 
and hybridization of indigenous millennialism into the realm of a self-declared identity of 
Muslim Blackness. 
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Sufi Millennialism between Prophecy and Conspiracy 
Sufi movements from outside of South Africa and their charismatic leaders hold a specific 
attractiveness to Muslims in South Africa and converts to Islam in particular. In his brief 
discussion of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani order and their activities in South Africa, CASSIEM 
(2007) refers to this as a post-apartheid Sufi resurgence, in which Sufi shaykhs are ascribed a 
higher degree of credibility, authenticity, and trust compared to Imams that were trained in the 
Islamic scholarly institutions of the Arab world, who are reproached for preaching Wahhabi 
Islam. Moreover, in the historical context of apartheid South Africa, orthodox scholars of the 
‘Ulama’ have had to struggle with the stigma of being seen as collaborators of the oppressive 
regime of White minority rule, who refused to join the resistance (JEPPIE 1991; TAYOB 1990). 
Furthermore, as newcomers, able to move for some time outside of the inscribed and ascribed 
racialized orderings, foreign Sufi movements have been able to more easily approach the 
population in the former Black African areas. This is especially true of those with a narrative of 
undoing injustices against disadvantaged communities. However, in this context, the Sufi 
messages also become translated into a realm of political fundamentalism, an inherent effect of 
the radicalization resulting from apartheid’s radical modernity of racial segregation and 
oppression. The Murabitun must also be seen in this light. As a charismatic personality with a 
ritualized and mythologized personality cult promising a global Sufi brotherhood, Abdalqadir 
as-Sufi can be interpreted as a prophet of an Islamic revivalism that falls somewhere between 
apocalyptic analysis and millennialist promise. The specific indigenous quality of his work rests 
in his assumption that the current social orderings will be overthrown and replaced by future 
societies ruled from the South. For the assessment of apocalyptic narratives, LANDES (2011: 32) 
proposes a model consisting of two axes: one locating the apocalyptic narrative between the 
poles of cataclysmic and transformative scenarios and the other representing the roles of the 
believers in the narrative on a continuum from passive to active. Murabitun ideology represents 
a very clearly transformative scenario of the ultimate change of orderings on all scales, from the 
individual to the globe. The role of the believer in this ideology alternates between active and 
passive. While calling followers to take things into their own hands, as-Sufi also prescribes a 
reactive position of preparing oneself and awaiting the moment of action. Intriguingly similar 
to a ‘sleeper cell’ approach, his preaching fits in well with the overall conspiratorial connotation 
of the presence of a hidden menace. His ideology draws on stands of argumentation that deliver 
enough information for followers to opt into it, while keeping the writings vague enough to allow 
followers to fit their own situation into the overall narrative. 
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At the same time, his ideological underpinnings strongly build on anti-nationalist positions, an 
aspect which renders his message attractive for the indigenous Africans of South African. He 
indirectly teaches those who were deprived of citizenship and participation in national society 
throughout colonialism and apartheid to reject the transformational project of a democratic, 
post-apartheid South Africa and to strive instead for a territorialized social order, i.e. the 
building of a new state for a new order that is defined by the logics of Islamic revivalism. 
Although Abdalqadir as-Sufi advocates at certain points for bridging the ethnic divides—as 
these politics of differentiation are interpreted as an inherent element of the powers of the 
modern nation state (cf. AS-SUFI 1978: 38), his message should not be mistaken as an inclusive 
one. Rejecting the social and political ordering system of the nation fits into his deconstruction 
of Western democracies and his extremely selective and partially distorted analysis of the history 
of globalization, while at the same time constructing cultural politics of difference between us 
and them, between the Muslims as the future leaders of the world and the unbelievers. 
Additionally, his continuous anti-Semitic inclination builds on conspiratorial beliefs of a 
“dangerously misread” and “undoubtedly existent dimension of freemasonry” as the underlying 
power structure secretly controlling the globe, mainly through economic policies and the control 
of financial markets (AS-SUFI 2000: 74). In this ideological reality, Muslims are the victims of 
and, at the same time, the only future hope against all injustices brought about by supposedly 
just democracies (cf. AS-SUFI 2000: 78). These democracies are in turn viewed as machine-like 
systems with “unprincipled and hypocritical politicians serving the needs of a deciding and 
dictating system of bureaucracy in the background” (see also AS-SUFI 1978: 41ff.), while the 
public is “interfaced (sic!) through media and assembly halls” (cf. AS-SUFI 2000: 9f.).The answers 
to these hidden threats—the ‘true’ reasons for oppression and injustice—are then sketched out 
within an Islamic agenda which continues the revivalist perspective and the adherence to 
Malikism found in the Root Islamic Education and perpetuated the “Ribat Model” described in 
Jihad. A Groundplan, a scheme to be “inwardly and outwardly equipped to establish an Islamic 
society according to the Madinah pattern” (AS-SUFI 1978: 40). The latter publication, from 
1978, demands that individuals form communities that concentrate their work on religious 
purification by studying and preparing for the coming battle through the Sufi practice of dhikr, 
combined with training in tactics and combat, before going into solitary retreat and awaiting 
the moment when his or her “inner eye is opened and he is freed from fear of creation and lack 
of provision” (ibid.). 
Building on this ground plan, the agenda in the Technique of the Coup de Banque represents a 
fundamentalist message of oppositional binaries, of chosen sides, in the anticipated battle (see 
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AS-SUFI 2000: 81f.). Here, humankind and human-made laws enslave and impoverish, while 
Allah and divinely given rules enrich and liberate; humanism destroys civilizations, while Islam 
is their creator; and democracy lacks the compassion that Islamic governance provides. In 
addition, the constitutions of states are presented as false scriptures for legitimizing violence, 
while the “revealed book,” the Qur'an, provides the necessary license to fight and kill the kuffar, 
the non-believer. Concerning humanism and unbelievers, Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s position is 
defined more precisely in the follow-up publication Sultaniyya, in which he writes that  
“the modern kuffar, by that I mean the atheist, the secularists, the christians, the jews, 
the buddhists and the hindus […]. They are the humanists! How could this ignorant, 
savage horde create a civilisation knowing nothing and believing nothing? […] 
Constitutions are forged Qur’ans.” (AS-SUFI 2002: 18) 
Murabitun ideology essentially constructs a millenarian scenario against the backdrop of 
apocalyptic conspiratorial ideologies common to the contemporary, secular millennialist 
movements of the twentieth century. Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s promise of a new (world) order is 
therefore more a matter of aggressive conspiracy theory than of messianic outlook. It stands in 
stark contrast to the millenarian content of contemporary Sufi orders with similar global 
aspirations, such as the Haqqani-Naqshbandi (cf. GEAVES 2001). However, as-Sufi’s writings 
and teachings do resonate with conspiratorial publications like the ‘classic’ conspiracy theory 
found in the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, a book found on the bookshelves of various 
Murabitun followers, which was regularly discussed in interviewing sessions as a proof of the 
imperialist control of the apartheid oppressor. LANDES & KATZ (2012a: 11) point out that 
conspiracy theories are a way to bring sanity to the cognitive dissonance of modernity by 
delivering holistic visions of social homogeneity, which are only hindered by threats from the 
outside. In his account on the role of the Protocols in contemporary political discourse, BERLET 
(2012: 207) extends this argument by stating that: 
“All conspiracist theories start with a grain of truth embedded in preexisting myths and 
prejudices, which movement leaders then hyperbolize. People who believe conspiracist 
allegations sometimes act on those irrational beliefs, and this has concrete consequences 
in the real world. Conspiracist thinking and scapegoating on a mass scale are symptoms, 
not causes, of underlying societal frictions. Nonetheless, the spread of conspiracy theories 
across a society is perilous to ignore because scapegoating and conspiracist allegations 
are toxic to democratic civil society and are tools used by cynical demagogic leaders to 
mobilize a bigoted mass base.” 
Murabitun ideology works along these lines, while its leader’s biographical background reveals 
an embeddedness in the very same dissonance of modernity common to the post-war generation 
in the West. The ideological and fundamentalist narrative links Islamic mysticism to anti-
Semitic conspiracy theories on the level of economic accusations. The weak economic status of 
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Black Africans is credited to Jews manipulating the economy through the banking system and 
the issuance of paper money (cf. BERLET 2012: 188). Instead, the Murabitun encourage their 
local groups to make themselves economically independent from the surrounding ‘masonic’ 
system of a kuffar capitalist society, previously going so far as to propagate the use of their own 
gold dinar and silver dirham as currency (BUBANDT 2009). The millennialist revelation promises 
a post-capitalistic, post-usury life in a revived community of indigenous Africans. The social 
program for bringing about this transformation in the lived-in places is embedded in a vision of 
Islamic revivalism. The critique of orthodox scholarship is directly linked to the call to get 
involved in religious terms in order to bring about change in the here and now. Linked to this 
radical framework is the practical realm of Sufi-oriented Islamic rituals, which work to facilitate 
the formation and maintenance of smaller, de-centralized groups of Murabitun followers. By 
preaching the importance of dhikr, of praising Allah within a mystic ritual, Abdalqadir as-Sufi 
creates a repetitive scheme of communally shared practices, which create ‘unorthodox’ sacred 
spaces as heterotopia for the everyday life, and thus foster the upholding of Murabitun ideology 
through Sufi practice. Much of this can be seen as rooted in as-Sufi’s own conversion biography, 
as discussed above. What could be termed a fundamentalist filter-bubble allows analogies to 
similar isolated, counter-hegemonic Muslim groups such as the Nation of Islam in the United 
States (cf. LIPSTADT 2012). It explains the attractiveness of the “religio-political,” or even 
“religio-geopolitical” (cf. DIJKINK 2006) ideology to converts from contexts of resistance to 
Western hegemony and the modernization of societies, as in the case of indigenous Africans in 
South Africa. 
Towards a Black Islamic Millennialism: Projecting Blackness onto 
Murabitun Ideology and Practice 
Millennialist ideas of cultural-political transgression and social transformation based on an 
ideological framework of Muslim Blackness are popular among people of color living under 
racist oppressive regimes, including but certainly not limited to the South African situation. The 
Murabitun phenomenon bears a striking resemblance to the Nation of Islam in the United 
States and its pull-effects as a radical, counter-hegemonic and anti-White movement that 
merged Blackness and Muslimness into a religious message of millenarian outreach with a 
racialized contingency (see CURTIS 2006). Moreover, on both sides of the Black Atlantic 
(GILROY 1993; for a comparative account on Black and Muslim identity politics across the 
Atlantic, see GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016), movements have been founded by 
converts to Islam that entail the projection of the socio-political struggles of converts and their 
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cause of resistance onto an Islamic framework, which allows their self-defined expression in a 
cultural realm that is articulated in opposition to the White Christian oppressor. The Nation of 
Islam did in fact play a role in many conversion biographies among Muslims from Black African 
townships. Malcolm X in particular is repeatedly referred to as an inspirational figure, merging 
Black power with a powerful expression of resistance. “Many embraced Islam because of 
hearing of Malcolm X. So, there were video tapes, audio tapes, some books that were written. 
[…] It made sense to us.”67 While the American context of Black Power served as a source of 
inspiration, the organizational ideas of the Nation of Islam were not translated into the South 
African context in a magnitude comparable to the Murabitun movement. This is because the 
core of the message was perceived as American centered and therefore unfitting for the South 
African struggle. Besides, resistance to apartheid had its own ideological development of 
Blackness. Out of the political activities of students in the 1960s and 1970s, the Black 
Consciousness movement developed. Its founder and leading figure Steve Biko argued for 
Blackness as an inclusive, counter-hegemonic category of political identity (cf. MACDONALD 
2006: 115f.; HOWARTH 1997). Black Consciousness transformed the category of “Non-White” 
within the racialized dialectic of a White/Non-White South Africa into “Blackness”—a realm 
of shared suffering and shared struggle (cf. FREDRICKSON 1995: 301). Those who were not 
White but did not challenge the modes of order remained “Non-White.” Ideologically 
disassociated from phenotypical racism and associated instead with the realm of activism, 
Blackness became defined by the cultural-political dimensions of shared identity and counter-
culture (GILROY 1993). At the same time, Steve Biko’s ideology can be understood as the 
programmatic political translation of the dismantling of logics of symbolic power (cf. BOURDIEU 
1989; SCHUBERT 2008), i.e. the acceptance of the subordinate position as a necessary 
counterpart to actual subordination. 
“Social transformation and a true humanity could only be achieved once a 
counterhegemony to the dominating values and practices of the white superstructure 
had been prefigured in the opposition movement. Internalized acceptance of racial 
domination among the oppressed stemmed from low self-esteem and feeling of self-
hatred, conditioned by the prevailing ideology of white superiority and black inferiority.” 
(ALLY & ALLY 2008: 172) 
The ideology of Black Consciousness influenced the struggle of the younger generation in the 
Black African townships and homelands and thereby became meaningful on an individual level 
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for converts to Islam. It also provided the foundation upon which Islamic organizations could 
link their political message with the cause of resistance to racist oppression. This was true of the 
political self-understanding of the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa, for example, an 
organization founded in the 1970s in the wake of global Islamic resurgence and inspired by 
modernist Islamic scholars such as Qutb or Mawdoodi. As one of its former members points 
out, the Muslim Youth Movement “wanted to politicize [the] youth with an Islamic perspective, 
to create an awareness and develop a leadership that would serve the struggle via Islam” 
(JADWAT 2012: 182). The propagation of an Islamic way of life and the promise of a subsequent 
transformation of the self and society reveals a millennialist dimension in the programs of the 
Movement, which most certainly had an impact on Black African Muslims. All respondents 
among the interviewed converts had been politically sensitized, mobilized, or structured in the 
1970s and were directly or indirectly influenced by the outreach programs of the MYM. The 
movement’s synchronicity with Black Consciousness was made possible by embedding the 
Islamic ideas within a framework of Blackness. “The MYM’s rejection of the West, and its call 
for an Islamic ‘way of life’ reflected the Black Consciousness Movement’s appeal to an authentic 
Black identity in South Africa” (TAYOB 1995: 122). At the same time, the topics of Black pride 
and a self-defined sense of African indigeneity were high on the agenda of the MYM. However, 
unlike Black Consciousness, the MYMs message of an “Islamic way of life” prevented it from 
being drawn into macro-scale political developments in South Africa, as it propagated a post-
national idea of community (ibid.).  
The Movement hosted or interviewed international guests from inside and outside the Muslim 
world from the very beginning, thus presenting their members with a wide variety of 
perspectives on social life, politics, and religion. These guests’ writings were circulated through 
the book networks, and their views were published in the Movement’s newspaper Al-Qalam. 
Among these guests was Abdalqadir as-Sufi, who first visited South Africa in 1983. His 
promotion of the sole adherence to Malikism together with the rejection of modernist scholars 
(AL-MURABIT 1993: 14) challenged the Muslim Youth Movement’s position with an absolute 
and radical political message for Black South Africans (TAYOB 1995: 151). The Murabitun 
themselves presented a new home to Muslims in Black African areas and offered them the 
possibility to organize themselves in smaller groups on a decentralized, grassroots level. 
Nevertheless, color became an issue during the very first encounters with as-Sufi. One follower 
reported the following from his first meeting with the Murabitun leader in 1985: 
“I was just listening, these guys were saying, the Shaykh is coming, the Shaykh is coming! 
Who is the Shaykh? The one who wrote the Letter to an African Muslim. Oh, Ok. Then 
it was 1985 when he finally came. […] The Letter to an African Muslim gave the 
197 
impression to us that the man who wrote this book must be a Black man. And when this 
White man came there. How can this White man write a book like this? It was a little bit 
disappointing. We expected a Black man and there was this White man. Eish.”68 
Nevertheless, as-Sufi’s content had an argumentative proximity to the Black Consciousness 
narrative and applicability to the Black Muslim situation. He discussed with those he met the 
economic and political situation of Black African-classified people and offered his critique of the 
monetary system, while presenting Islam as a revolutionary religion. 
“He was talking about our condition. He was like telling us how to look at ourselves. 
How to look at our condition. Not like we saw ourselves with the ideologies of the PAC 
and the ANC, the Karl Marxism and the things like that. He took away that completely 
and then we understood how relevant Islam was to our situation. We nearly wasted our 
lives and our time with the ANCs and the PACs, when Islam has got all the solutions. 
[…] You know, now, his Whiteness was turning a little bit darker.”69 
His deconstruction of the prominent African organizations of resistance, such as the African 
National Congress or the Pan-African Congress, was followed by instructions on how Black 
Muslims could form their own hierarchical structure, a system of amirs, wazirs, and qadis, and 
thus take things into their own hands. 
“And when we came from there we were like strong. Giants. We were fresh, we were 
solid, we were fit. We were strong. […] We became Murabitun and this was now a real 
group of Black Muslims.”70 
In a classical way, the millennialist contents in the Murabitun teachings unfold as a combination 
of rejection of the old and a program for the creation of a new order. This rejection of the old 
is not only directed towards the oppressive modes of social and spatial ordering but also towards 
those organizational structures that have ordered the acts of resistance thus far. In the same way 
that as-Sufi deconstructs the nation state, he decouples the ideological framework of South 
African Blackness from the political structures of the struggle against oppression by presenting 
those structures as a corrupted undertaking and a waste of time. Those new followers who had 
already been politicized by Black Consciousness could then project their Blackness as politics of 
identity onto the offered Islamic structure, even though the references to the particularities of 
the South African case are minimal in as-Sufis works. 
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Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s writings do refer to colonial Africa in general and South Africa in particular 
on various occasions. His publication Letter to an African Muslim is the most prominent title, but 
it mainly underscores its locally unspecific criticisms of capitalistic globalization with random 
examples of their effects on the situation on the African continent. Nevertheless, as discussed 
above, the Letter became a focal point for politically motivated converts to Islam in the Black 
African areas during apartheid, as it situated the local lived injustices within a postmodern web 
stretching from anti-colonial ideologies to the deconstruction of capitalist and socialist models 
of state and society, encompassing an embeddedness in a global vision of apocalyptic 
conspiracy. The major thematic setting is that of the hidden elite and the way to a post-
capitalistic life: “Democracy gave South Africa two things even worse than the shameful 
Apartheid: it put the gold securely in the hands of the usury elite, safe and secure, and then 
made Johannesburg the murder capital of the world […]”(AS-SUFI 2000: 80). The millennialist 
message allows a projection of the lived-in situation onto an ideological framework that offers 
enough radical answers to the desperate conditions, while leaving enough space for the reader 
to interpret his or her personal scenario into the greater narrative. It thus circumvented not only 
the larger political battles during apartheid but also allowed the African indigenous population 
to disassociate the self from the post-apartheid project and to pursue the fulfillment of the 
millenarian promise of Islamic revivalism. Thus, democratic transformation is rendered a 
broken promise, while the societies of the South are predicted to build a new human on earth 
(AS-SUFI 1978: 20; AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 48). The unfulfilled post-apartheid promise of 
a united society in a post-colonial state based on social justice, spatial redistribution, cultural 
diversity, cohesion, and reconciliation—a millenarian project in itself—is confronted with the 
prophecy of the coming of a caliphate, which will serve as the socio-political as well as spatial 
habitat of a revived global umma, the utopian community of Muslims. While similar approaches 
from Sufi Islam draw on the reemergence of the Mahdi and the subsequent beginning of a new 
era of global Islamic reign, Abdalqadir as-Sufi projects the fulfillment of the revelation onto a 
very modern conception of territorialized social order, for with the last Ottoman empire serves 
as a macro-scale blueprint and the imagined life of the first community of Muslims under 
Muhammad serves as a guideline for the micro-scale of everyday life. In the meantime, Sufi 
practices offer ritualized routines for re-ordering the self and hybridizing Black and Muslim 
realms of identity. 
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Travels and Translations: The Racialization of Fundamentalist 
Islamic Thought 
The case of the Murabitun and their followers from Black African townships and former 
homelands of South Africa is an example of global travels of ideologies of resistance and 
transgression, specifically religious ones, and how they are translated into the local-specific 
realm of anti-hegemonic politics and practices. According to PASTOR DE MARIA Y CAMPOS 
(2015: 146), with the intensified outreach of the Murabitun and the expansion of their da’wah 
activities into regions of the globe formerly under colonial rule, Murabitun followers no longer 
consisted primarily of middle-class converts with a European cultural tradition. Instead, the 
movement became attractive to those who perceive themselves as the indigenous population of 
an area that had been oppressed by dominating colonial regimes from the West, and who 
therefore continued to live under the unjust conditions of a structural governance and 
materialistic culture. These new followers of the Islamic social ideology were the result of a 
continuous focus in Murabitun outreach on sketching out a future Islamic world for those living 
under the unjust conditions brought about by racism, colonialism, and capitalism. The 
ideological promise of a new world Islamic order and the subsequent prophecy of the demise of 
Western democracy and culture are a characteristic feature of those publications by Abdalqadir 
as-Sufi that deal with socio-political issues, which began circulating in South Africa in the late 
1970s. What is offered is an Islamic revivalism with a core Salafi tradition, which positions the 
imagined community of the first Muslim generations as a societal model. Similar to what 
LANDES (2011: 144) points out in his discussion of millenarian cargo cults, the situation of the 
self is projected onto the religious framework, not the other way round. In the South African 
case, the mythologized narrative and future vision of African indigeneity is projected onto the 
belief-structure of Islam, thus hybridizing and indigenizing it, as a means to improve the African 
narrative. At the same time, this indigenous perception of the self unfolds against the 
background of a shared history and continuous experiences of suffering, oppression, and 
injustice in the lived-in places of everyday life. Murabitun thought has thus been translated into 
the realm of the White/Non-White dialectic of the racialized doxic landscapes (CRESSWELL 2003: 
277) of South Africa. The ideology became available to a younger generation of South Africans 
beginning in the 1970s through cassettes and books, along with other political publications of 
conspiratorial quality. In this regard, in light of the critical discussion of Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s 
writing above, anti-Semitism and millennialism seem to run very well with each other. 
Apartheid’s censorship of political literature and the limited access to books and education due 
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to a segregated school system made such books as the Protocols or Jihad. A Groundplan all the more 
attractive to a Black youth that was growing more and more politically active. 
Since their arrival and the beginning of da’wah activities in South Africa, the Murabitun have 
been accused of propagate a racist ideology along the segregationist lines of color and 
population group differentiation, thus preaching a Black African Islam while lashing out against 
Muslims from the established communities, especially those with an Indian South African 
background (cf. TAYOB 1995: 150). However, viewing these contestations as racist instigations 
is a foreshortened interpretation of the persistent effects of socially inscribed and individually 
embodied modes of segregation stemming from colonialism and apartheid, which presents 
social and spatial effects as an intentioned ideology und unilateral position. A critical assessment 
of the writings and teachings of Abdalqadir as-Sufi is certainly justified when it comes to 
othering and ethnicity, especially the works’ overt anti-Semitism—a racism of its own. 
However, what happened as soon as the Murabitun started preaching their ideology in South 
Africa is that that message of Islamic indigeneity as an anti-hegemonic, anti-Western, and anti-
colonial ideology became translated into the doxic realm of South Africa’s social and spatial 
orderings and therefore racialized. Racism thus comes as a socio-political contingency, not as 
an intent. In political terms, Murabitun ideology is aimed specifically at colonially oppressed 
indigenous people, promising a self-determined future beyond the experiences of injustice in 
their daily lives, while drawing on the recreation of indigenous ways of life through Islamic 
practices. On the religious side, as-Sufi brings a rejection of orthodox and established Islamic 
theology together with a connotation of purification of the Muslim self. Both aspects of the 
Murabitun message—an indigenous millennialism, i.e. the re-ordering of the self and belonging, on 
the one hand, and an Islamic revivalism, i.e. the new order of Islamic communities and the re-
emergence of an Islamic caliphate, on the other—are to be established through transgression of 
the White/Non-White dialectic of South Africa’s modes of ordering and therefore automatically 
represent a challenge to and contestation of the historically situated Muslim groups and 
institutions that are mostly found among the Indian and Coloured population groups. 
Abdalqadir as-Sufi’s confrontational position towards established Muslim communities is linked 
to his demand that followers adhere to the school of Malikism alone, which is the scholarly core 
of his Islamic revivalism. However, his rejection of the authenticity and religious legitimacy of 
the Muslim other is inevitably translated into this realm of racialized religious belongings. To call 
the message of the Murabitun an inclusive or universalist one would ignore these critical facets 
of their ideology. Nevertheless, the movement’s racist implications come as a contingency and 
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must be understood as a translation of the South African realities of the cultural politics of 
segregation into an Islamic framework of fundamentalist thought.  
After centuries of colonial domination, division and rule, and social and spatial segregation, the 
South African society is a deeply unsettled one in which trust is not easily earned. Ideologies 
that build on mistrust, as is the case of the conspiratorial narrative of the Murabitun, seem to 
be attractive in this regard. In addition, indigenous African cultural ordering includes its own 
millennialist accounts. A prominent example is the Xhosa cattle slaying of the nineteenth 
century, during which followers of an apocalyptic prophecy “dreamed of a world before the 
white invaders had come and destroyed the great age that was” (LANDES 2011: 95). Another 
example can be traced to the region of the former Zulu homeland. In their historical account 
of domination and subordination in colonial Natal at the turn of the century, (LAMBERT & 
MORRELL 1996: 85f.) describe the millennial discourse and activities aimed against the White 
oppressor prior to the Bambatha rebellion of 1906: 
“Resistance could take on a millennial form, often involving the killing of white animals 
or the destruction of European made (sic!) implements. […] Jantshi gave expression to 
the belief in millennialism when he told Stuart in 1903 that ‘a time will come when 
another wind will blow and a state of affairs different to what is now existing will be 
brought about… When such day comes an end will be put to present modes of 
government.’” (LAMBERT & MORRELL 1996: 85f.) 
Looking at the Bambatha rebellion and its importance for the revolutionary Black Muslim 
narrative of Murabitun followers illustrates how Islamic millennialist ideology can be translated 
into the realm of African experience under colonialism and apartheid. The rebellion in question 
arose as a reaction to a poll tax imposed in 1905, leading to violent clashes in the Natal Colony 
and neighboring Zululand. The uprising of the Zondi chief Bambatha proved to be a futile 
undertaking against an absolutely superior enemy in terms of military means. Still, it became a 
martyr-like narrative for generations to come, an apocalyptic event, amalgamated in two 
uneven battles in which 3,000-4,000 Africans were killed, 7,000 were taken prisoner and 4,700 
floggings were carried out, but ultimately commemorated as a case in which “an African took 
a stand.”71 For many among the indigenous population of South Africa, facing the desperate 
situation and the fatalistic experience of life within an oppressive and exploitative ordering 
regime, experienced not as a distant political discourse but as an everyday reality manifested 
throughout the twentieth century and continuing today, renders the post-apartheid promise a 
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false prophecy. Turning to radical narratives that provide fundamentalist perspectives of us vs. 
them seems to be an attractive answer to the desperate cause of those who suffering under a 
system which absolutely dominates from an almost divine, machine-like distance—as was the 
case in the Bambatha rebellion and other previous forms of millennial resistance. Along the 
lines of the aforementioned public and hidden transcripts of apocalyptic scenarios and millenarian 
thought, life in the townships of the ‘new’, de-racialized, and democratized South Africa is seen 
through the hidden transcripts of the inherent failure of democracy and the conspiratorial 
perception of a masonic and Jewish elite as the ‘true’ enemy, which can only be defeated by 
circumventing the existing social order. In contrast, the coming kingdom is Islamic and 
indigenous, a revivalism of the African self through the Islamic order and the creation of a 
renewed Black and Muslim society. LANDES (2011: 423) classifies such scenarios as tribal or 
nativist millennialism. This section argues for the category of indigenous millennialism as it points 
to the uniting of the end of times and a nascent new order, which will—it is believed—put an 
end to the longing for belonging and bring stability to the African self. 
Township Hijra: The Social and Spatial Ordering of Black 
Muslim Indigeneity 
Under the influence of the alternative promise of indigenous millennialism provided by the 
Murabitun, the re-ordering of African indigeneity as Black and Muslims has been taken a further 
step compared to the efforts made in the 1980s and 1990s. Not only have the idealized cultural 
fragments of a pre-colonial Africanness been re-interpreted and revived through Islam; the very 
principles of Islamic belief have been hybridized into a Black African realm. The processes of 
re-ordering of the African self by translating a historicized, pre-colonial African indigeneity into 
Islamic ideology as explained above (see section “Contact Zones”) have been extended and 
inversed, as Islamic rituals and routines have been transmuted into the African sphere. Through 
extraordinary personal contributions, the Islamic theological material and thought provided by 
the Murabitun is literally being translated into the cultural realm of Zulu Africanness. At first, 
Shaykh Abdulqadir made the wird, the texts for dhikr, available in the form of a transliteration 
of the original Arabic. Soon after, the Murabitun followers of KwaMashu who practice the 
dhikr—the “endless repetition of the name of god as a new form of ritualized religious service” 
(ENDREß 1997: 68f. (own translation))—on a weekly basis in the jamāt khane in Section J asked 
for an English translation of the texts, in order to be able to fully understand the wird. In a third 
step, a member of the group translated these texts into isiZulu with the result that the dhikr is 
now practiced in the native language of the converts. Through this translation, the Arabic word 
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Allah became the isiZulu word mDali, the creator. The group explained that this was the result 
of a long debate concerning which word for God in their own language would best suit their 
understanding of Allah. In isiZulu, God is represented by different words such as Nkhulunkhulu 
(the greatest), Somandla (the all-powerful), Menzi (the one who does), or Mvelinqangi (one god who 
does not create and is not created, or he who shows up and amazes) (Interviews with 
Muhammad, Ishaq, Solomon, Amin, Ally, Dawuud). Regarding Mvelinqangi, interviewed 
converts frequently made reference to Surah Ikhlas 112:1-4 in the Qur’an (he begetteth not, 
nor is he begotten), pointing to the doubtless similarities between these understandings of God. 
This discourse can be linked to a popular publication written by Ahmed Deedat of the IPCI, in 
which he makes this same analogy (DEEDAT 1981). The group of Zulu Murabitun decided to 
use mDali, pointing out that this word represents the merging of Allah and the Zulu 
understanding for the oneness of god. The translation of the wird thus represents an translation 
of Islamic thought into a self-conscious sphere of African Zulu indigeneity. Conversion to Islam 
therefore becomes a continuous transgression of Blackness by constituting a Black Muslimness, 
rendering Islam the authentic religion, not on the grounds of ritualistic similarities between the 
Islam as a way of life and an idealized pre-colonial African indigeneity but through the 
Africanization of Islamic thought, which makes the latter suitable for the re-ordered African self. 
The perceived cultural hegemony experienced in the contestations with actors and institutions 
from the field of Indian Muslims is turned into a self-esteem and even perceived cultural 
superiority of Africanness. 
The continuous transgressions of the modes of orderings are not limited to the realm of social 
and cultural politics and significations; they are acted out in very spatial ways as well. Towards 
the very end of the field research for this study in 2015, the group of Murabitun Muslim converts 
presented their plan to collectively leave the lived-in areas of the townships in order to create a 
new home for a community of African Muslims outside of the urban zone of eThekwini 
(Durban).  
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Picture 5: Construction plans for a new Islamic center outside of Durban. Picture: M. Gebauer. 
The plan calls for the construction of the new center, named the KwaNjobokazi Islamic Project, 
in the Umbumbulu district to the west of eThekwini (Durban), near the village of 
KwaNjobokazi. Situated in a rural area of the former KwaZulu homeland, the converts intend 
to build religious facilities such as a mosque and a madrassah, along with sleeping quarters for 
children, a skills center, and even sports facilities like a karate school. The land has already been 
purchased from the local chief Mkhize, and the first steps of construction began in 2015. The 
different functions of the new Islamic center resemble the activities that were already taking 
place at the KwaMashu mosque before the dispute. The plans are not only a continuation of 
ongoing work, however. They also reflect a refinement of the process of re-ordering the African 
self as Black and Muslim. The lesson learned from the conflict around the KwaMashu mosque 
is that the space of the township, with its spatially inscribed racialization and oppressive 
orderings of indigeneity, prevents the independent and authentic development of a community 
of Black Muslims.72 The shared idea of being Black and Muslim resulting from the travels and 
transmutations of Muslimness into the realm of Blackness is being thought anew in light of the 
Murabitun call to move out of the oppressive lived-in places and to create a territory for 
themselves: 
 
72Interview with Ismail (2015). 
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“If we call to Islam we must do so openly – and to do that is to call people to a persecuted 
minority in the world at present nowhere in command, and yet the best of people, 
forbidding evil and calling to good. We are at war. And our battle has only just begun. 
Our first victory will be one tract of land somewhere in the world that is under the 
complete rule of the shari‘at of Islam. Its rule must be simple and from source.” (AS-SUFI 
1978: 38) 
This pursuit—the construction of a new place of living for the community with the intent to 
move all participating Muslim families from the townships into new homes surrounding the 
center, in order to lead a subsistent life away from the city—is strongly inspired by the idea and 
ideal of the Salaf, the first community of Muslims. Understood as a path to a “faithful and 
promised land,” it is described as a “Hijra.”73 Because of the forced removals and relocations 
during apartheid, life as Black and Muslim in the former Black African townships can be 
interpreted as living in a diasporic state, detached from the promised land of their forefathers, 
even if they still physically live on or in proximity to it. Even after the end of apartheid rule, 
these lived-in places remain in a state of dis-order, because they were created by White South 
Africa to spatially order African indigeneity and to keep the indigenous population profoundly 
in place. The continuing effects of what PORTEOUS & SMITH (2001) describe as the annihilation 
of place render the post-apartheid paradigm a broken promise, especially in relation to life in the 
post-apartheid city. Thus, the only alternative appears to be out-migration, or Hijra, from those 
spaces, those permanent orderly dystopia, that make the re-ordering of African indigeneity 
otherwise impossible. 
The religious modes of orderings in South Africa continue to be a space of contestation. This 
becomes obvious in the similarities between the teachings of Abdulqadir as-Sufi and those of 
Ahmed Deedat. Both work with the narrative of the anti-indigenous positions to be found within 
Christianity and its respective missionary activities. In contrast, Islam is propagated as a return, 
a reversion to the origins of the self and to indigenous cultural belonging and heritage. The 
socio-political, religious, and spatial ideology offered by the Murabitun to the converts to Islam 
among those once classified as Black African has become a fruitful continuation of the core 
message initially put forward by the Muslim Youth Movement, i.e. to avoid engaging with earthly 
politics and to look for solutions in Islam instead. The millennialist promise of the Murabitun 
offers a new window of opportunity for re-ordering the African self by linking the transgression 
of orderings more closely with an ideal of purified indigeneity. Furthermore, Murabitun 
 
73Interview with Mariam and Ahmad (2015). 
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ideology entails a strong spatial dimension, which in turn translates the search for belonging 
through conversion to Islam into the indigenous millennialist vision of realizing utopian 
communities outside of post-apartheid space. In an intriguing way, the attempt to create a new 
ideal Islamic center for the ideal African Muslim community bears similarities with the case of 
the Mariannhill Mission’s ideal African villages scheme discussed above (see section “Divine 
Modernization: Settler Colonialism and the Ordering of African Indigeneity”). Throughout 
colonialism, apartheid, and even into the post-apartheid era, the doxic landscape of South Africa 
seems to offer an arena for experimentation to those who feel mandated to order indigeneity on 
religious grounds. The Muslim converts’ move to build their own ideal Islamic center must be 
seen as an attempt to gain a voice and a mandate within this doxic landscape and an endeavor to 
actively participate in the orderings of their lived-in places by means of a religiously motivated 
out-migration, or Hijra, from the spatially inscribed, bodily ascribed, and therefore persistent 
modes of orderings. The fact that suitable land could only be acquired within the former 
homeland territory of KwaZulu again signifies the seemingly inescapable segmentation of South 
Africa. Apart from that, however, what is taking place is a shift away from a Muslim Blackness 
understood as the transmutation of a pre-colonial idea of African indigeneity into the realm of 
Islamic thought. As discussed in the chapter “Attempting Muslim Blackness”, such attempts 
have always taken place on disputed grounds and have not fulfilled the hopes for transgression 
but rather reified the colonial and apartheid modes of orderings. Under the influence of the 
Murabitun ideology of indigenous millennialism, these transgressions began to shift in another 
direction, with the un-orthodox Islamic thought of Abdulqadir as-Sufi providing a new 
framework for being Black and Muslim. The aim is no longer to try to find the African self within 
the orderings of Islam as religion and way of life. Instead, the cultural-political bricolage 
resulting from the process of translating the African self into an Islamic framework has turned 
into a cultural-religious transmutation of Muslimness into the realm of a purified, fundamental, 
and highly racialized understanding of Black Muslim indigeneity. The vision for an indigenous 
millennialism based on religiously revisionist Sufi-Islamic ideology re-defines the original aim 
of conversion as resisting the social and spatial modes of ordering, shifting towards Black 
Muslimness and the fulfilling of a prophecy of a new and re-ordered Islamic age to come that will 
not only defy the persistent modes of colonial hegemony—in South Africa and beyond—but 
also dominate the field of Islam in theological as well as institutional terms. 
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Black Muslim Indigeneity: 
Transgressing Social and Spatial 
Modes of Ordering 
Throughout the history of colonization in South Africa and especially in the time of apartheid, 
the practice of Islam was strongly interwoven with a changing but consistent struggle for identity 
and space. Being Muslim became racialized and was racially inscribed into the doxic landscape of 
South Africa through the oppressive White regime’s delineation of the group areas and 
definition of their respective population groups, including those groups’ religious affiliation. 
However, Islam became more than just an orderly element in the modernist conception of 
segregationist domination. As a field of forces and field of struggles stretching beyond the 
national sphere of South African politics and linking Muslims to a global network of institutions, 
ideas, and ideologies, Islam offered a state of exception—a theological, intersubjective, and 
spatial heterotopia—and a means of interrupting the lived-in modes of racialized restrictions and 
enforced identities. At the same time, the particular path dependencies along the colonial roots 
and modes of existence during apartheid’s segregation led to the isolation of Islamic 
communities, actors, and institutions within the South Africa as a whole, producing a specific 
orthodoxy of Islamic fields.  
When looking at conversion to Islam among the indigenous African population, the indirect 
racialization of believers through the Islamic fields must be seen in addition to the direct social 
and spatial modes of orderings that were aimed at the Non-White population, determining their 
everyday life under colonialism and apartheid. BARNETT (2006: 153) is correct when pointing 
out that 
“[i]f colonialism and imperialism involve the denial, denigration, and negation of the 
cultural traditions of subjugated groups, then political opposition to these processes can 
be characterized in part as a set of struggles for the right of communities to represent 
themselves.” 
Conversion as resistance to the orderly African other is one such struggle for the power of 
representation; however, social fields tend to overlap and therefore create contestations at the 
contact zones. Thus, as Africans pursued indigeneity by becoming Muslims and began their 
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own institutions to represent their identities as Black and Muslim, they came into conflict with 
the established field of Islam in South Africa, which itself created its orthodoxy within the given 
framework of racialization and restrictions. The cases featured in this study reveal that the 
transgression of social and spatial modes of orderings through conversion to Islam in a post-
colonial society, such as South Africa, is aimed at two orders: One is the direct experience of 
dominating Whiteness and the other is indirect oppression inscribed into the racialized field of 
Islamic actors.  
The featured cases with a focus on KwaZulu-Natal positioned the processes of conversion as 
transgression in a local setting comprised of a social, spatial, and political sphere of African 
indigeneity strengthen and defined by Zulu ethnicity, as well as a field of Islam with its own 
specific internal logic, power struggles, and a strong sense of cultural belonging. The attempts 
to strengthen and empower the ideology of Blackness by thinking and living it through the 
orderings of Islam (Muslim Blackness) took place on disputed grounds and in some cases failed to 
unfold a liberating effect, instead reproducing the existing modes of order. The continuing 
transgressions and especially the transmutations of Islamic modes of orders into the African 
sphere gained renewed momentum, and a particularly spatial expression, through contact with 
the Murabitun movement. Here, an unorthodox idea of being Muslim began to evolve, which 
became legitimized through the struggle for Blackness and the African self (Black Muslimness). The 
envisioned township Hijra, whether it happens or not, expresses the longing for belonging which 
a millennialist promise of indigenous quality claims it will fulfill, thereby not only undoing the 
injustices of the past but also overcoming the promise of a de-racialized, democratized post-
apartheid South Africa. The path of conversion thus leads into a socio-political as well as 
religious framework of Black Muslim indigeneity as a true post-colonial setting for re-ordering 
society and space. 
Furthermore, researching conversion to Islam among the indigenous African part of society 
highlights the diverse expressions and entanglements of Muslim identity constructions as 
practices, politics, and discourses of the persistent orderly indigeneity of the African other. The 
realm of African indigeneity in South Africa is a conflict-laden arena, be it under the auspices 
of bodily and spatial inscriptions of colonialism and apartheid or the contestations resulting 
from the creation of a self-defined, empowered African identity. In South Africa, African 
indigeneity entails conflict: It is a strategy and a symbol at the same time—ascriptive, affirming, 
political, and spatial. For indigenous South Africans, becoming Muslim stands in some cases for 
the continuation of this conflict, for a fortification of the self in the everyday life of post-colonial 
South Africa aimed at strengthening one’s position within the struggle against persistent modes 
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of social and spatial ordering. In other cases, becoming Muslim stands for abandoning the 
conflict through such a radical transformation of the self as that the logics of the continuous 
conflict no longer have any effect. In such cases, a new societal order is generated and 
maintained, a foundation for future generations and an authentic move towards a liberated 
(South) Africa. That is the cause of the converts to Islam. Some of them pursue it by continuing 
their transgressions of the doxic landscape through being Black and Muslim, while others aim at a 
final exodus from the dystopic ream of post-apartheid South Africa.  
One way or the other, such developments are attempts to create their own set of mythologized 
belongings, combining a pre-colonial ideal of indigeneity and a connection to a global realm of 
shared sufferings as Black and Muslim individuals. It is appropriate to speak of a mythologized 
context in this regard, as the analysis of the dynamics reveals intentional narratives and therefore 
the sharing of intent through the re-ordered rituals (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 255) of Black 
Muslim indigeneity. Such rituals are re-interpretations of pre-colonial Africanness as well as 
transmutations of Islamic theological and socio-political elements into an anticipated, authentic, 
and purified African indigeneity. The mythical world of Africanness becomes orderly in its 
reinterpretation and hybridization through the meta-narrative of Islam. Understanding the 
ancestors’ ways, looks, rites, and politics as Islamic uplifts the historical background in contrast 
to the religious humiliation of colonialism, which entailed the branding of Black African history 
as heathen, inferior, and barbaric. Repeated Islamic rituals and symbols, like prayers, dhikr, 
clothes, etc., are thus not only to be understood as religious rituals but as rituals assigning 
meaning and value to the African self and community (cf. JACKSON 1989b: 48). The converts 
thus construct a bridge between the ideal of the African self prior to the beginning of White 
domination on the one end and the vision for a new Black and Muslim era to come on the other. 
By projecting an ideal past of an identity lost to colonialism and Christian missionary work onto 
an African Islamic future, the time-frames of colonialism, apartheid, and post-apartheid are 
abridged or even neglected, which can be interpreted as a negation of the history of racist 
oppression, dispossession, and exploitation, and with it the persistent social and spatial modes 
of orderings. Challenging Blackness in post-apartheid South Africa is not only a matter of 
challenging external mechanisms, institutions, hegemonic ordering logics, etc. It is also a matter 
of challenging the tacit, embodied structures themselves. Conversion can therefore present a 
critical moment of internal as well as external re-ordering, of the self and the environment, 
which redefines belonging in social and spatial terms In conceptual terms, Islam is a heterotopia, 
offering a window of opportunity to continuously think and practice an-other order. However, 
with the racist modes of orderings affecting the field of Islam in South Africa and the experience 
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and expression of Muslimness in the former Black African areas, the link to a future era to come 
seems to be most essential for continuing transgression. Only a millennialist promise of 
indigeneity seems to uphold the belief that a break with the social and spatial modes of orderings 
in the lived in places can be achieved. 
Black Muslim indigeneity is thus not only a transgression of orders, it is the attempted negation 
of their existence and power. Re-ordering the self as Black and Muslim means opting into a new 
meta-narrative that offers a social, cultural, and spatial solution to segregation and denigration, 
while at the same time rejecting the process of Christianization as part of the fractured societal 
order imposed by colonialism, racism, and apartheid, which has kept the indigenous population 
profoundly in place by legitimizing oppression, devaluing indigenous heritage and African ways 
of life, as well as de-constructing the indigenous social setting (cf. DODSON 2000: 145; 
MALULEKE 2008: 119ff.). Black Muslim indigeneity unfolds as an-other order, a constant 
heterotopia, and the transgressive attempt at—and attempted transgression into—a future order, 
both social and spatial. 
As a collection of modes of re-ordering the African self in social and spatial terms, the Black 
Muslim indigeneity discussed in this study finds various expressions. It can stand for the cause 
of continuing the unfinished struggle against the White oppressor and the remaining oppressive 
structures, aiming at the very roots of dispossession and oppression. Being Black and Muslim 
then unfolds a counter-colonial momentum, as Islam is associated with aspects of anti-
colonialism and counter-hegemonic positions set against the former oppressor and the persistent 
oppressive structures. It is a sphere of radical difference, empowerment, and the creation of self-
esteem, projected by the converts as essentially and truly African. Furthermore, Black Muslim 
indigeneity can stand for the vision and anticipation of a future social and spatial Black Muslim 
utopia, and most of all the attempt to realize that future by leaving the oppressive society and 
habitat behind and creating a new one in its stead. Black Muslim indigeneity thus becomes a 
mode of achieved indigeneity, i.e. a self-determined re-grounding after being forcefully uprooted. 
For SHELLER (2003: 276), the aspect of achievement “refers to a process of being uprooted from 
one place and re-grounded in another such that one’s place of arrival becomes a kind of 
reinvented home. It implies the displacement (yet not total loss) of a previous home/culture and 
the claiming of a new place of belonging.” With the utopic vision of an African Muslim future 
being linked to the re-ordering of the African self as a pre-colonial ideal of indigeneity, conversion 
to Islam can also be understood as a reversion to Africanness in the sense of an indigeneity achieved 
by intentionally removing oneself from an ordered social and spatial structure while 
simultaneously seeking to be re-grounded in a new place of belonging that resembles that of the 
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forefathers. Third, Black Muslim indigeneity can stand for an inter-generational revision of the 
very maps of cultural orderings with a decisive shift from the converted parents to their children. 
With few exceptions, this aspect has not been given prominence in the featured cases. Still, as 
almost all converts who participated in the research have children of different ages, from small 
toddlers to teenagers, this aspect was a constant topic of discussion. For the parents, being Black 
and Muslim represents a way of creating solutions for Africanness in the here and now of the 
everyday life in the lived-in places. It is also still a constant struggle against the bodily ascribed 
and inscribed modes of orderings. This contestation within the habitus of the converts can be 
described as the most difficult of all transgressions. For that reason, the converts hope that their 
children will not be locked in such an internal dispute, because they are growing up as African 
Muslims. Nevertheless, the stigmatization and discrimination of African Muslims—as discussed 
regarding the experiences of Saliim Mthimkhulu’s children at their Islamic college—can be seen 
as a precursor to continuing questions and contestations to come. In this light, the vision for a 
future ideal community with their own territory becomes even more important to those parents 
belonging to the Murabitun. Finally, Black Muslim indigeneity can represent the mode of a 
counter-culture (cf. GILROY 1993, 1991). Resisting and transgressing the social and spatial 
modes of orderings, especially the bodily inscribed ones, needs a mode of expression, a window 
of opportunity in the doxic landscape of cultural orders. Islam is such a mode: Brought about—in 
the case of Durban—by Indian migrants who moved through the colonial networks of the 
British Empire, it became a sphere of practice, materiality, and symbolism that was foreign 
enough to the colonizers’ religion and therefore the religion of the colonized. There was an anti-
colonial capacity to it, an chance to break with the subjectified dystopic order of the colonized 
and uprooted African self, enabling modes of resistance (cf. COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 31) 
which are, in contrast to the Black Consciousness Movement, free from the culture of the 
oppressor, i.e. free from Christianity. Transmuted and transformed into an ideal of ancestral 
belonging, Black Muslim indigeneity is the mode of a counter-culture, making the expression 
of a heterotopic order within the lived-in places possible and linking the self to a global ideal of 
being Black and Muslim. 
By looking at the Muslim converts in the former Black African areas, this study has discussed a 
unique set of social and spatial dynamics arising from the manifestation of the sphere of 
becoming and being Black and Muslim beyond the local, regional, and national particularities, 
which connects practices in the lived-in places with globally traveling ideologies. The struggle 
to belong as indigenous Africans in the persistently unequal social and spatial conditions of post-
colonial South Africa is translated into a contemporary and globalized realm of Muslim 
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indigeneity. Thus, conversion is not only a transgression resisting the particular modes of 
ordering, but also a window of opportunity to decouple the ascription and inscription of the 
African self from the orderly indigeneity of the African other as defined by centuries of White 
domination. As discussed above, resistance as transgression, as stepping into the sphere of 
heterodoxic topoi, is either inward looking, pointing the transformation towards the maps of power, 
or it is outward oriented, towards something new, often based on intangible, invisible, and 
unconscious desires and beliefs (see section “Agency of Change: From Resistance to 
Transgression”). Subsequently, for some of the converts, the aim is to transform the conditions 
at hand through a Black and Muslim way of life, while others strive for an out-migration from 
the social and spatial modes of orderings which in their view are reflected and reified again and 
again in everyday encounters, even within the field of Muslims in South Africa, as can be seen 
in the case of the Murabitun. The movement of converts from the urbanized townships to 
resettle in the countryside in order to establish an ideal community of Muslims is an intriguing 
expression of the spatiality of the White/Non-White dialectic defined by an opposition of 
racialized habitats, i.e. the formerly White urban nodes and corridors vs. the Black African 
hinterland. By locating Black Muslim indigeneity in a territory that—within the doxic landscape 
of South Africa—is ascribed with African indigenous sovereignty, those converts belonging to 
the Murabitun group hope to free themselves from the persistent orderings. The Murabitun 
ideology of the ‘Ribat’ model links this move to an idealized Islamic historicism of the Almoravid 
Berber dynasty in the Maghrib of the eleventh and twelfth century and their creative re-
interpretation as a network of counter-hegemonic actors on the periphery, on the one hand. On 
the other hand, the anticipated township Hijra links the planned ideal African Islamic center to a 
global network of singular groups of indigenous Muslims in post-colonial settings, making the 
‘Ribat’ model a blueprint for a new order to come and therefore rendering the local-specific 
spatial re-orderings the vision of a holy land, not only outside of the persistently oppressive 
urban space but also outside of an idea of an un-Islamic and un-indigenous territory. Only the 
sacred space can become an orderly space for a utopic vision of African indigeneity (cf. TUAN 
1978). 
Relating this to the doxic landscapes of South Africa, it can be argued that the apartheid project 
aimed at acquiring something like a sacred status as a modern concept of ordering society on 
all levels of existence, creating a sacred space of order and justice for the White minority by 
combining settler ideology with the religious territoriality of a promised land and a God-given 
duty to bring order to it—in spatial terms, as well as by ordering the supposedly heathen 
indigenous population. Subsequently, since the official end of White domination, the 
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transformative paradigm of post-apartheid South Africa stands as a promise of re-ordering and 
the undoing of social and spatial injustices. However, everyday life in the former segregated 
Black African areas remains in a relatively desperate state. The post-apartheid promise is 
perceived by the converts to Islam almost as cynically as the narrative of the townships being 
the well-ordered places for a modern African life. In the 1980s and 1990s, the converts to Islam 
of Section J in KwaMashu, together with other Muslims from the greater area of Durban, found 
a new spiritual and political belonging in their Islamic activities, which they lost again in the 
dispute concerning the management and Islamic orientation of their mosque. In the Murabitun 
order, the break-away group found a new spiritual home—and patriarch—whose millennialist 
though promised them a new place of belonging for the African self, the ordering of indigeneity 
beyond the persisting modes of social and spatial orderings, and the creation of their own sacred 
space. For the heterogenous field of Muslims in South Africa, these developments have had a 
decisive influence. RAFUDEEN (2002) is likely correct in his assessment that, in terms of identity 
formations, Muslims in South Africa seem to be in a state of limbo, caught between their 
persistently restricted and oppressively ordered groundings established under colonialism and 
apartheid, one the one hand, and their search for a position, a “niche” as RAFUDEEN (2002: e) 
terms it, in the greater scheme of the new post-apartheid South Africa, on the other. Looking 
at the evolving contestations and disputes between the established Islamic organizations and 
actors and the growing number of converts among the indigenous African population, the 
author’s call for creating a true (South) African Muslim identity that is “rooted in the indigenous 
traditions of the South African and broader African people” (ibid.) by teaching indigenous 
culture and indigenous languages in Islamic schools appears to be a lost cause. 
In order to fully grasp the conceptual dimension of Black Muslim indigeneity, it seems 
appropriate to borrow from the discussion of the situation of Afro-American Muslims in the 
United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, being Black and Muslim represents the dilemma of 
a dual diaspora. With regard to the Afro-American context, DANNIN (2002: 264) points to the 
“double consciousness between religious and ethnic identity. Did he [Malcolm X] 
perceive himself as a Muslim representing a religiously diverse African-American 
constituency? Or an African American who invested his personal identity in the Muslim 
umma? These questions concern the dilemma of those who straddle the crossroads of 
two diasporas, one African, the other Muslim.” 
Muslims among the indigenous African population face similar contestations of belonging. On 
the one hand, they are in a diasporic state within the national sphere of South Africa. The long 
history of oppression, dispossession, territorial restriction, segregation, and forceful removals 
renders the majority of inhabitants foreigners to the physical habitat and doxic landscape in which 
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they live in. The aspect of domicide, discussed above as the ultimate and irreversible loss or better 
the annihilation of place, casts them in a diasporic state, being scattered on a meso- to macro-
scale due to township and homeland politics, while also being unable to return to their places 
of origin which were re-developed soon after their removal. Thus, it is appropriate to view this 
situation through the lens of diasporic consciousness as proposed by GILROY (1994: 207), “in which 
identity is focused less on common territory and more on memory, or, more accurately, on the 
social dynamics of remembrance and commemoration.” What has been described in the case 
of the communities evicted from the religious territory of the Mariannhill Mission as short-
distance-diaspora (see section “Apartheid and the Dis-Ordering of Religious Territoriality”) is 
not only a longing for belonging in terms of place-making but also a longing for remembrance. 
Existing as Black in South Africa means embodying the memories of losing home, making Black 
politics a continuous commemoration of the shared experience of domicide. Becoming Muslim 
in the South African context casts the politics of belonging into a second diasporic state, a result 
of the uprootings, re-groundings, and translations in the history of Islam in South Africa. For 
the converts among the indigenous population, embracing Islam and the articulation of being 
Black and Muslim has aimed at a history of resistance and represented a move towards an 
authentic and liberated African self. However, against the background of contestations in the contact 
zones of local Islamic fields, social and socio-spatial conflicts have evolved from the emergence 
of this new realm of identity in processes that persist up until today, as the KwaMashu cemetery 
case exemplifies. This is expressed in two ways: On the one hand, becoming Muslim has been 
one way to fulfill the longing for self-defined and intentional differentiation from the 
characterizations ascribed by South African society, though this has led to alienation from the 
converts’ communities of origin. Although becoming Muslim implies the re-ordering of being 
African, experiences of religious racialization, for example being called “Black Indians” (VAHED 
& JEPPIE 2005: 265), have also come to the fore. On the other hand, new conflict situations with 
Muslims from the orthodox Islamic institutions have arisen, making the expression and practice 
of Muslim faith independent from established Islamic field hardly possible. Moreover, the 
acquisition of land for religious places has always implied the involvement of those institutions 
perceived as supreme and thus oppressive to Black Muslims. This has led African converts to 
the continue segregative modes of orderings themselves. Again, the history of the racialized 
distribution of resources and the related colonial structures become visible, as they are reflected 
in the structural opportunities and limitations for expressing faith and acting through religious 
communities. Being Black and Muslim not only represents a dual diaspora but the everyday reality 
of double racisms (RANA 2007) related to the conflation of race and religion in the doxic landscape 
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of South Africa. In order to overcome this situation, Black Muslim indigeneity connects to 
global streams of Muslim Blackness and Black Muslimness—to the Afro-American context, as 
the influence of the Nation of Islam shows, as well as to a global movement of converted 
indigenous populations from post-colonial contexts, as in the case of the Murabitun. In addition 
to the diasporic state of Blackness, being Muslim implies a diasporic consciousness as well, 
linking the converts to a shared idea of suffering as Black and Muslim and a diasporic 
brotherhood of converted indigenous people.  
In the context of this study, diaspora is understood as a heuristic device to contextualize the 
struggle for belonging and the complex contestations of re-ordering the self and community in 
terms of South Africa’s social and spatial modes of ordering. This perspective derives from 
FORTIER (2005) specific focus on aspects of multi-locality and multiple, often contradictory 
attachments. However, her reference to GILROY (2000: 124) regarding the necessity of a 
“historical and experiential rift between the locations of residence and the locations of 
belonging” is decisively modified here, as the location of belonging is a utopic future-to-come 
and simultaneously a projection of a pre-colonial African indigeneity lost to colonization and 
missionary work, which is to be revived in a millenarian age of re-ordered, Islamic indigeneity. 
In order to grasp the heuristic quality of diasporic consciousness for the conceptual 
understanding of Black Muslim indigeneity deriving from the featured cases, the idea of home 
has to be approached as the necessary counterpart to diaspora. BRAH (1996: 192) points out 
that the “question of home […] is intrinsically linked with the way in which processes of 
inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced under given circumstances. It is 
centrally about our political and personal struggles over the social regulation of ‘belonging’.” 
Referring to this, WALTER (2001: 194) notes that in this understanding home is an implicit 
element, a necessity binary opposite of the diaspora. In the same way, the dynamics of 
movement, transgression, religious-political transmutations, and cultural-political bricolage 
found among the converts to Islam implicitly represent a struggle to belong and a longing for 
home. The anticipated ideal African Muslim community is the most explicit expression of such 
new maps of cultural orderings as place-making processes. However, this future vision for a re-
territorialized Black Muslim indigeneity is not to be understood as a binary alternative to the 
persistent modes of social and spatial orderings. Instead, attempting to realize a utopic order 
socially and spatially is more a question of home understood as a journey (TUAN 1971: 188f.). 
For the converts to Islam among the indigenous African population, their venture is a mode of 
home-coming and home-making, of achieving belonging through an achieved indigeneity as Black 
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and Muslim. The township Hijra attempted by some is an alter-territorialization of a home-to-
come, away from the dystopic, un-homey lived-in places of post-apartheid South Africa. 
As pointed out in the introduction to the conceptual framework for order, resistance, and 
transgression, order is an enigmatic idea. So is home. Both seem to stand for uniformity but 
entail contestation and constant longing. In the same way that conversion to Islam offered a 
sense of order and re-ordering the African self, breaking with the orderly indigeneity of White 
South Africa, becoming Black and Muslim, involves longing for home and an ongoing journey, 
which deserves further inquiry. This study made a crucial step forward in conceptual terms by 
understanding the conversion to Islam among those once classified as Black African as a series 
of acts transgressing the social and spatial modes of orderings. The persistence of the orderly 
indigeneity of the African other as defined by colonialism and apartheid is a result of their social, 
spatial, and bodily ascriptions and inscriptions. In this context, conversion became a project of 
re-indigenization as well as a re-ordering of everyday life in an anti-colonial manner. The 
existing academic accounts on conversion to Islam in South Africa discussed in this study seem 
to miss the self-determined, self-defined quality of Black Muslim indigeneity and are rather 
reluctant to analyze and contextualize these dynamics against the background of persisting 
colonial, racialized, and spatial modes of ordering. Still today, these aspects seem to render the 
project of re-ordering the African self an impossible undertaking, leaving the indigenous South 
African people in a constant dispute for home and with a constant longing for belonging in an 
unsettled society. For this reason, acts of resistance must be acts of transgression; it is the only 
way to move beyond the existing framework which otherwise pre-defines the acts of resistance. 
The dynamics of the cases presented here, moving from resistance to orderly indigeneity to an 
indigenous millenarian perspective, show that the actions of conversion to Islam and opting into 
being Black and Muslim are not limited to the South African realm of social and spatial orderings 
and power relations but aim instead at moving beyond it. The converts’ continuous 
transgressions are driven by a longing for home, a journey of out-migration from the maps of 
cultural orderings, and most recently, the unfulfilled promise of post-apartheid South Africa. 
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